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Abstract 
Nigeria is a mono-economy nation depending on the petroleum sector for her foreign 
exchange earnings. Its oil industry faces a major challenge of vandalism of oil pipelines, 
where recorded incidents have varied between 3 and 10 every day during the last 15 years. 
The aims of this research were to examine the problem of petroleum products pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria and make recommendations for improving the national response to the 
problem, with the specific objectives of examining the nature and extent of the problem, 
identifying the strategies and tactics being employed to address the problem, and examining 
the strengths and limitations of the current measures. The extant literature indicates that 
vandalism of oil pipelines is a global phenomenon, against which most oil and gas producing 
countries deploy equipment and technologies in conjunction with security forces to protect 
their oil and gas facilities. The methodology adopted for this study was qualitative in nature, 
comprising semi-structured interviews with ten NSCDC anti-vandalism personnel from 
Niger Delta states’ commands and headquarters; twelve other critical stakeholders 
encompassing the security joint-task force (JTF) personnel, multi-national oil companies’ 
senior managers, leaders of oil-producing host communities, NGO managers, senior 
personnel in private security companies (PSCs) and other physical security experts.  
 
The participant accounts suggest that vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria is multifaceted, 
requiring a combination of methodologies and tactics to combat it. They included details of 
a massive deployment of security forces to the Niger Delta region to combat oil pipelines 
vandalism, reporting positive results from NSCDC personnel deployment to Niger Delta 
region in the form of arrests of the perpetrators and foreign collaborators, and seizures of 
their vessels. At the same time, however, it was reported that the militarization of the oil 
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producing communities increases tension, escalates violence and leads to human rights 
abuses. The research recommendations include evolving alternatives away from the current 
measures which emphasise security forces deployment to combat vandalism of oil pipelines; 
investment in the deployment of physical security in combination with the security forces 
in a more integrated manner, provision of social amenities in the oil producing communities, 
seeking international collaboration, provision of job opportunities for the youths of the 
Niger Delta region,  identification and apprehending of the sponsors of oil pipelines vandals, 
and also learning best practices from other oil and gas producing countries. 
 
374 words 
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Chapter one: Introduction 
Background 
The exploration of petroleum resources in Nigeria can be traced back to 1908, the year that 
surveyors from Germany working for Nigerian Bitumen Corporation were prospecting for tar 
sand deposits in south-western Nigeria (Ite, Ibok, Ite, & Petters 2013). However the outbreak 
of First World War in 1914 brought these pioneering efforts to an abrupt end. In 1938, the 
exploration of petroleum resources began with Shell D’ Arcy (a consortium of the Iranian Oil 
Company which was later called British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell). Shell D’Arcy was 
granted a sole concessionary right over the whole of Nigeria. The Second World War (1939-
1945) however terminated the initial exploration activities by Shell D’Arcy.  
 
In 1946, immediately after the Second World War, Shell D’Arcy resumed oil exploration in 
the Nigeria Niger Delta and a number of oil exploratory wells were drilled in 1951. Shell 
D’Arcy was given complete monopoly of oil exploration between 1938 and 1955. In 1955 
however the monopoly was broken by Mobil Producing (Nigeria) Ltd, a subsidiary of 
American Socony-Mobil Oil Company which was granted license for oil exploration under the 
name Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated and later incorporated as Mobil producing 
Nigeria on June 16 1969 (Ite, ,Ibok,  Ite,  & Petters, 2013) .  
 
In 1956, Shell British petroleum discovered crude oil in a village called Oloibiri in the present 
day Bayelsa state of Nigeria (Kadafa, 2012), and this discovery which was in commercial 
quantity marked the birth of the petroleum industry in Nigeria (Okoli & Orinya, 2013). Onuoha 
(2008, p.98) posits that the petroleum industry was born “when oil was discovered in 
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commercial quantity in Oloibiri in 1956, in present- day Bayelsa State”. The oil company 
started with a production rate of 5100 barrels per day and a peak production of 2.44 million 
barrels per day over the next few years (Kadafa 2012).  In 2006, Nigeria has eleven (11) oil 
companies, one hundred and fifty-nine (159) oil fields and one thousand four hundred and 
eighty-one (1,481) wells all operating in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria (Anifowoshe, 
Lawler, Host and Chapman 2012). Onuoha, (2008, p.98) describes   Nigeria as a country with 
a land mass of 923768 square kilometres (356,669) square miles, a large economy which 
depends heavily on petroleum. 
The oil sector in Nigeria over the years has been developed into a massive domestic industrial 
infrastructure, which consist of more than 300 oil fields, 5284 wells, 7000km of pipelines, ten 
export terminals, 22 petroleum storage depots, 275 flow stations, ten gas plants, four refineries, 
and massive liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects (Smith, 2006).Oil companies in Nigeria are 
the major producers of crude oil in the country and also market the gas products.  Jike (2010, 
p.131) argues that “The production of crude oil and the marketing of gas products remain the 
overriding function of oil companies in Nigeria. This objective has been sustained by the global 
attraction for Nigeria’s crude”. Pinto (1987, pp. 419-420) describes Nigeria as a member of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries which exports “coveted (bonny light) and 
medium grade crude oil”. He posits that the oil price shocks of 1973 – 1974 and 1979 led to a 
stupendous transfer of wealth to Nigeria, noting that the domination of oil in the economy of 
Nigeria is demonstrated by sharp rise in the share of oil in gross domestic product (GDP) and 
oil exports after 1970 – 73, which rendered the Nigerian terms of trade virtually synonymous 
with the price of oil deflated by the import price index. 
The petroleum sector is critical to the Nigerian economy. This is because the sector is the 
primary source of revenue to the country.  Table1.1 shows the percentage of oil revenue in 
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Nigeria from 1960 to 2018 adapted from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) annual statistical 
bulletins. In 1975, oil revenue contributed to 77.5% of the total revenue in Nigeria. In 1980 the 
percentage increased to 81.1 % and further increased to 83.5 % in 2000.  The percentage 
increase rose to 85.8% in 2005.The table indicates that there was a drastic decline of oil revenue 
in 2015 (from 73.9 % in 2010 to 55.4 percent in 2015). The reason for the decline is attributed 
to the drop in prices of oil in the international market. According to the Nigeria Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Report (2015), Nigeria suffered 54.6% decline in 
oil revenues due to drastic reduction in the unit price of crude oil in the global market. The 
report indicates that the yearly average price of crude oil per barrel tumbled from 101.91 USD 
in 2014 to 52.16 USD in 2015. The declines in the oil price in the global market continued to 
impact the oil revenue negatively resulting in 58.1% contribution to the total revenue in 2018. 
Table 1.1 Percentage of oil revenue in Nigeria from 1960 to 2018 (Millions of Naira MN) 
Year Total revenue Oil revenue Non-oil 
revenue 
% Of 
Oil 
Revenue 
1960 223.65 0 223.65 0.0 
1965 654.34 0 654.34 0.0 
1970 634 166 467.4 26.2 
1975 5,514.70 4,271.50 1,243.20 77.5 
1980 15,223.50 12,353.30 2,880.20 81.1 
1985 15,050.40 10,923.70 4,126.70 72.6 
1990 98,102.40 71,887.10 26,215.30 73.3 
1995 459,987.30 324,547.60 135,439.70 70.6 
2000 1,906,159.70 1,591,675.80 314,483.90 83.5 
2005 5,547,500.00 4,762,400.00 785,100.00 85.8 
2010 7,303,670.00 5,396,090.00 1,907,580.00 73.9 
2015 6,912,500.00 3,830,100.00 3,082,400.00 55.4 
2016 5,616,400.00 2,693,900.00 2,922,500.00 48.0 
2017 7,317,700.00 4,109,800.00 3,207,900.00 56.2 
2018 9,551,600.00 5,545,600.00 4,006,000.00 58.1 
Adapted from CBN Annual Statistical Bulletins (2008 – 2019) 
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Presently Nigeria has been ranked the largest oil producing country in Africa, the sixth 
largest crude oil producer within the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the sixteenth largest oil producer in the world (OPEC Monthly Oil Market 
Report 2019, Deloitte, 2018). According to Export.gov (2019), Nigeria depends heavily on 
oil which accounts for about 90% of export earnings and over 70% of total revenue earned.  
The pivotal role of crude oil to the survival of Nigerian economy is demonstrated by its 
strategic importance in determining the directions of the annual national budget estimates of 
the country. For instance, the 2018 national budget presented to the Federal Parliament is 
predicated upon three key assumptions; oil production of 2.3 million barrels, benchmark oil 
price of US$45 per barrel and average exchange rate of N305/ US$ (Buhari, 2018). Thus 
Boris (2015, p.563), a research scholar and an active commentator on Nigeria oil and gas 
resources; describes Nigeria as a “mono-economy nation which largely depends on the oil 
sector for its economic survival”. 
Figure 1.1 OPEC Crude Oil Production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (2019) 
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Most of the Nigeria oil and gas production takes place in the Niger Delta Region. The region 
is made up of nine states which include; Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, 
Imo, Ondo, and Rivers.  These states are also blessed with abundance of natural resources 
including vast crude deposit.  The Niger Delta region is the largest wetland in Africa, and the 
third largest mangrove forest in the world.  It is the third largest wet land in the world, holding 
an area of about 70 000sq kilometres, and possessing ecological zone that comprises large 
rivers, coastal areas, mangroves, and fresh and salt water swamp forest (Wetland International, 
2016; Boris, 2016). 
Figure 1.2 Map of Nigeria showing 9 States of the Niger Delta region.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 17 of 220 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Map of Niger Delta Showing Rivers, States and Vegetation Zones.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Academicjournals.org 
 
 Onuoha (2007, p.96), a social scientist, scholar and an  active commentator on the Niger Delta 
crisis,  observes that the Nigerian oil industry has  long been confronted with the major 
challenge of vandalism of petroleum products pipelines defined by him as “illegal or 
unauthorised activities that involve the destruction of oil pipelines to disrupt supply or the 
puncturing of oil pipelines to siphon crude oil or its refined products in order to appropriate it 
for personal use or for sale in the black market or any other outlet”. Okoli & Orinya (2013, 
p.67) describe vandalism of oil pipeline as bunkering which is “the act of drilling into the pipe 
lines with the intent to steal the products”. They observed that it is typically perpetrated by 
criminal syndicates in Nigeria as a lucrative source of income.    
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The term bunkering has many different definitions as used by the shipping industry. However, 
within the context of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria, bunkering refers to the clandestine 
siphoning off or diverting of oil from pipelines or storage facilities. 
 
Vandalism of oil pipelines in the Nigerian context is a term that covers all the different 
categories of action that occur in different attacks on oil pipelines and pumping infrastructure 
in Nigeria. These include: 
i. Genuine acts of vandalism perpetrated by individuals within the local oil producing 
communities to sabotage and damage oil pipelines to make statements against oil 
companies and the Nigerian government due to lack of benefits accruing to the oil 
producing communities of the Niger Delta region. 
ii. The criminal syndicates that tap into oil pipelines and steal and smuggle out products 
and illegal bunkering. 
iii. The militants who deliberately sabotage the oil pipelines to demand for equitable 
distribution of oil revenue and resource control. 
 
According to the NNPC statistics on incidences of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria 
between 2002 and 2018, summarised in figure 1.4, there were about 500 vandalism of oil 
pipelines in 2002, and this rose astronomically to about 3,800 in 2006.  In 2010, vandalism of 
pipelines incidences dropped to about 800, partly as a result of the amnesty program of the 
federal government of Nigeria which was initiated in 2009. Amnesty programme is a peace-
building initiative in the Niger Delta region aimed at curbing violence in the region by engaging 
the militants. A 60-day period was allowed for armed youths to surrender their weapons in 
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return for training and rehabilitation and many Niger Delta armed youths embraced the 
programme. However, in 2011, the incidences of vandalism of oil pipelines increased to 2768 
and reached its peak at 3700 in 2014. In 2018, the incidences of vandalism of oil pipelines has 
recorded a decline to 1894 according to the NNPC statistics. 
Figure 1.4 Statistics of incidences of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria from 2002 to 2018 
 
Adapted from Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) (2018) 
 
 
According to the NNPC’s Monthly Financial and Operations Report (2018), in figure 1.5, 
a total number of 2,224 vandalised points were recorded between December 2017 and 
December 2018 alone.  In December 2017, there were 176 vandalised points comprising 24 
points along Mosimi pipeline, 11 points along Kaduna pipeline while Port Harcourt pipeline 
suffered 129 vandalised points. Similarly, Warri and Gombe pipelines recorded 3 and 9 
vandalised points respectively. The statistics also indicated that in December 2018, 257 
vandalised points were recorded. These included 216 breaks along Mosimi pipeline, 7 breaks 
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along Kaduna pipeline. Port Harcourt pipeline recorded 24 breaks, 8 breaks occurred along 
Warri pipeline while Gombe pipeline recorded 2 vandalised points. 
 
 
Figure 1.5 Oil pipeline breaks between December 2017 and December 2018.  
 
Source: NNPC’s Monthly Financial and Operations Report (2018) 
 
A range of stakeholders led by the Nigerian Armed Forces contribute to the protection of 
petroleum products pipelines across the country. For instance, in order to reduce militancy in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and curtail vandalism of oil pipelines, there have been several 
military operations in the region led by the Nigerian military aimed at effectively securing the 
hub of oil and gas production in Nigeria, the economic base of the Nigerian nation and also to 
protect the coastal areas from where the stolen crude are exported and illegal weapons brought 
in (Adisa, 2018). Such operations are described using different code names such as operation 
Delta Safe and Operation Crocodile Smile. These operations are directed at the restive Niger 
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Delta region of Nigeria; the region that currently produces the bulk of the Nigerian crude oil 
and play host to the militant activities. 
 
Similarly, a core mandate of the Nigerian Navy is “to protect the Nigerian Maritime 
Environment and rid it of all forms of illegal activities especially as it relates to crude oil theft 
and oil bunkering" (Nigerian Navy 2013). In carrying out this mandate, the Nigerian Navy has 
had successful operations against vandalism of pipelines such as foiling some attempts to 
vandalise oil pipelines including breaking the pipeline belonging to the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, NNPC, which pumps petroleum products from Atlas Cove, Lagos to 
Mosimi depot, Ogun State, and in the process recovered 972 drums and 595 jerrycans, of the 
products, including four boats (Deolu 2017). To boost the anti- vandalism drive efforts of the 
military, a Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the Nigeria Navy, the Nigeria Air Force and the 
Nigeria Army code named “Operation Jagunlabi” was launched specifically to check the 
vandalism of petroleum products pipeline around the creeks of Ikorodu area of Lagos state of 
Nigeria. The main objective of the JTF was to check “the increasing menace of pipeline 
vandalism and crude oil theft” (News Agency of Nigeria, 2017:np).  
 
Working in support of the Nigerian armed forces is the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (NSCDC), a para-military agency of the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
(Ministry of Interior). It was established in 1967 and is currently under the Federal Ministry of 
Interior (Abolurin 2010). The Agency was established by an Act of Parliament; NSCDC 
Amendment Act (2007) which expressly conferred to it the authority to investigate the offence 
of vandalism of oil pipelines and to initiate proceedings thereto on behalf of the Attorney 
General of the Federation. The agency is empowered to enter and search any premises and 
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seize any material suspected to have been used in vandalisation or suspected process of 
vandalisation. It is also mandated to arrest, investigate and hand over to relevant security 
agencies the suspects for further investigation and prosecution (NSCDC Amendment Act 2007 
No 6, 2007). 
 
 To carry out this statutory mandate, the agency established a task force on anti-vandalism 
charged with the duty of protecting the oil pipelines (Mboho & Udousoro 2014). The NSCDC 
responds to pipeline vandalism in three main ways: deployment of men and officers of the 
Corps to communities traversed by pipelines and patrolling of the communities on daily basis 
to prevent vandalism, the use of force to arrest and prosecute pipelines vandals, and assisting 
victims where inferno occurs as a result of vandalisation of petroleum products pipelines 
(Abolurin, 2010).  
 
To complement the efforts of other security agencies in the anti-vandalism drive of the federal 
government, the Nigeria Police Force established a special Police anti-vandalism squad 
dedicated to the protection and security of oil and gas pipelines (Muhammad, 2012). This squad 
was deployed to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria to join other security agencies in the fight 
against the vandals. Other identified stakeholders in the petroleum products pipeline security 
management include the oil companies, the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 
and the host communities living within the networks of petroleum products pipelines.  
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Research aims and objectives 
The aims of the research are to examine the problem of vandalism of petroleum products 
pipelines in Nigeria and make recommendations for improving the national response to the 
problem. These aims will be operationalised according to three main objectives. 
1. To examine the nature and extent of the problem of vandalism of petroleum products 
pipelines in Nigeria.  
2. To identify the strategies and tactics being employed to address the problem. This will include 
examination of best practices adopted by other countries faced by similar problem.  
3. To examine the strengths and limitations of the current measures with a view to making 
recommendations for their improvement. 
The proposed research will make original contribution to the body of academic and practice   
knowledge, examining the problem of vandalism of petroleum products pipeline, and assessing 
the measures being employed to address it, in order to present recommendations to enhance 
the mitigation of the problem of vandalism of petroleum products pipelines.  
  
Outlines of Chapters 
The remainder of the thesis is laid out as follows. Literature review in chapter 2 commences 
with an overview of the literature search and selection strategy, providing an appraisement of 
the extant academic and grey literature in respect of the research objectives. Within the context 
of this study, grey literature refers to materials and research produced by organisations outside 
the traditional commercial or academic publishing and distribution channels. The chapter 
examines the problem of petroleum products pipeline vandalism in Nigeria, the strategy and 
tactics being employed to address the problem, which include the strategies and tactics 
employed in some selected oil and gas producing countries, application of physical security in 
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oil pipeline security management, and the Nigerian government strategies and tactics to combat 
vandalism of oil pipelines. It was found that vandalism of oil pipelines remains a major threat 
to the oil and gas sector in Nigeria. The findings brought to the fore the negative consequences 
of vandalism of oil pipelines on various sectors of Nigeria, which include massive economic 
loses, environmental degradation and a threat to the national security.   
 
Chapter 3 gives a rundown of the research methodology; setting out the epistemological and 
ontological bases of the research. The case study methodology adopted in the research is 
critically examined. The purposive sampling strategy employed in the research is examined 
and is followed by a discussion on semi structured interview.  Twenty two participants were 
drawn from the critical stakeholders in oil and gas management in Nigeria, which include; 
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC); the case study organisation, the military 
joint task force, multinational oil companies, the oil-producing communities’ leaders, NGOs,  
private security companies and physical security experts. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion on ethical considerations and the research experience. 
 
Chapter 4 commenced the presentation of the thematic analysis of the interview data, and 
examined the ways which the participants interviewed for the research perceive the nature of 
vandalism of oil pipelines. The research identified three categories of actors responsible for 
vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria. The first category involves the local actors from the oil 
producing communities who are mainly jobless youths, the second category encompasses 
vandals sponsored for a fee, while the third category encompasses the Niger Delta militants. 
The findings indicate that the illicit business is still flourishing despite the government efforts 
Page 25 of 220 
 
to combat it. It was also found that the petroleum products pipelines vandalism is multifaceted, 
requiring an integrated solution for an effective mitigation. 
 
Chapter 5 continued with the presentation of the thematic analyses of the interview data with 
respect to the participant perspectives on the strategies and tactics being employed to address 
the problem. The research found that the federal government of Nigeria depends largely on the 
security forces in her efforts to combat vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria. It was also found 
that the government engaged the ex-militant leaders and warlords to provide surveillance on 
oil pipelines, through the PSCs they employed. The findings also indicate that deployment of 
technologies and equipment such as intrusion detection system and unmanned aerial vehicle 
(drones) are not given serious consideration by the Nigerian government in the current strategy 
and tactics adopted to combat the pipeline vandals. 
 
 Chapter 6 concludes the presentation of the thematic analyses of the interview data and 
examined the participant perspectives on the strengths, weaknesses and ways of improvement 
of the current measures. The research found that in the area of the strengths of the current 
measures, the increased military presence in the Niger Delta region is a deterrence to oil 
pipeline vandals. It also found that the massive deployment of NSCDC personnel to the areas 
traversed by oil pipelines strengthens the current anti vandalism drive. Also, the personnel of 
the JTF are usually deployed for rescue of oil workers and expatriates kidnapped for ransom 
by the militants. With regards to the weaknesses or the measures, it was found that the 
militarization of the oil producing communities increases tensions and escalates violence. It 
was also found that most JTF personnel are not familiar with the terrain in the creek. In the 
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areas of improvements, the research found out among others, that there is an urgent need to 
deploy equipment and technologies alongside the security forces in an integrated form. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a discussion on the findings and their potential 
implications. It recommends that an integrated solution be adopted in the security management 
of petroleum products pipelines.  In addition to the massive deployment of security forces, the 
federal government in collaboration with the multinational oil companies should invest 
massively on protection of oil and gas facilities. The study also proposed three options for 
further research.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Introduction  
This chapter reviews the extant academic and grey literature on the three main objectives of 
this study, structured as follows:- 
It begins with an outline of the literature search and selection strategy. This is followed by a 
discussion on the problem of vandalism of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, extant academic and grey literature on strategies and tactics being employed to 
address the problem is investigated; the literature also investigates the strengths, weaknesses, 
and ways of improvement. The chapter further examines literature on the strengths and 
limitations of physical security deployment in oil and gas pipelines security management and 
concludes with the discussion on the major issues identified in the literature. 
 
Literature search and selection strategy 
This work attempted to assess what is known already and bring to the fore any gaps and 
limitations in the literature. In order to identify relevant literature; the study consulted a number 
of sources which included library held printed material, electronic data bases, and electronic 
journals. The discovery service delivered by EBSCO was utilized in finding articles, journals, 
books and other academic resources. Search ‘modes and expanders’ such as application of 
related words were used.  The researcher also applied SmartText Searching in some searches 
which resulted in greater access to the University of Portsmouth library held academic 
resources. As a distant student, off-campus link was utilized, and this was achieved through 
the setting up of the Virtual Private Network (VPN) which facilitated unrestricted access to 
sources of relevant digital material held in the library.  
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The research employed some key words and phrases relevant to the literature. Some of the key 
words/phrases include; oil pipelines, vandalism, petroleum products, oil and gas, vandals, 
security management, oil theft, illegal bunkering, multinational oil companies, Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation NNPC), militants, restiveness, oil-producing communities, 
human rights abuses, Niger Delta region, Nigeria, etc. Combination of some key words were 
then placed into a number of different search engines such as EBSCO, JSTOR, Science Direct 
etc., provided by the University, which are designed to scan a large number of bibliographic 
databases, of which the most important were defined in advance of the start of the search 
process. The resources used in this research included peer and non-peer reviewed journal 
articles, books, conference papers, technical reports, and government policy papers.  Peer 
review articles constitute most of the journal articles used for the study.  
 
The search was also conducted in the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) 
library located at the headquarters of the organisation. The library provided access to physical 
relevant material held by the para-military agency.  Access to the library was made possible 
through the ‘gate keeper’; the Commandant General of the NSCDC who had earlier granted 
permission to conduct a study within the NSCDC as the case study host organisation.  
 
Search engines, provided by both Google and Google Scholar, were also used to identify 
relevant journal articles and other materials not covered by the University Library’s 
subscriptions. In conducting this search, care was taken to sift relevant material from the 
thousands of related topics that appear in the internet. To narrow the search to relatively smaller 
number of materials, effort was made to combine some of the key words listed above during 
the internet search. For instance a search for ‘pipeline vandalism’ gave 14, 300 results in 0.28 
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seconds. However, when combining two key words, such as ‘oil and gas pipeline vandalism’ 
the results were reduced to 7 680 in 0.06 seconds. Repetition of key words combination   
tremendously reduced the results and help in identifying relevant material for the literature 
review. 
 
It is pertinent to note that vandalism of petroleum products pipelines is a Nigeria unique 
security issue. It seems to have attracted less attention from scholars outside Nigeria especially 
those from the western part of the world.  A search in the University of Portsmouth library 
website, for instance, was undertaken for academic journals specifically related to oil pipelines 
vandalism, however this proved fruitless as only a few academic journals were found 
discussing the issue in specific contexts such as illegal oil tapping, oil pipelines vulnerabilities, 
oil and gas pipelines and terrorism etc.   
 
Consequently, most authorities cited in this study are Nigerian scholars who may not be 
familiar to some readers in the UK. However, they have contributed many scholarly articles in 
reputable journals regarding oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria and the Niger Delta crisis. For 
instance, Dr Freedom Onuoha, a lecturer and political scientist; a security analyst and a Fellow 
of the Nigeria National Defence college, is a prolific writer who has contributed over 100 
scholarly articles in reputable international peer reviewed journals with particular interest in 
the Niger Delta security issues and oil pipelines vandalism. Another notable authority cited in 
this research is Odalonu Boris, a research scholar and author of many scholarly articles in 
reputable journals, focusing on the Niger Delta oil resources, oil theft, militancy and general 
security issues in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Dr K. Mboho and P.  Udousoro’s scholarly 
work investigates the activities of   the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) 
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with respect to the agency’s mandate to tackle oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria. Dr Ade 
Abolurin, also cited in the study is the pioneer and former Commandant-General (CG) of 
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), who has contributed many scholarly 
works regarding the operations of the NSCDC in particular, and Nigeria internal security 
challenges in general. Other Nigerian authors cited in this research have made numerous 
scholarly contributions with regards to oil pipelines security management in the Niger Delta 
region which is the focus of this research. The broader literature includes some scholarly works 
on oil and gas pipelines infrastructure globally, aimed at bringing to the fore the role of 
pipelines in oil and gas transportation. Other literature cited incudes extant academic and grey 
literature on strategies and tactics employed in some selected oil and gas producing countries 
such as the United States of America, Russia, Kenya and Turkey. The broader literature also 
includes some scholarly works and publications in the area of application of physical security 
measures in oil and gas pipelines security management. 
 
The problem of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria 
This section examines extant academic and grey literature on oil and gas security. It also 
examines oil pipelines infrastructure generally, and particularly oil and gas pipelines 
infrastructure in Nigeria. Furthermore, the problem of vandalism of oil and gas pipelines is 
examined in global context and with more emphasis in the Nigerian context. 
Oil and gas security  
According to Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) (2004), oil and gas 
industry is divided into the upstream sector, and the downstream sector.  The upstream relates 
to those activities that take place before processing and refining of hydrocarbon, while 
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downstream on the other hand refers to those activities involving processing and refining of 
the crude, petrochemical plants, logistics and retail transaction. The downstream activities 
typically require industrial plants, pipelines and storage services (Suda, Rani, Rahman & Chen, 
2015). The oil and gas industry is classified into various segments which cover exploration and 
production, transportation and storage, refining and marketing (The World Bank Group 2009). 
Oil and gas sector face a growing number of security challenges (Risk Watch International 
2018), hence, human and environmental safety and health protection remains a priority for the 
industry (Bigliani, 2013). Alon & Herbert (2009), prominent scholars and prolific 
commentators on both macro and firm-specific risks, observe that oil and gas industry is one 
of the most sensitive sectors to invest.  Moran (1998), a leading international business and 
finance scholar, posits that since the resources involved in oil and gas are often viewed as part 
of the country’s national patrimony, investment in this sector are more likely to affect the 
country more than other investments, because of the wealth and power which accrue from the 
oil production.  Despite being 21 years old, his observations remain relevant today. 
 
Oil and gas sector is faced with many risks, Yanting and Lygun (2011) and Nwaeke (2008) 
discuss this in their articles on the risk management of petroleum operations. Yanting and 
Lygun (2011) classify these risks as natural environmental risk, which includes climatic and 
geologic risk; engineering risk, which includes exploration risk, development risk and 
construction risk; management risk, which incorporates human resources risk, organization 
risk, operating equipment risk; dispute risk; environmental protection risk; and economic risk, 
which encompasses financial risk, market risk and economic policy risk. The oil and gas sector 
is further confronted with other industry-specific risks such as corruption, terrorism, 
repatriation restriction, government regulations and environmental activism (Berlin, 2003, 
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Alon et al., 2009). Alon et al (2009) note however that oil and gas companies are willing to be 
exposed to a high degree of risk as long as they are able to manage the risk and make profits. 
According to Miller (1992) risk management is one of the most important objectives of oil and 
gas companies with investment all over the world. Despite the fact that this publication is old, 
it is still relevant. For instance, this work has been cited by 1291 scholars, including Bromiley 
et al., (2015), demonstrating its relevance in today’s enterprise risk management, including the 
oil and gas business. Risk must be assessed in continuous manner in the oil and gas companies’ 
decision-making processes. As (Berline, 2003) observes, the quality of oil and gas companies’ 
risk management decision making is critical to the success of new investment or the growth of 
existing investments. 
 
In order to counter the threats in the oil and gas industry, the security as well as the security 
risks requires thorough analysis.  Bigliani (2013) notes that risk related to asset damage, 
business interruption, pollution, injuries to people and damage to properties are intrinsic in 
normal oil and gas activities. Yasseri (2008), an energy sector researcher, observes the myriad 
of methods that are used by oil and gas companies for mitigation of hazards. Such 
methodologies incorporate hazards affecting the environment such as an oil spill, including 
one technique known as “inherently safer design” which eliminates or greatly minimises the 
quantities of extremely hazardous chemicals stored in any one plant or site. He argues that this 
approach can significantly reduce the potential number of vulnerable targets and the risks 
associated with those targets. Risk Watch International (2018) notes that several prominent 
security and intelligence agencies all over the world have consistently brought to the fore the 
asymmetric threats from various extremist groups confronting oil and gas facilities. It 
recognises that many oil and gas facilities attract attacks because of the potential for the 
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perpetrators to have a significant impact, not only affecting the targeted facilities, but the 
stability of the wider oil and gas industry, and undermining the government. 
After the 9/11 terrorist incident in the US, attacks against oil and gas facilities gained higher 
priority for terrorists who believe that such attacks would have a great impact on the oil-
dependent economies of the West and hence petroleum facilities became favoured targets. 
Consequently, al-Qaeda issued a decree legitimising attacks on all oil and gas facilities 
supplying the West. In March 2004, Abdul Aiz Al-moqrin released a document titled “the 
targets inside cities” on several Jihadist websites. In the document, Al-Morqrin directed attacks 
on the oil and gas sector, identifying pipelines, wells, refineries, and other Western investments 
in the oil and gas sector as acceptable targets. According to the document, this kind of attacks 
are aimed at dealing economic blow on the enemies of al-Qaeda including their allies (Toft, 
Duero & Bieliouskas, 2010). 
 
 Another document released in 2004, by a known jihadist, Abu Bakir Naji titled “The 
Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will Pass” 
(Naji, 2004), presents a doctrine that outlines the strategies that jihadist movements should 
adopt if they are to rebuild an Islamic state. In the document, he emphasises the criticality of 
oil and gas installations as targets for the Al-Qaeda network. According to him, the only way 
to defeat the Western states is by attacking the core of their economies, which are based on oil 
and gas (Naji, 2004). Also, in June 2004, a cleric named Ab-al-Aziz bin Rashid al-Anzi 
published a document titled “The laws of Targeting Petroleum-Related Interests and a Review 
of the Laws Pertaining to Economic Jihad” which clearly supports the stand of al-Qaeda on 
operation against oil and gas installations (Toft, et al. 2010). In the document, the focus was 
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also directed on oil and gas industry as legitimate targets for terrorists organisations, 
specifically those ones not under the control of Muslims. 
 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attack of 9/11, the US government agencies and the public 
became more concerned about chemical storage and transportation facilities which are close to 
areas with heavy populations. This resulted in increased security and surveillance of LNG 
terminals/facilities and ships moving to port to upload LNG cargo (Melhem, Kalukar, Surraf 
& Ozog, 2006). Luciani (2011) recognises that terrorist and politically violent groups target 
civilian economic installations such as oil fields, refineries or logistic facilities to inflict 
economic damage on the government. He notes that bandits have also been identified as major 
threats to oil and gas facilities, arguing, that the primary motivation of bandits is material gains. 
The bandits according to him may also tactically or strategically form alliances with forces 
whose main objectives are to derive material gain from the attacks on oil and gas facilities.  
 
According to RiskWatch International (2018), companies in the oil and gas industry face a 
growing number of security challenges such as asymmetric threats from various extremist 
groups. Their private security forces are confronting non-traditional strategy and tactics of 
opponents, both internal and external. The adversaries include national and international 
extremists, well-organized criminal syndicates, cyber security threats, ideologically driven 
actors and disgruntled employees. Anastasakis (2016) takes the view that the physical 
protection of energy-critical infrastructure is an issue that is highly complicated. Therefore, 
assessing the risk present in a company’s operating environment is indispensable to the security 
of personnel, local communities and assets of the company, including the success of the 
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company’s operations both in the short term and long term and also the promotion of human 
rights.  
 
An accurate and effective risk assessment should consider identification of security risks; 
potential for violence, human right records, rule of law, conflict analysis and equipment 
transfers (Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights). The Voluntary Principles 
posits that while governments hold the primary role of maintaining law and order, security and 
respect for human rights; companies are interested in ensuring that governments’ actions, 
particularly the actions of public security providers are consistent with human rights protection 
and promotion. The Voluntary Principles therefore proposes that companies have the duty of 
encouraging host governments to make security arrangements transparent and accessible to the 
public subject to any overriding safety and security concerns. 
 
Oil pipelines infrastructure 
 The history of oil and gas pipelines dates back to thousands of years. However, the modern-
day pipelines are traceable to Pennsylvania, USA in the mid 1800s. With improvement in 
technology, larger and longer pipelines were constructed. During the Second World War, there 
was an increased demand for energy, which also led to increase in the demand for pipelines 
and the extent of the demands in United States of America and also around the world (Hopkins 
2007). Prior to the Second World War, most of the crude oil and refined products in the United 
States has been transported by coastal tankers to the Northeast from where the product was 
shipped across the Atlantic. The United States remained officially neutral until the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1942. The incident led to the declaration of war on the 
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United States a few days later by Hitler who directed attacks on United States shipping (Wicks, 
2016). When the United States formally got involved in the war, the German submarines began 
to target and sank US tankers along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts and the Caribbean, causing 
the disruption in the flow of oil.  
 
With constant bombardment and sinking of the US tankers by Germany submarines, the need 
to develop alternative transportation for the oil led to the technological breakthrough which 
resulted in the invention of “long distance, large diameter pipelines. This new capability to 
transport large quantities of oil over long distances subsequently fueled the post-war economic 
boom and changed the shape of the petroleum industry” (Trench 2001, p.1). It has been claimed 
that “transmission pipelines are the main ‘arteries’ of the oil and gas business working 24hours 
per day, seven days a week, continuously supplying our energy needs”, and that the pipelines 
are “critically important to most countries’ economies”  (Hopkins 2007, p.2).  
 
Pipelines are “the irreplaceable core of the U.S petroleum transportation system and hence the 
key to meeting petroleum demand” Trench (2001). Trench further argues that about two thirds 
of the petroleum products shipped in the United States is through oil pipelines transportation 
which deliver over 14 billion barrels, and without oil pipelines, petroleum products would not 
reach millions of consumers in all the fifty states. In 2004, oil pipelines transported 66.44% of 
the total crude oil petroleum products carried in domestic transportation system. During the 
period, Pipelines transported 75.9% of the 902.5 billion ton-miles of crude petroleum and 
59.8% of the total 528.4billion ton-miles of light petroleum products such as gasoline, jet fuel, 
liquid petroleum gas, kerosene, heating and fuel oils (Trench 2001). These pipelines move 
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about 66% of domestic petroleum in the United States (Restrepo, Simonoff & Zimmerman, 
2008). 
Fig.2.1 Pipelines transportation system in the US 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Association of Oil Pipelines, Shift in Petroleum Transportation (2000) 
 
 
  
O’Neil, Hopkins, & Gressley (2016) posit that in 2014, there were 61,379 miles of onshore 
crude oil pipelines in the United States, and about 68.6 percent were defined as interstate lines. 
It noted that onshore crude oil pipelines are located in 35 states, but almost 95 percent of the 
total millage is concentrated in the 20 states listed in the table below; 
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Table 2.1 Pipelines infrastructure in the United States 
S/N STATES MILES OF PIPELINE  
1. Texas 16,788 
2. Oklahoma 5,844 
3. Wyoming  3,765 
4. California 3,687 
5. Kansas 3,478 
6. Louisiana 3,200 
7. North Dakota 2,818 
8. Minnesota 2,659 
9. Illinois 2,575 
10. Montana 2,380 
11. Missouri 1,847 
12. Michigan 1,437 
13. New Mexico 1,372 
14. Mississippi 1,306 
15. Wisconsin 1,181 
16. Alaska 1,109 
17. Nebraska 758 
18. Colorado 715 
19. Ohio 552 
20. Kentucky 550 
 All other States 3,360  
 Total US Length 61,379 
 
Source:  Distribution, Transmission and Gathering, LNG and Liquid Annual Data (2015). 
 
There is rapid expansion of oil pipelines globally and this is consequent upon the increase in 
energy demands.  Hopkins explains this phenomenon thus:   
 It has been estimated that world pipeline expansion could be up to 7% per year over 
the next 15 years. This means over 8000km/annum of pipeline being built in the USA 
alone, at a cost of $US8 billion/annum. Internationally, 32,000km of new pipelines are 
constructed each year: this is a $US28billion business, and 50% of these new builds are 
expected in North and South America. Additionally, 8,000km of offshore pipelines are 
being built per year: this is a $5billion business with 60% in NW Europe, Asia Pacific, 
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and the Gulf of Mexico.  The total length of high-pressure transmission pipelines 
around the world has been estimated at 3,500,000km (Hopkins 2007, p.13) 
 
In Canada, most of the crude oil is shipped through pipelines infrastructure. According to 
Canadian Pipeline Transportation System (2014), in 2012, over 537,000 cubic meters (m3/d) 
or 3.38million barrels of crude is produced and most of the products is shipped by means of 
pipeline from western province to market in other provinces or the United states. The Canadian 
pipeline network is made up of four main groups of systems of which each one plays an integral 
part in the delivery of energy to Canadians and export markets. These four groups of systems 
include; Gathering Pipelines which move crude oil and natural gas from wellheads to oil 
batteries or natural gas processing facilities.  
 
The concentration of these pipelines is within the producing areas of western Canada. Another 
group of system is the Feeder Pipelines which move crude oil, natural gas, and other products 
such as natural gas liquids (NGLs) from batteries, processing facilities, and storage tanks to 
transmission pipelines. These pipelines are also largely amalgamated in the producing areas of 
western Canada.  Transmission Pipelines, another group of systems of the major pipeline 
network take charge of transportation of crude oil and natural gas within provinces and across 
provincial or international boundaries. The Distribution Pipelines are operated by local 
distribution companies or provincial cooperatives, and are saddled with the responsibility of 
distributing natural gas to homes, businesses, and various industries (The Canadian Pipeline 
Transportation system 2016). 
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The United Kingdom (UK) is the largest producer of oil and the second largest producer of 
natural gas in the European Union (US Energy Information Administration 2016).  Like other 
oil producing countries in the world, the UK also relies on pipelines system as the major means 
of transportation of crude oil and condensate. There is an extensive network of pipelines in the 
UK that conveys oil extracted from North Sea platforms to coastal terminals in Scotland and 
in Northern England. This network consists of six major pipelines and other smaller pipelines 
that transport the petroleum products from individual fields to the major pipelines which 
eventually moves the products to the shore. Although the pipelines in the UK are privately 
owned and operated, any shipper that is qualified can gain access to the pipelines (US Energy 
Information Administration, 2014). 
Russia also prefers pipelines for transportation of her crude oil. In 2014 for instance, Russia 
exported 223.4 million tons of crude oil and 90% of the exports were handled through the 
national oil pipelines operator, the Transneft (Vatansever, 2017). Explaining further, 
Vatansever (2017) notes that five pipelines were used to export oil to four main destinations. 
According to him, Druzba pipelines were used for direct sales to the refineries in Europe; two 
pipelines (Baltic pipelines system BPS-1 and BPS-2) were used for oil exports through Russia 
ports on the Baltic coast. The Novorossiysk pipelines exported oil through the black sea port 
of Novorossiysk, while the ESPO pipelines exported oil to Asian markets. 
 Africa is estimated to produce more than 12% of the world petroleum products and also holds 
nearly 10% of all oil reserves (Kowalczk-Hoyer, 2011). Pipelines International (2011) observes 
that there is rapid expansion of oil infrastructure and pipeline networks throughout the 
continent of Africa in recent decades.  Odhiambo, Maito & Onkware (2014) explain that when 
comparing with other modes of energy transportation such as rail and high way, pipelines are 
the safest and fastest.  
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Eze, Chukwuemeka, Ojiaku & Ekeanyawu, (2014), scholars and researchers on pipelines 
vandalisation-detection through SMS alert, at the Federal University of technology Owerri, 
Imo State Nigeria, posit that as a medium of transportation, pipeline system is usually attributed 
to products that are sensitive. Such products include crude oil, natural gas and industrial 
chemicals. Pipelines that transmit crude oil convey the product from production location for 
example, conventional crude oil deposits and shale formations containing light oil, to 
processing locations, such as refineries. From there, specialty pipelines carry the refined 
products to customers, which include manufacturers that use refined products as an 
intermediate input and final consumers (O’Neil, B., Hopkins, P., & Gressley J. 2016) 
 
The failure rate of pipeline transportation system is lower than other means of transportation 
such as rail road or high way (Udofia & Joel 2012). Onwuka & Dike, (2015, p.130) argue that 
“petroleum pipeline system is cost-saving and has high efficiency potential in moving 
petroleum products from the nation’s refineries to depots”.  Chukwujekwu, Chibuzor & Ekene 
(2014) explain that as a medium of transportation, pipeline system is used for transportation of 
sensitive products such as crude oil, natural gas and industrial chemicals. According to Greens 
and Jackson (2015), pipelines are safer way to transport oil when juxtapose with railways and 
roadways. 
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Figure 2.2 Petroleum products pipeline infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Flow control staff: Oil and Gas News (2015) 
 
In Nigeria, petroleum products pipelines system is critically indispensable in the operations of 
oil and gas industry, because they are at the core of production, transportation, storage and 
distribution of natural gas, crude oil and refined petroleum products (Adejoh, 2014). Onuoha 
(2008, p.108) describes Petroleum products pipelines and installations as “the arteries and veins 
that supply the lifeblood of Nigeria economic wealth – crude oil and its refined products to 
various parts of the country” 
In Nigeria, the first pipeline system was constructed in 1955, and as at 1964 Shell- BP had 
installed about had about 300 kilometres of pipelines. Most oil pipelines infrastructure in 
Nigeria were constructed and commissioned between 1975 and 1980, a period that covered the 
third national development plan of the country, and this included the initial 3001 kilometres 
crude/petroleum products pipelines. Presently Nigeria has 5001 kilometres of pipelines 
(Arosanya,2005). The pipelines traverse the entire country’s geo-political zones, and this 
encompasses the subsea swamp, the rain forest and the savannah grass land (Ogwu, 2011).  
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The oil pipelines Network in Nigeria is strategically located to effectively transport gas and 
petroleum products from Delta to other parts of the country. The 5001km network of petroleum 
products consists of 666 kilometers of crude oil pipelines and 4,315 multi-product pipelines 
which forms a web that interconnects the 22 petroleum storage depots, the four refineries and 
the off-shore terminals located at Bonny and Escravos, and the jetties at Atlas Cove, Calabar, 
Okirika and Warri (Alawode & Ogunleye 2011; Onuoha 2008, Okoli & Orinya 2013). The 
pipelines and products marketing company ltd, a subsidiary of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) is responsible for the crude oil transportation to the nation’s refineries 
and also has the duty to evacuate the refined petroleum products from the refineries for supply 
and distribution to the end users throughout the country (Udofia & Joel 2012). 
 
Figure 2.3 Map of Nigeria Showing oil pipelines network and facilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ambituuni, Amezaga, & Werner (2015, p.2) 
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Vandalism of oil pipelines  
Vandalism is an action which involves deliberate destruction of public and private property 
(Okafor & Olaniyan, 2017). In the context of oil pipeline vandalism, it is “illegal or 
unauthorised activities that involve the destruction of oil pipelines to disrupt supply or the 
puncturing of oil pipelines to siphon crude oil or its refined products in order to appropriate it 
for personal use or for sale in the black market or any other outlet” (Onuoha, 2007 p.96).  
vandalism of oil pipelines is viewed by Adishi & Hunga (2015-2016, p.51) as “the intentional 
acts of destroying pipelines, platforms loading barge and other facilities for selfish reasons or 
vendetta purposes”. They describe it as an illicit trade that entails the theft of crude oil and its 
derivative products using a variety of contraption. Chukwuchekwa, Ojiaku & Ekeanyawu 
(2014) view vandalism of oil pipelines as a negative activity which is aimed at acquiring 
petroleum products for personal use or for sale in the black market especially in developing 
countries of the world where the illicit activities are rampant.   
 
Pipeline sabotage has been reported in many countries of the world including Indonesia, US, 
UK, Canada, Iran and Iraq, and typically those engaged in this act are vandals, thieves and 
pipelines saboteurs (Eze, Nwagboso, Newman & Georgakis 2015). Vandalism of oil pipelines 
is not a recent occurrence in the world. It had been experienced in oil producing countries of 
Russia, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela many years ago (Akpan, 2016).   Zabyelina & Kustova 
(2015) argue that large–scale illegal oil tapping and pipeline sabotage have been remarkably 
noticeably in the last two decades. They posit that the phenomenon is a global menace affecting 
countries such as Nigeria which loses US$5bn to oil theft yearly. Other countries affected by 
the menace according to (Zabyelina & Kustova 2015) include; Libya, Syria, Egypt and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). And particularly, Transneft, the Russia’s oil 
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pipeline monopoly for example, has been struggling to combat oil theft in the North Caucasus 
since the times of the first military campaign in Chechnya.  Zabyelina & Kustova (2015) also 
stress that Mexico, Columbia, Venezuala and Bolivia are among the most important oil 
producing states in Latin America that have encountered critical levels of oil and gas theft 
which results in billions of dollars loses.  
 
Oil and gas pipelines are vulnerable to vandalism and terrorist attacks, an example of such an 
attack is Colombia where rebels have bombed Occidental Petroleum’s Cano Limon pipeline 
about 950 times since 1986. This resulted in shutting down the pipeline for months at a time 
resulting in revenue loss of about $2.5b to the government of Colombia (Parfomak 2004). It is 
also been claimed (Sun, Zhang & Sun, 2016, p.1586) that “the pipelines owned by Sinopec has 
been drilled to steal oil for 90,000 times by the end of July 2014”. They also reported that the 
Lin-Cang crude oil pipeline was drilled more than 860 times within 20 years. Hopkins (2007) 
asserts that one of the big challenges facing pipelines in recent years has to do with acts of 
terrorism, sabotage and theft. He stressed that since pipelines pass within and across poor 
regions that are politically unstable, inhospitable, corrupt and prone to terrorist attack, pipelines 
and other oil facilities are vulnerable to attack, sabotage and theft. He noted that Cano Limon 
pipeline in Colombia for instance was attacked 170 times in 2001 by terrorist groups despite 
the heavy and constant presence of armed guards. 
  
In Nigeria, vandalism of petroleum products pipelines dates back to the late 1970s or early 
1980s, when Nigeria was under military rule (Onuoha 2008, Katsouris & Sayne 2013, Boris 
2015). According to (Akpan, 2016) it started in the early 1970s, getting to its peak in the 1990s 
and since then has been on the rise. He noted that the modus operandi of the vandals also 
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progressed from small scale bunkering to highly sophisticated method of operation involving 
the use of ship for the transportation of the crude oil. In the 1980s, oil pipelines vandalism was 
carried out by a few amateurs who utilised crude methods to extract crude oil from the pipelines 
(Ikelegbe 2005).  
 
According to Alawode & Ogunleye (2011), in the 1990s petroleum products pipeline vandals 
were mainly unemployed youths who operated in remote areas and communities through which 
oil pipeline pass. These youths either punctured the pipes or took advantage of ruptured or 
leaking pipes to siphon the products into drums, plastic containers or storage cans ready for 
sale on the black market. Within this period the technology deployed was local and rudimentary 
which included funnels, drilling tools and plastic hoses. This period also witnessed few cases 
of vandalism. For instance, in 1995, there were only 7 reported cases of vandalism and the next 
three years recorded 33, 37, and 57 respectively (Special Committee on the Review of 
Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution, 2000).   
 
 Onuoha (2008) posits that the petroleum products pipelines vandalism has increased 
unprecedentedly since 1999. He argues that the vandalism of oil pipelines increased from 497 
in 1999 to 909 in 2000. In 2005, the phenomenon witnessed a sharp increase and recorded 2, 
258 cases. Corroborating the above view, Yunana, Adewale, Alfa & Sanjay (2017) stress that 
pipeline infrastructure in Nigeria, especially in the Niger Delta region has been confronted with 
increased number of vandalisation. According to them, between 2005 and 2015, an estimated 
number of 16,083 pipelines damages were documented, and out of this number, 15, 865 
(97.5%) breaks were attributed to vandalisation activities, while the remaining breaks were 
linked to other factors such as rupture. 
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 Ikelegbe (2005, p.221) contends that the ‘illegal business has grown from the amateur stage 
to “a very sophisticated industry which uses advanced technologies to tap crude and 
sophisticated communications equipment to navigate through the maze of hundreds of creeks, 
rivers and rivulets”. He maintains that the oil theft syndicate also transformed from the use of 
boats and barges to the utilisation of ships and large oil tankers in the high seas to ferry the 
stolen crude. Over the years, the frequency of vandalism of oil pipelines has indeed been very 
disturbing (Okoli & Orinya 2013).   
 
According to Ikelegbe (2005, p.221) Crude Oil is tapped from pipelines and terminals of the 
oil producing companies using advanced technological equipment and this is carried out in the 
“waterways, creeks swamps and high seas”.  Onuoha (2008) supports this assertion by 
maintaining that the rise in vandalism of oil pipelines has been accompanied by more 
technological sophisticated methods resulting in what Boris (2015, p.565) describes as 
attaining an “industrial scale and involves commodity traders, international criminals and a 
whole network of people”.  Nigeria loses over 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day to oil theft, 
vandalism of oil pipelines and related criminal vices in the country’s oil sector. This has been 
identified as the biggest threat to the Nigeria economy (Boris 2015).  
 
Okolo (2010) identifies three categories of actors responsible for oil pipelines vandalisation in 
Nigeria. These include those sabotaging the pipelines to siphon the products for economic 
gains. Under this category are the locals who collaborate with the staff of the multinational oil 
companies “especially in the Production Department and Liaison Offices in their flow stations 
to break pipelines, and later recommend the same “criminals” to the company’s Management 
for “clean-up” at exorbitant cost”. Another category according him is vandalism due to 
 
 
 
Fig 2 Nigeria’s Pipeline Networks 
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corrosion as a result of the aging pipelines, while those in the third category are the militants 
who “has over-shadowed the other two groups” Okolo (2010, p.10) . 
 Asuni (2009, p.5) argues that “at the local level, Niger Delta youth and community leaders 
play the leading role. As one moves up the network to the senior echelons, members of the 
Nigerian military, oil company and NNPC employees, top politicians, and retired military 
officers predominate”. The activities of oil theft in the Niger Delta is highly developed 
organisation involving different actors. These actors include the oil company employees, the 
military officers, the political elites, the local communities, the international oil traders, 
shippers, bankers, refiners, wealthy individuals, and the militants (Boris, 2016). According to 
Okoli and Orinya (2013, p.70), “vandals are members of organised crime who are engaged in 
oil theft, breaking into oil industry equipment, stealing thousands of gallons of the products 
and loading them into tankers and barges for export through the help of corrupt bureaucrats 
and police forces” 
 
Akpan (2016) identifies three classes of youths who engage in illegal bunkering in Nigeria. 
The first class is the jobless youth who try to earn a living through the illicit business, the 
second class of youths include those sponsored by influential Nigerians such as the military, 
the police and highly placed politicians for a fee. The third class is the militants who siphon 
the oil by blowing the pipes using various devices or instrument.  Lopez-Lucia (2015) believes 
that the militants from the Niger Delta and Bakassi Peninsula are involved in oil pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria. According to him their actions involve kidnappings, vandalism of oil 
pipelines and sabotaging of oil companies’ installations. He further claims that the goals of 
these militants has shifted from political towards capturing economic benefits emanating from 
oil crimes and related trafficking.   
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Fig 2.4 Niger Delta Militants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Nigerian News Direct 
  
There is international dimension to oil theft and vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria.  The 
international players are from Eastern Europe, Russia, Australia, Lebanon, the Netherlands, 
and France who all play roles in financing, transporting, and laundering the money associated 
with the illicit business, according to Asuni (2009). In support of this argument, Olateju (2013) 
emphasise that Oil theft is a big criminal ring with sophisticated organization and international 
network. Katsouris & Sayne (2013, p.30) note thus: 
In the general public narrative about Nigerian oil theft, tankers carry stolen crude to 
foreign refineries for instant processing and sales. The full picture is more elaborate. 
Crude oil can move in complex ways before and after it leaves Nigerian waters. None 
of these moves are suspect per se, but thieves can use the following complexities in 
normal everyday logistics to make stolen oil vanish into the legitimate market 
The effects of oil theft and vandalism of pipelines in Nigeria cannot be overemphasised. Assi, 
Amah & Edeke (2016) argue that oil theft and vandalism of pipelines is responsible for the 
massive crude oil spillages and pollutions in the Niger Delta region, destroying farm lands of 
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the host communities, vegetation and the means of livelihood of the people. Okoli & Orinya 
(2013) identify economic loses, environmental degradation, fire disaster/pipeline explosions 
and corruption as some of the effects of oil pipelines vandalism in Nigeria.  
 Abolurin (2010) the pioneer Commandant General of NSCDC, posits that the proceeds from 
vandalism of oil pipelines and crude oil theft are used for purchase of illegal weapons which 
are deployed for more bunkering, theft and other crimes including armed robbery and murder.  
Boris (2015) identifies revenues loss to the Nigerian government and the oil firms that own the 
assets from which oil is stolen, the river and land pollution, environmental degradation, 
increased criminality and insecurity in the Niger Delta region as some of the effects of oil theft 
and illegal bunkering activities. 
 
Fig. 2.5 Vandalised pipeline and people scooping fuel  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Financial watch (2017) 
 
The strategies and tactics being employed to address the problem 
In this section, literature on the strategies and tactics employed in some selected oil and gas 
producing countries is examined. Also investigated is extant academic and grey literature on 
the application of physical security in oil and gas pipelines security management, this is 
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followed by examining literature on the Nigerian government strategies and tactics to combat 
oil pipelines vandalism. The section concludes with a review of literature on the strengths and 
limitations of physical security deployment. 
 
Strategies and tactics employed in some selected oil and gas producing countries 
The protection of oil pipelines against vandalism and sabotage remains a high priority in 
countries that produce oil and gas all over the world (Fielding, 2012). The reason is that in 
these countries, oil and gas installations constitute the foremost critical National infrastructure.  
Ezeh, Chukwuchekwa, Ojiaku & Ekeanyawu (2014, p.21) explain that from the time 
immemorial, the need to implement “adequate security systems for pipelines management has 
been addressed”. Cooper (2006) maintains that pipeline security is something that is attracting 
increasing levels of investment within the oil industry.  
 
In the US, pipeline operators have always sought to secure their systems. For example, during 
the Gulf war, security at the Trans-Alaska pipeline included measures such as armed guards, 
controlled access, intrusion detection and dedicated communication at key facilities as well as 
aerial and ground surveillance of the pipeline corridor (US General Accounting Office, 1991). 
The event of September 11, 2001, however led to increase in security by Natural gas pipeline 
operators by identifying additional ways to deal with terrorist threats (Parfomak, 2004). This 
resulted in establishment of an information Sharing and Analysis center (ISAC) by pipeline 
operators in conjunction with other oil and gas companies. Agbakwuru (2011) observes that in 
2001, a project was initiated by the US department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and the 
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objective was to develop and demonstrate an optical fiber intrusion detection device that would 
prevent outside force damage. 
 
In Russia, the security of oil pipeline is given high priority. In 2006, the state Duma passed a 
Bill allowing energy companies, Gazprom and Transneft “to create corporate armies with 
expanded powers and privileges, and in July 2007, Gazprom and Transneft were authorized to 
form specialized paramilitary units, tasked to protect the pipelines (Zabyelina & Kustoria, 
2015, pp. 546-547). Apart from the specialized paramilitary units created by the Russian 
government, Skichel Corporation, a Russian security company developed a modern method of 
pipeline security for the complex security requirements of oil companies (Udofia & Joel, 2012).  
They stress that between 2004 – 2005, Russian oil producing companies were losing millions 
of dollars daily to theft and vandalism. Having taken into consideration the problem of the oil 
industry, security experts at Skichel developed several solutions for pipeline 
security/protection using security detectors of ‘the Gyurza’ series manufactured by the 
corporation. For the detection of all attempts of undermining a pipeline, a universal anti-
tunneling (or digging) security detector ‘Gyurza – 038P’ is used. This system with vibrations 
sensors registered all attempts of unauthorized tunneling or digging mechanical or explosive 
effects on the ground” (Udofia & Joel, 2012, p.12).  
 
Kenya pipeline companies have an elaborate security programme in partnership with private 
security firms to protect the energy facilities. Although Kenya private security guards are not 
allowed to carry guns, they nevertheless focus on industrial safety, accident prevention and 
mitigation, and also ensure that only the authorized personnel have access to critical facilities 
and they also prevent pilferage or theft of petroleum products. While the private security firms 
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are responsible for security outside the critical infrastructure, they however work closely with 
the nation’s intelligence professionals to identify and defeat threats before approaching the 
perimeter (Odhiambo, Maito & Onkware 2014).  
 
Turkey has a robust protection plan for its oil pipeline through a variety of regulations. In 
Turkey, two institutions are legally empowered to provide security for oil pipelines. These 
institutions are the ‘General Command of the Gendarmerie’ (GCG) which operates under the 
control of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) with the responsibility for border patrols and 
internal security particularly in rural areas, and ‘BOTAS’, the Petroleum pipelines corporation. 
These institutions are saddled with the responsibility of protecting the critical energy 
infrastructures (CEIs) of Turkey. “While the GCG with its 36 teams and 35 stations has been 
protecting pipeline facilities in rural areas in the Eastern parts of Turkey, BOTAS enhances 
and covers the expenses of physical security conditions (fortification of buildings, monitoring 
by infrared cameras and CCTV and so on) of those CEI’s” (Is, eri,2015, p.7) 
 
Application of physical security in oil pipeline security management 
 
Physical security is concerned with physical measures designed to safe guard people, and 
prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, materials and documents and safe guard 
them against any form of security incident (ASIS International, 2009). It uses “people, 
procedures and technology (both hardware and software), to protect assets” (ASIS 
International, 2012, p.1). 
Physical security is defined by (Coole & Treagust 2015, p.387) as “that part of a physical 
control measure designed to safeguard people, prevent unauthorized access to equipment, 
facilities, materials, documents; and to safe guard them against incident”. According to 
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Fennelly (2013) physical security measures encompasses devices, system or practice of 
tangible nature designed to protect people and prevent damage to loss of or unauthorized access 
to assets.  
Explaining further the concept of Physical Security, Patterson (2013, p.2) stresses that physical 
security is concerned primarily “with restricting physical access by unauthorized people 
(commonly interpreted as intruders) to controlled facilities”. He further notes that among the 
components of physical security are equipment, policies, standards and procedures which 
support the rings of security.  
 
In petroleum products pipeline security management, equipment, policies, standards and 
procedures could be used. According to ASIS International (2012) notes that: people, 
procedures and technology are combined to provide the physical protection system functions. 
The primary functions being detection, delay and response while the Secondary function is 
deterrence (Gracia, 2008). The Petroleum Industry Operators are aware of the critical role of 
physical security in petroleum products pipelines security management. In this regards, 
Fielding (2012, p.56) notes thus:  
Most petroleum producers recognize the importance of deploying an effective pipeline 
monitoring and surveillance solution, which includes a round-the-clock vigil on key 
operational perimeters in the distribution network, as well as monitoring leakages, 
electronic surveillance and the physical patrolling of the right of way 
He points out that pipeline security measures commonly deployed include aerial surveillance, 
ground patrolling, and installation of pipeline warning boards/ makers, deployment of security 
personnel and creating awareness for the locals along the pipelines route. Other methods 
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according to him includes advanced telecommunication system and leak detection system 
which are widely used for improved monitoring and remote control of pipelines.  
 
Cooper (2006) posits that SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) is routinely 
deployed in securing gas pipeline infrastructure throughout the world. He emphasized that 
SCADA enables real-time monitoring of the pipeline at several levels.  Hopkins (2007) 
recommends satellite surveillance as a practical solution for pipelines security. He also 
maintains that the use of sophisticated leak detection systems and remote sensing devices are 
generally deployed for detection of tampering on the pipelines. 
IFSEC Global (2016) identifies early detection of intruders along pipeline routes as the real 
key to securing such critical asset, because it provides time for security personnel to respond 
and intercept adversaries to prevent theft and damage.  
 
Eze, Nwagboso, Newman & Georgakin (2015) identify seismic sensor monitoring methods 
which are installed closed to the pipelines to collect and transmit seismic signals. Others 
include; fibre optic sensors which are used for detection of pipeline third party interference 
(TPI), satellite monitoring techniques which deploys satellite to monitor pipelines rights-of-
way for ground motion and encroachment. They also include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 
methods, wireless sensor network (WSN) which they describe as “presently the technology of 
choice for monitoring oil pipelines due to their low-cost nature and relative reliability” (Eze, 
Nwagboso, Newman & Georgakin in 2015, p.6).  
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Agbakwaru (2011) identifies physical security applications in oil pipelines security 
management to include, the acoustic impact detection system comprising of multiple acoustic 
sensors, power supply and remote transmitting devices which are placed along the pipeline at 
fixed intervals. An example of the acoustic impact detection system is ‘pipeguard technology’ 
developed by Magal Security Limited (Israel) and ‘threatscan technology’ developed by 
general electric. Both technologies can be deployed for warning on sabotage and illegal tapping 
detection.  Agbakwuru (2011) also recommends patrols and satellite monitoring which involve 
patrolling the pipelines right-of-way (ROW) by security forces and the use of drones for aerial 
surveillance. He also mentions optic fibre system, an intrusion detection device which detects 
and sends alarm when there is attack on the pipeline. Among the technology identified by him 
is the Impressed Alternating Cycle Current (IACC), which is a method that impresses 
“electrical signals on the pipe by generating a time varying voltage between the pipe and the 
soil at periodic locations where pipelines access in available” (Agbakwuru 2011, p. 1058).  
Fig 2.6 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gomex & Green (2017) 
 
Nigerian government strategies and tactics to combat vandalism of oil pipelines  
Given the strategic importance of crude oil to the Nigerian state, and obvious threats posed by 
the oil pipeline vandals, successive Nigerian governments have implemented various policies 
and measures aimed at preventing the vandalisation of oil pipelines. Such measures include 
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increased military presence in Niger Delta in 2003, culminating in the deployment of a JTF in 
2008 (Tomas, 2010, cited in Adishi & Hunga, 2017).  The JTF comprises the Army, Navy, and 
paramilitary agencies, and is mandated to check and possibly put an end to illegal bunkering 
in the oil-rich Niger Delta region (Adishi & Hunga, 2017). 
 
 Lupez-Lucia (2015) posits that the Nigerian government created the JTF  in 2004 comprising 
the army, navy, air force and mobile police to combat oil pipeline vandalism. He explains that 
the JTF was later expanded into a maritime security force, mandated to tackle a whole range 
of security issues in the maritime environment. Okafor and Olaniyan (2017) argues that the 
efforts of the Federal government towards improvement of the security of the pipelines include 
the hiring of private security firms, providing arms and ammunitions to the men and officers 
of the Nigerian armed forces to protect the facilities. 
 
Onuoha (2007 p.99) noted that before the pipelines were laid, the government acquired 3.5 
meters wide rights of way on each side of the pipelines and that the pipelines were buried a 
meter deep to “avoid accidental contacts since they traverse the length and breadth of the 
country”.  As explained by (Boris 2015, Adishi & Hunga 2017) the government established a 
task force on national infrastructure intended to monitor and respond to oil theft noting that the 
establishment of this task force and the militarization of the Niger Delta region, increased 
enforcement measures against the maritime trade in stolen oil. These measures according to 
them involved tasking the Nigerian Navy with the responsibility for registering vessels in 
Nigerian waters, closing markets for illegal oil and a hotline for reporting oil theft.  
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The Nigerian government efforts to improve the security of the pipelines include among others; 
hiring of private security firms, providing necessary equipment to men and officers of the 
Nigerian armed forces to protect the government facilities (Okafor & Olaniyan (2017). In 
support of this assertion, Onwuka & Dike (2015, p.128) note thus: 
“The Nigerian Government enlisted the ex-militant leaders in the war against pipeline 
vandalism, in addition to other surveillance procedures by the oil industry operators. 
Multi-billion Naira surveillance contracts were awarded to the companies belonging to 
the ex-militant leaders and operational areas assigned to them for effective surveillance 
of the oil and gas pipelines”.      
These ex-militant leaders include; Dokubo Asari, the founder and leader of the Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Force; Tompolo & Boyloaf, former commanders of the movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta and Ateke Tom, a former leader of Niger Delta Vigilante. 
 
Other strategies adopted by the Nigerian government include the  constitution of committees 
such as the National Economic Council (NEC) comprising  governors, Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) officials, department of petroleum resources (DPR), 
multinational  oil companies, security agencies and other relevant agencies mandated to come 
up with strategies to contain vandalism of oil pipelines and the concomitant oil theft; an inter-
agency Marine Operation Coordination Committee (MOCC), mandated to provide synergy 
among agencies operating within oil sector to ensure safety, security and air surveillance on 
Nigeria’s pipelines (Anyio 2015)      
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As part of the strategies adopted by the Nigerian government to check the menace of petroleum 
products pipeline vandalism, the government established the Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps (NSCDC), a para-military agency of  the government of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (Mboho & Udousoro, 2014), which is currently controlled by the Federal Ministry 
of Interior (Abolurin, 2010). The Act of Parliament (Nigeria) expressly conferred to it the 
authority to investigate the offence of vandalism of oil pipelines and to initiate proceedings 
thereto on behalf of the Attorney General of the Federation. Generally, the core responsibility 
of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps is the protection and prevention of vandalism of 
Nigeria’s critical national infrastructure including the petroleum products pipelines (Mboho & 
Udousoro 2014). According to Phenson, Ojie & Esin (2014), the NSCDC Act 2013 passed by 
the Nigeria National Assembly gave the agency the responsibility to monitor oil and gas 
pipelines and arrest vandals. Abolurin (2010) stressed that the NSCDC has a vital role to play 
in containing the vandalism of oil pipelines, critical national infrastructures such as 
Telecommunications cables, the Power Holding Company of Nigeria Limited (PHCN) 
installations, government buildings and other infrastructures throughout the country.    
 
It holds “responsibility to enter and search any premises and seize any material suspected to 
have been used in vandalisation or suspected process of vandalisation as well as arrest, 
investigate and hand over to relevant security agencies for further investigation and 
prosecution” (Abolurin 2010, pp.51-52). To carry out this statutory mandate, the agency 
established a task force on anti-vandalism, charged with the duty of protecting the oil pipelines 
(Mboho & Udousoro 2014). The NSCDC responds to vandalism of oil pipelines by the use of 
three different approaches. These are; “preventive diplomacy” which entails deployment of 
men and officers of the Corps to the communities through which pipelines traverse and 
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patrolling the pipelines on daily basis; the “use of force” which implies arrest and prosecution 
of vandals where vandalism of oil pipelines has occurred; and “human security dimension" 
which involves intervention of the corps members during cases of infernos resulting from 
vandalization of oil pipelines (Abolurin 2010 p.52).  
 
 Commenting on the successes achieved by the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps 
(NSCDC), Mboho & Udousoro (2014, p.57) maintain that “there is increased success recorded 
by the corps when compared with “the incessant menace of vandalism of a decade ago and into 
present”.  Substantiating this argument, Mboho & Udousoro (2014) present the following data 
from four states in Nigeria, highlighting the achievements of NSCDC in the anti-vandalism 
war. 
 
Table 2.2 September, 2012 and August 2013, Bayelsa State Anti-Vandalism Report 
S/N Discovered Item Quantity 
1 Oil spillage and bunkering zone 1 
2 Car 3 
3 Shovel 5 
4 Kidnap victims 2 
5 Jerry can 3 
6 Wooden Boat 4 
7 Arrested Militant 4 
8 Illegal refineries 8 
9 Arrested suspects 8 
10 Wheel Barrow 10 
11 Illegal Oil Distillery Camps 42 
12 Cotonou Boat 40 
13 Iron Tanks 33 
14 Plastic Drums 127 
Source: Mboho & Udousoro (2014) 
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Table 2.3 September, 2012 and September 2013, Delta State Anti-Vandalism-Illegal 
Bunkering Activities Report 
S/N Discovered Item Quantity 
1 Truck 1 
2 Kidnapped Victims 2 
3 Illegal refinery 7 
4 Trucks 4 
5 Pistol 5 
6 Shovel 4 
7 Cars 6 
8 Cotonou Boat 8 
9 Wheel barrow 10 
10 Metal Drums 15 
11 Dug pit 19 
12 Hose 24 
13 Persons injured 24 
14 Gee Pee Tanks 35 
15 Arrested Suspects 80 
16 Wooden Boat 177 
17 Vessels 3,000 
18 Jerry Cans 6,205 
19 Surface Tanks 105 
20 Plastic/Iron drums 9,527 
21 Quality of AGO 10,975 litres  
Source: Mboho & Udousoro (2014) 
 
 
Table 2.4 September 2012 and September 2013, River State Anti-Vandalism and  
Dismantling of Illegal Refinery Report 
 
S/N Discovered Item Quantity 
1 AGO 29,785 ltrs 
2 Plastic drums containing crude oil 1 
3 Crude oil 2420ltrs 
4 Welding gas cylinder  1 
5 Pressure Gauge 1 
6 Pumping machine 3 
7 Pipeline leakage 1 
8 Empty drums 10 
Source: Mboho & Udousoro (2014) 
 
 
 
Page 62 of 220 
 
Table 2.5 September, 2012 and September 2013, Akwa Ibom State Anti-Vandalism Report 
S/N Discovered Item Quantity 
1 AGO 14,076 ltrs 
2 Illegal refinery 2 
3 Suspected vandals 9 
4 AK 47 5 
5 Rifles 2 
6 Iron Drums 69 
7 Suspected vandals including a politician 3 
Source: Mboho & Udousoro (2014) 
 
Table 2.2 to 2.5 present the reports of anti-vandalism task force in four states of Nigeria; 
Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers and Akwa Ibom States respectively, from September 2012 to 
September, 2013 as cited by Mboho and Udousoro (2014). The tables show various items and 
the quantities recovered from the vandals by the task forces from the four states.  Efforts to 
obtain the most recent data on the activities of the anti-vandalism task force in the Niger Delta 
region by this researcher did not yield result because such data could not be obtained either 
from the Ministry of Niger Delta or any other sources. 
 
Boris (2016) summarises the achievements of Nigerian armed forces including the  JTF in the 
fight against vandalism of oil pipelines and oil theft for the period 2009 -2014. His findings are 
presented in appendix A1 
 
Despite the apparent successes recorded by the current government strategies and tactics in 
reducing or eliminating oil pipelines vandalism in Nigeria, the literature examined brought to 
the fore an avalanche of notable limitations. One such limitation from the literature is that the 
vandals seem to be armed to a greater extent with modern and sophisticated weapons than the 
government security forces, and are highly skilled in weapons use. Alluding to the 
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sophistication of the vandals, (Akpan, 2016, p.50) argues that “oil thieves often come fully 
armed and are backed by top military officers who will simply instruct the junior officers on 
the field to look the other way”. This implies that the corrupt senior military officers have been 
bribed to instruct the junior ones to look the other way from the direction of the vandals. 
Corroborating this argument, Ikelegbe (2005) maintains that the syndicate are well organised 
and the field operators are heavily armed. Odalonu (2015) believes that the theft of crude oil 
in Nigeria may persist for a long time to come due to the level of sophistication the illicit 
business has assumed in recent times, and the caliber of those involved. The anti-vandalism 
war in Nigeria appears to be ineffective because of involvement of criminal cartels and trans-
national organized criminals (Okafors & olaniyan, 2017). Insiders play remarkable role in 
slowing down the war against oil pipelines vandalism in Nigeria. Onwuka & Dike (2015) 
substantiate this claim by arguing that the outsourcing of pipelines surveillance contract to ex-
militants in the Niger Delta region created tension because the ex-militant war lords who were 
contracted to provide surveillance on oil pipelines turned round to become security threats to 
the facility by sabotaging the government and vandalizing the same pipelines to steal petroleum 
products. 
 Another notable limitation militating against the success of the current government efforts 
towards eradicating vandalism of oil pipelines is the connivance of some security personnel 
with the vandals to steal petroleum products (Onuoha, 2008). Furthermore, it is argued that the 
security agents deployed to protect the oil pipelines do not target or arrest the real masterminds 
of vandalism of oil pipelines (Lopez-Lucia, 2015).  According to him, corruption is so 
pervasive in the Nigeria oil and gas sector and requires a complete clean-up of the system. 
Adishi & Hunga (2017, p.58) concurring with the view of  Lupez-Lucia notes that the seizure 
of ships and arrests of oil theft suspects did not result in their successful persecutions due to 
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the disappearance of both seized ships and those involved in the acts. Odalomu (2016, p. 002) 
describes the masterminds of vandalism of oil pipelines as “untouchable thieves” who illegally 
load crude oil onto their own or hired ships and sail to the waters off Nigeria, where the buying 
foreign merchants from west Africa and Eastern Europe await them. Asuni (2009 p. 6) observes 
that the efforts to control oil bunkering “were usually not sustained or were executed in a half–
hearted manner”. This could be due to “inadequate knowledge of the scale of its occurrence in 
terms of the patterns expressed by its varying intensities or magnitude of its aspects over space, 
time and structure” (Ingwe 2015, p.77).   
Another significant limitation to the current strategies and tactics adopted to end vandalism of 
oil pipelines is the lack of cooperation by the host communities (Oteh & Ezeh 2012). As set 
out by them: 
Oil prospecting companies in the area exist in opposing end with the people. While the 
management of the known companies enjoys good living conditions (which include use 
of electricity, health care, good water supply etc., their host communities have no access 
to such basic amenities” (Oteh & Ezeh 2012, p.15). 
 The continued poor living condition of the oil producing communities according to Oteh and 
Ezeh, (2012) has led to constant hostilities between the locals and the government. Adejoh 
(2014) on his part attributes the hindrances to the success of anti-vandalism drive to the terrain 
and environmental factors in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. According to him, the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company’s 95km trunk, for instance,  “runs from Nembe Creek field 
to Cawthorne channel field passing through thirty five communities and traversing sixty rivers 
and Creeks of various sizes along its route” (Adejoh, 2014, p. 94). This difficult terrain 
according to him inhibits successful monitoring and adequate policing of the oil pipelines by 
the government security forces.  
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The deployment of the members of the armed forces of Nigeria to the Niger Delta region 
commonly referred to as “militarization of the Niger Delta” has been heavily criticized and the 
security forces have been accused of human rights abuses including bombing the vandals in 
civilian locations resulting in civilian casualties. The JTF operations in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria have led to human right abuses (Chiluwa 2011; Obi 2009; Okumagba 2012). Usoro, 
Ekpeyong & Effiong (2014, p.145) argues that the deployment of security forces to the Niger 
Delta region has led to severe human rights abuses. Table 2.6 is the recorded human right 
abuses between 1990 and 2006 cited by Usoro, Ekpenyong and Efffiong (2014).  These records 
were the most recent available at the time of conducting this research. Although the records are 
old, they have however demonstrated the claims of human right abuses by the JTF personnel 
in the Niger Delta. 
 
Table 2.6 Recorded human right abuses between 1990 and 2006  
Year Place  Security 
Agency 
Action carried out  
August 1990 Umuechen Security Forces 80 unarmed demonstrators killed, 395 
houses destroyed. 
1993 Choba Mobile Police Houses razed down; properties destroyed.  
Nov. 1999 Odi Army The entire community completely 
destroyed. 2,483 mostly women and 
children killed. 
Jan. 2004 Uwheru Joint Task Force 20 persons killed, 11 houses burnt down.  
July 2004 Egbema Joint Task Force A total of 13 communities destroyed, over 
500 houses razed and 200 persons mostly 
women and children feared dead. 
August 2004 Olugbobiri 
& Ikebiri 
State Security 
Forces 
About 16 peaceful and unarmed persons 
killed. 
Oct.2005 Odioma Joint Military 
Task Force 
Over 50 people mostly women and children 
killed. 
Feb. 2006 Gbaramatu Joint Military 
Task Force 
15 women and children killed in their 
houses.  
Oct. 2006 Afiesere Police  Over 80 houses burnt and 20 persons killed. 
 
Source: Usoro, Ekpenyong, & Effiong, (2014, p.145) (Adapted from Emeudo, (2013).  
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Strengths and Limitations of physical security deployment 
In terms of deployment of physical security such as the application of wireless sensor networks, 
the strengths lie in its ability to monitor pipeline infrastructure at real-time (Yunana, Adewale, 
Alfa & Sanjay (2017).  Bernos (2017) notes that SkyX Drone-based monitoring system can 
reduce traditional monitoring costs by nearly 90%, as claimed by the manufactures. According 
to him, the technology can provide more comprehensive information faster by employing 
artificial intelligence to recognize issues and recommend immediate interventions.  
 
Kadafa (2012) discussing the limitations of physical security application, argues that in terms 
of monitoring, some critical factors such as the location of the oil companies, the terrain, the 
accessibility, revenue, manpower availability for monitoring agency, qualified manpower are 
not   available. This according to him restricts the ability and efficiency of pipelines monitoring.  
Eze, Nwagboso, Newnan & Georgakis (2015) posits that most pipeline monitoring systems 
available currently are mainly based in detecting leakages, which only report pipeline leaks 
after incidents had occurred. In this respect they are reactive monitoring system.  Murray (2012, 
p.30), however maintains that “many perimeter intrusion protection methods that have been 
successful in other environments have proved impractical for pipelines”, since the requirements 
for pipeline protection include very long protection sites.  
Table 2.7 computed by Yunana Adewale, Alfa & Sanja (2017) compares oil pipelines 
protection techniques through application of technology; identifies the researcher, the 
technology, their strengths and weaknesses. 
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Table 2.7 Oil Pipeline Monitoring Techniques Compared 
 
Researcher Techniques Strengths Weakness 
Gar and Alfred, 
2003 
Satelite 
Monitoring 
Ability to monitor entire 
pipeline Right of Way 
Unsuitable for real-time 
monitoring. It is applicable for 
over ground pipelines only 
Yuanwei and 
Eydgahi, 2008 
Acoustic Detection of minimum 
noticeable leaks 
Non-interference with the 
pipeline operation. The 
topology of the pipeline is 
made too simple with 
acoustic sensors 
Custom-built for the pipeline 
structure. 
Localization method is 
ineffective for complicated 
topologies of pipeline. 
Jasper, 2011 Visual 
inspection 
Support available 
commercial cameras in 
monitoring 
Unsuitable for underground 
pipelines different cameras are 
usually required for individuals 
line-sight 
Bimpas et al., 
2011 
Ground 
Penetrating 
Radar 
Ability to precisely locate 
underground pipelines with 
no digging required. It can 
cover quite a number of 
miles 
Unsuitable for real-time 
monitoring. Involves rigorous 
human participation. 
Jakub, 2014 Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle 
(Drones) 
High signal rate and ability 
to move around along 
pipeline vicinity 
Unsuitable for underground 
pipeline and continuous 
monitoring 
Rajeev et al., 
2013 
Fiber 
Technology 
It provides real-time 
monitoring of pipeline 
infrastructure. Able to cover 
long distances 
Expensive in nature, fibre 
damage can render the system in 
operational. It must be installed 
across the entire length of the 
pipeline. 
Nader and 
Imad, 2008 
Wired and 
wireless 
Sensor 
Network 
Architecture 
It is suitable and reliable for 
wired and wireless sensors 
deployment in monitoring 
pipeline infrastructure 
There was no clear architecture 
illustrating how the individual 
sensor nodes will be deployed 
and what parameters to be 
measured for a specified fluid 
Source: Yunana Adewale, Alfa & Sanja (2017) 
 
Discussion 
The academic and grey literature on vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria depicts it as a 
complex problem which involves many actors including the locals within the oil producing 
communities, the armed bandits operating as militants, some security personnel deployed to 
the Niger Delta region, some oil companies’ staff and international actors. A review of the 
literature reveals that there is a scarcity of scholarly works in the area of specific challenges 
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which inhibit the operations of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and 
thus need to be improved so as to enable the agency operates optimally and successfully carry 
out its statutory mandate of protecting Nigeria’s national critical infrastructure, including the 
petroleum products pipelines.  
 
Crude oil and refined petroleum products are the main revenue earner for Nigeria and the 
sustainer of her economy. These products are transported from the point of production to either 
local refineries or export terminals through pipelines. These pipelines have been subjected to 
vandalisation by oil thieves and other criminal elements in Nigeria. The literature examined 
reveals that a gap exists in the area of holistic mitigation strategies for vandalism of oil 
pipelines. While many scholars seem to emphasise the impacts of vandalism of oil pipelines 
on the Nigerian economy, environment and human security, few scholars even mention how 
the menace can be brought under control or how the pipelines can be better protected. This 
empirical study will attempt to investigate this area with a view to contributing to scholarly 
works in this area.  
The Niger Delta region remains the hub of crude oil production in Nigeria. The area also plays 
host to the militants who attack these pipelines either to sabotage the Nigerian government or 
to steal the products which are sold in black market or export illegally to foreign collaborators. 
Although the literature addresses the government efforts to checkmate the illicit business, there 
is a clear gap on why oil theft is in the increase, despite the efforts of the government to 
checkmate it. The issues of corruption and complicity of top military personnel and other 
security operatives in vandalism of oil pipelines and oil theft have not been thoroughly 
investigated. There is therefore an identified gap in the literature. We intend to investigate these 
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apparent gaps with a view to bringing to the fore the suspected corrupt practices alleged to be 
prevalent in the Nigeria oil industry. 
 
The basic principles of risk management have been examined in the literature, and strategy for 
corporate risks mitigations which involves planned actions to respond to identified risks at 
corporate level is also highlighted. These actions are categorised into four groups 
fundamentally, which includes risk avoidance, risk reduction, risk transfer and risk retention.  
Physical security, which is concerned with physical control measures in assets protection, has 
also been discussed. It emphasises the deployment of devices, systems or practices to protect 
assets in all forms, whether tangible, intangible, or mixed. These include people, property and 
information. Physical security has also been described in the literature as defence-in-depth 
which combines different layers of control, usually moving from the outer perimeter of a 
facility to the center. The literature on physical security has placed in context the relevance of 
their applications in the management of the security risks associated with oil and gas sector in 
general, and petroleum products pipelines in particular. 
 
Oil and gas sector faces many risks, with the risks ranging from natural and environmental, 
engineering, management and economic. Other industry-specific risks which the sector faces 
include corruption, terrorism, government regulations and environmental activism. The 
criticality of security risk management in oil and gas sector has been brought to the fore in the 
literature and various methods have been suggested to mitigate them. Of particular note are the 
threats posed by terrorism, extremism and organised criminal syndicates.  The adversaries have 
been identified as national and international extremists, cyber security threats, ideological-
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driven actors and disgruntled employees. It has been suggested that to counter the threats posed 
by the adversaries, the oil and gas sector should adopt multi-prolonged strategies which could 
isolate extremists through application of a socio-anthropological lens to enable them gain a 
deeper understanding of the various extremists’ groups (Giroux & Gilpin, 2013). 
 
Of particular importance in the oil and gas sector is the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights, which emphasises accurate assessment of risks present in a company’s 
operating environment, an action that is very critical to the security of personnel, local 
communities and the company’s assets. The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights posits that, while governments have the primary roles of maintaining law and order, 
security and respect for human rights, companies should demonstrate sufficient interest in 
ensuring that governments’ actions, especially actions of public security providers are 
consistent with human rights protection and promotion. 
 
The literature identifies countries around the world that experience the problem of oil and gas 
pipeline attacks, vandalism and oil theft. Kustova (2015) mentions some oil producing 
countries of Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia in Latin America that have lost billions of 
dollars to oil and gas theft. There is presently scarcity of scholarly works on how these countries 
address the problem of oil pipelines attacks and oil theft in their domain. It is the researcher’s 
view that the literature in this area could assist other countries especially developing countries 
like Nigeria in tackling similar menace. 
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Physical security uses people, procedures and technology to protect assets according to ASIS 
International (2012). Oil pipelines are critical national assets in countries that produce oil and 
gas. Although, there are various technologies such as wireless sensors, intrusion detention 
systems & unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to monitor and protect oil pipelines, the study  has 
not fully explored these technologies and how they can be applied in the management of 
petroleum products pipelines security. There is a need to research into this area so as to avail 
the oil and gas producers with the benefits of applying these technologies in the protection of 
critical energy infrastructures. 
 
Okafor & Olaniyan (2017) emphasise the need for structured multi-agency security response 
approach to tackle the menace of vandalism of oil pipelines. This approach, according to him 
implies coming together of all relevant security agencies in a formal and organised manner to 
deal with all issues relating to pipelines security. The approach completely ignores the role of 
technology in oil pipelines protection. There is therefore an existing gap in the area of 
integrated security approach, where physical security is fully integrated with the security forces 
and other stakeholders in an organized manner to provide holistic protection for oil pipelines. 
This is an area for further research which this study is set to investigate empirically.       
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology employed in the gathering and presentation of the 
research data. It begins with a discussion on research design which covers research philosophy 
and case study methodology; followed by the research method which discusses sampling 
strategy, semi structured interviews and data analysis. Finally, the research experience is 
discussed, and the chapter concludes with a reflection on the effectiveness of the research 
methods adopted for the study.  
 
Research design  
The research design discusses the research philosophy and the case study methodology adopted 
for this study.  The research philosophy probes into the ontological and epistemological bases 
of the research, while the case study methodology is discussed highlighting its advantages to 
this study with relevant literature. 
Research philosophy 
 Before the discussion of the research methods used in this study, it is important to set out the 
philosophical perspectives, in other words, the epistemological and ontological bases of the 
research. Assumptions and choices are made in response to research questions which, overtly 
or covertly, have significant consequences for conducting social enquiry, as well as the 
research results (Blaikie 1993). All research is based on some underlying philosophical 
assumptions about what constitute an acceptable research (Antwi & Hamza 2015).  Denscombe 
(2010) and Grix (2010) contend that the philosophical standpoint of the researcher provides 
the very foundation upon which social research is constructed and should not be overlooked. 
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Contextually, Dunne, Pryor and Yates (2005) argue that philosophical issues are essential 
ingredients in determining how a researcher perceives social realities. Research Philosophy 
addresses “the assumptions that support the research strategy and the methods chosen as part 
of research paradigm” (Ihuah & Eaton 2013, p.935). The relevance of research philosophy 
brings to the fore the philosophical foundation debate which according to Mkansi & 
Acheanpong (2012), generate contradicting arguments as to which philosophy is best for a 
subject.  
 
  Tobey, Rotich & Bengat (2015, p.224) note that ontological question in social science 
research are related to the nature of reality and that there are “two broad contrasting positions: 
objectivism that holds that there is an independent reality and constructionism which assumes 
that reality is the product of social process. Wilson (2001 p.175) postulates that positivism and 
post-positivism are two paradigms that are based on the similar ontological foundation; that 
there is only one reality and that researchers have to be “as objective as possible in order to 
reach that reality”, so the researchers use manipulative and experimental types of research in 
trying to increase objectivity in order to get closer to that reality.  
 
 Wilson (2001) further posits that another ontological foundation is constructivism which 
believes that there is not just one reality but multiple realities that exist and that these realities 
are socially constructed. Denscombe (2010) describes these positions as realist and 
constructionist.   Reflecting on my position as a researcher, I tend to lean toward the 
constructionist perspective considering that elements of social world are constantly changing 
and adapting with human lifestyles. My view is that the problem of petroleum products 
pipelines vandalism in Nigeria is understood differently by different people.  My aim is to ask 
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the research participants their own view on the problem and to obtain their perspectives of the 
phenomenon.  This view will be constructed with reference to their personal experiences and 
each generating their own version of reality. 
Epistemology could be described as the foundation of true knowledge and is necessary in the 
creation of new knowledge because it makes it possible to understand how researchers generate 
and acquire scientific knowledge (Ashatu 2009 cited by Everest 2014). The idea of 
epistemology infers several questions: “what is the relationship between the knower and the 
known?”, “how do we know what we know?” and “what counts as knowledge?” (Antwi & 
Hamza 2015, p.219).  Grix (2010) identifies two principal epistemological starting bases: 
foundationist and anti-foundationist, stating that the foundationist sees reality as independent 
of human understanding while anti–foundationist holds that reality is reliant on people 
constructing meaning from it. 
As a researcher, my sympathy is for both epistemological perspectives and therefore consider 
that each may have something to offer in the advancement of social science. Tying myself to 
one paradigm is restrictive and therefore I have chosen to adopt a pragmatic approach. 
Pragmatism is described as the rejection of the competing primary philosophies (O’Leary 2007, 
Dencombe 2010). Johnson & Onwuegbuzie (2004 p.16) posits that “taking a pragmatic and 
balanced or pluralist position will help improve communication among researchers from 
different paradigms as they attempt to advance knowledge”. This study employed a descriptive, 
explanatory and analytic qualitative case study approach. 
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Case study methodology 
 The case study research accommodates a variety of research techniques such as participant 
observation, interviews, questionnaires, and documentary studies (triangulation). A case study 
entails a detailed, in-depth and intensive exploration and analysis of a specific case which could 
be a person, a family, community, social group, institution, organisation, a country, an event, 
a programme, in its natural setting and from the perspective of the insiders (social actors).  
Hence, it is also known as the naturalistic inquiry, the field research or the interpretive 
paradigm. It focuses on the process, complexity and nature of the case in question (Bogdan and 
Biklen 1992, Cresswell 1994, Stake 1995, 2000, 2002, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Merrian 1998, 
Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Naoum 2006, Stake 2008).  
There are three types of case study approaches: the descriptive, the analytical and explanatory 
case studies (Naoum 2006). The case study approach explains theory and causality and “tries 
to show linkages among the objects of the study. It asks why things happen the way they do. 
The researcher collects facts and studies the relationship of one set of facts to another, with the 
hope of finding some causal relationship between them” (Naoum 2006, p.46).   
 
A case study is also crucial for an in-depth analysis which provides a framework for 
understanding issues in other similar settings or units. Hence, Cohen and Manion (1994, p. 
102) define it as an “investigation of an individual unit to probe deeply and analyse all 
characteristics of the unit to establish generalisations about the wider community to which it 
belongs.” However, the crucial factor is not whether the findings can be generalised to a wider 
universe, but how well the researcher interprets and analyses data and generates theory out of 
the findings. The case study organisation for this research is the Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps (NSCDC).  
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Research methods 
This section briefly discusses the sampling strategy used in the study. It also explores semi-
structured interviews and examines data analysis process adopted for the study. Ethical 
considerations are also discussed. 
Sampling strategy 
A purposive sampling technique was employed in this qualitative research study. This 
technique also called judgment sampling, is the deliberate choice of a participant due to the 
qualities the participant possesses (Etikan, Musa & Alkasim 2016). The argument or 
justification for the selection method is that the researcher identifies those who are in a position 
to provide informative data and answers to the research questions and problem due to their 
professional training or occupational advantage and experience (Patton 1990).  
According to Merriam (1998), the purposive non-probability sampling procedure is logical as 
long as the researcher needs the data to solve qualitative problems such as discovering what 
occurs, the implications and relationships of the occurrences rather than to answer questions 
such as how much or how many. This is because qualitative research aims at maximizing the 
range of specific information that can be obtained from and about that context, by deliberately 
selecting locations and informants that differ from one another. Therefore, sampling in the 
interpretive paradigm is often purposeful and directed at certain inclusive criteria rather than 
random” (Babbie and Mouton, 2006, pp.177-288). The merits of purposive sampling are that 
it provides expert answers to what one wants to discover, understand and gain insights into. It 
also accords the researcher the opportunity to select the respondents based on his/her 
knowledge of the population, its elements, the aims and rationale of the study and the 
researcher’s judgment of the purpose of the study (Babbie and Mouton, 2006). 
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While the research was primarily developed as a case study of the Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps, an agency established to provide security for critical infrastructure in Nigeria 
with special mandate to protect oil and gas facilities, efforts were made to gain views and 
insights from a number of additional stakeholders for an informed interpretation of the data. 
As Babbie and Mouton, (2007, p.27) advised “the best way to elicit the various and divergent 
constructions of reality that exist within the context of a study is to collect information about 
…events and relationships from different points of view. This means asking different 
questions, seeking different sources and using different methods”.  
A total of 22 participants were interviewed, as summarized in Table 3.1. The largest group of 
participants was drawn from the NSCDC, with nine personnel of the rank of commandant from 
all the oil producing states in Nigeria being interviewed. Their perspectives were supplemented 
by interviews with the following further stakeholders: 
 Three members of military JTF deployed to the oil producing states; 
 Representatives of the major oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, (Shell Petroleum 
Development Company and ExxonMobil); 
 Two Community representatives from the oil producing communities of Egbema in Rivers 
state and Ibeno in Akwa-Ibom state; 
 Representatives of two NGOs in the Niger Delta region; 
 Representatives of two PSCs contracted to secure oil and gas pipelines in the Niger Delta 
region; and  
 Two representatives of physical security professionals selected from known physical 
security experts. 
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The interview questions were structured to facilitate asking multiple participants the same 
questions. After the 22 interviews,  the responses  reached  “data saturation”, the point  when 
“ no new information or themes are observed in the data” (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2016, 
p.59),  and the interviews elicited all forms and types of occurrences that ensured the research 
questions within the scope of the case study were answered.  
The participants were selected through a purposive sampling strategy from the nine states of 
the Niger Delta region, including Lagos and Ogun states where vandalism of oil pipelines 
mostly occurs. In order to ensure sufficient anonymisation of the interviewees, zones were used 
to represent all the nine states of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, identified as zones A to H, 
from where the personnel of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps selected.  Two other 
states with high incidences of vandalism of oil pipelines that do not fall within the Niger Delta 
region classification were identified as Western region 1 and Western region 2 and from these 
regions two members of security JTF were interviewed.   
 
The interviews with the 22 participants commenced on September 15, 2018 and concluded 
February 20th 2019. Twenty interviews were conducted through Skype using internet while 
the remaining two interviews were undertaken face-to-face. The face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with participants representing oil producing communities and were drawn each from 
Rivers state and Akwa Ibom state oil communities respectively.  The face-to-face interviews 
became necessary because there were no internet facilities in the oil producing communities, 
hence neutral locations were decided in their respective local government council headquarters 
where the interviews were conducted. 
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Table 3.1 Profiles of Interviewees  
Current Role (NSCDC) Previous Role  
1. Zone A Command 
Deputy Commandant (Anti-Vandalism) 
 
Assistant Commandant Intelligence 
(Headquarters)  
2. Zone B Command 
Deputy Commandant (Joint Task Force) Field Operations 
 
Assistant Commandant Training  
3. Zone C Command 
Ass. Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Unit) Field Operations 
 
Assistant Commandant Armed Squad 
4. Zone D Command 
Dept. Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Units) Field Operations 
 
Assistant Commandant Armed Squad  
5. Zone E Command 
Deputy Commandant, (Anti-Vandalism Unit) Field Operations 
 
Assistant Commandant Logistics  
6. Zone F Command 
Asst. Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Unit) Field Operations 
 
Assistant Commandant (Joint Task Force) 
7. Zone G Command 
Deputy Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Unit) Field Operations 
Assistant Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Unit) 
8. Zone H Command  
Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Unit) Field Operations 
Deputy Commandant (Anti-Vandalism Unit) 
9. NSCDC Headquarters  
Corps Commandant 
Deputy Corps Commandant 
10. Deputy Commandant (HQTRs) Assistav5nt Commandant (Headquarters)  
11.  JTF Western region 1 
Joint task Force Commander 
 
Air Force Wing Commander 
NAF  
12. JTF Western region 2 
Joint Task Force Commander 
Navy Captain Nigeria Navy (NN) 
13. Multinational Oil Companies (MOC) 
Senior Manager (Shell Petroleum)  
Manager (Shell Petroleum) 
14. Senior Manager (ExxonMobil) Manager (ExxonMobil) 
15. Oil Producing Communities’ Leaders 
Youth Leader (Rivers) 
 
Youth Activist 
16. Youth Leader (Akwa Ibom) Youth Activist 
17. NGOs  
Deputy Manager (NGO Bayelsa) 
 
Assistant Manager (NGO Bayelsa)  
18. Senior Manager (NGO Akure) 
 
Manager 
(NGO Akure)  
19. Private Security Companies (PSCs) 
Guard Supervisor (Oil Facility Surveillance - Delta)  
Security Guard 
(Oil Facility Surveillance - Delta) 
 
20 Supervisor (Izon-Ibe Securtiy Company Nigeria Limited) Security Guard (Izon-Ibe Security Company 
Nigeria Limited) 
21. Physical Security Experts 
Physical Security Consultant (Lagos) 
Physical Security manager (Lagos) 
22 Physical Security Consultant (Port-Harcourt) Oil & Gas Security Expert (Port-Harcourt) 
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To gain access to the research participants and attain successful fieldwork, the researcher had 
to obtain the approval of the ‘gate keepers’ (relevant authorities) and maintain a productive 
relationship with the respondents (Marshall & Rossman 1989, Cresswell 1994). The relevant 
‘gate keepers’ included senior personnel in the office of the CG of the NSCDC who facilitated 
access to the NSCDC and the JTF personnel, while access to participants from the MOCs was 
facilitated by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN). 
Also, a senior official in the Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta 
facilitated the link with both oil producing communities’ leaders and the private security 
companies belonging to the former militant commanders. To access the participants from 
relevant NGOs in the Niger Delta, contact was facilitated by the Nigeria Network of NGOs, 
while ASIS chapters 236 and 206 facilitated the access to physical security experts from Port 
Harcourt and Lagos respectively. As Schotstak and Schostak (2008) put it “the negotiating 
process involves inscribing the reasons for being with people and at places relevant to the 
research into the agendas that prevail in the given social circumstances” Schotstak and 
Schostak (2008, p.237).  Letters requesting permission to conduct studies through interviews 
were posted and/or submitted by the researcher to the selected institutions and individual 
respondents.  
The letters explained how the studies was to be conducted, that is, the data collection 
instruments, the proposed participants, the time frame and how the data will be reported/used 
and shared with the respective institutions. This is in line with Miles & Huberman’s (1994) 
parameters for conducting qualitative research studies. That is, the researcher has to establish 
the setting (where the research will take place), the actors (who will be observed or 
interviewed), the events (what the actors will be observed doing or interviewed about) and the 
process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by actors within the setting) (in Cresswell 
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1994). This provided the framework for the conduct of this study. The details of the access 
negotiation and the research instruments are provided in the ethics section of this study. 
However, the researcher did not get responses from some of the intended respondents’ 
institutions such as the Multinational Oil Companies and the NGOs. However, through mutual 
contacts in the oil companies and the NGOs respectively, the potential participants were 
introduced to the researcher. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
This study employed semi-structured interviews. An interview (face to face interviews or 
interpersonal/interactive interview) as a research technique is defined as “a conversation 
between the interviewer and the respondent with the purpose of eliciting certain information 
from the respondents” (Moser & Kalton 1971, p.271). It is an interpersonal role situation in 
which the interviewer asks respondents questions designed to elicit answers pertinent to the 
research problem (Kvale 1996, Naoum 2006).  It is focused on the respondents’ experiences, 
views and opinions regarding the institution or situation under study. It thus constitutes an 
“ideal speech situation characterised by a process free from domination where the parties 
involved in construction of meaning exchange arguments without coercion” (Stringer 1999, 
p.36). A semi-structured interview was employed because of its adaptability and flexibility.  
The flexibility in the semi-structured interview guide allows the researcher to formulate other 
questions on the basis of information emerging from the responses of the interviewees and 
flexibly adjust them as interactions with the respondent progresses to capture the dynamics of 
the participants’ response (Denscombe, 2007; Robson 2011). 
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Bryman (2012, p.469) observes that interviews are the most popular instruments employed in 
qualitative research due to its relative flexibility. Interviews are time consuming and costly in 
terms of data management (collection, transcription and analysis) especially where the data 
generated is complex and large. This is likely to affect its findings and outcomes (Hagan 1982). 
Scholars with scientific positivist views like Robson (2011) and Kvale (1994) raised objections 
on the value of the interview method due to the lack of standardised and reliable matrix for 
measuring the responses of respondents. However, the open and flexible nature of semi-
structured interviews can be a useful instrument for investigating complex issues that require 
detailed data analysis in order to enhance the reliability coefficient of the data generated 
(Denscombe, 2007; Hagan, 1982). 
 
Among other things, qualitative interviews give the interviewer the opportunity to sift data 
from the respondents’ attitudes, feelings, interests, concerns, gestures, facial expressions and 
tone (Cresswell 1994, Rubin and Rubin 1995, Kvale 1996, Bogdan and Bikini 1998, Krathwohl 
1998, Gay and Airasian 2003, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006, Naoum 2006). Such 
invaluable data cannot be obtained through other research tools such as the quantitative 
questionnaire surveys. The other advantage as indicated in the definition is that it can be 
administered in person, therefore the researcher is an active participant, has control over the 
line of questioning, the response rate is relatively high and the researcher is fully assured that 
the respondents are the ones for which the interviews were intended.  
 
However, the interview research instrument has its challenges and shortcomings such as the 
presence of the interviewer and the manner in which he/she asks the questions influencing the 
interviewee. Babbie & Mouton (2006, p.289) note that “all too often, the way we ask questions 
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subtly biases the answers we get.” Put differently, “the researcher’s assumptions and values 
shape the inquiry and become part of the argument…there can be no disinterested 
research…the researcher is both a participant in the action and inquirer into that same action” 
(Stringer 1999, p.15). Among other things, the interview instrument can be obtrusive and 
disruptive to the respondents’ daily schedule, performance and production targets. Some 
respondents may be too busy for interview sessions, thereby affecting the progress of the 
research process. In some instances, the respondents may be biased and selective in what 
information to shed to the researcher in accordance with the rules and regulations of the 
organisation. In this case, the researcher can be denied access to vital information which could 
ensure fertile research findings.  
 
A detailed interview schedule comprising open-ended semi-structured questions (see Appendix 
1) on issues relating to the vandalism of petroleum products pipelines and mitigation strategies 
was drawn. Using the semi-structured interview format across all interviews was to help ensure 
that discussion could cover all the relevant areas. The interviews commenced with a 
comprehensive invitation for the interviewees to describe their professional background in 
relation to petroleum products pipelines security management. This covered their current 
deployment, level of management and their current role in the petroleum products pipelines 
security management. The open question allowed the researcher to collect valuable 
demographic data that would support the analysis of the interview data, and at the same time 
help to place in context the information from other interviews.   The open question was 
followed by questions aimed at stimulating discussions on the nature and extent of oil pipelines 
vandalism in the Niger Delta. Other questions were aimed at eliciting discussions on the 
strategies and tactics employed by the government to address the problem of petroleum 
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products pipelines vandalism. The participants were also asked questions to trigger discussions 
on the strengths and weaknesses of the current measures and the possible ways the measures 
could be improved.  
 Open-ended questions are regarded as highly relevant in this qualitative study as an instrument 
to extract more information from the respondents. Each interview session of this research was 
expected to last for approximately 30 minutes or more depending on circumstances emerging 
from each session and setting. However, as the interviews progressed, sessions extended to 
more than 45 minutes, because the researcher recorded the interview by hand, slowing down 
discussions to capture all necessary information from the interview. The notes were latter 
transcribed by the researcher for appropriate data coding, categorisation and analysis (Patton 
1990, Schurick 1998, Taylor and Bogdan 1998, Bryman 2001).  
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis entails the critical and reflective descriptions, explanations, interpretations, 
synthesis, evaluation, inferences and verifications of data collected for a comprehensive and 
coherent presentation of the research findings.  According to Tesch (1990), the process of data 
analysis is multifaceted as such there is no single ‘right way’.  Data analysis also involves 
segmenting the data, generating and developing categories, themes and patterns and matching 
them for a coherent and comprehensive presentation. Lofland and Lofland (1995, p.164) warn 
researchers against what they referred to respectively as “analytic interruptus” (in Bryman 
2001, p.388) and ‘descriptive excess’ all of which would stifle the analytic interpretations and 
arguments in the presentation of the findings as a result of the excessive data collected.  
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The process of data coding, categorisation, interpretation, pattern matching, explanation 
building and generalisations are based on the evidence provided by the data, literature reviews 
and theoretical frameworks (Merriam 1988, Tesch 1990, Bogdan and Biklen 1992, Yin 1994, 
Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006).  According to Bryman (2001, p.398) “coding is the 
starting point for most forms of qualitative data analysis.”  It entails the process of breaking 
data into component parts and labelling it according to themes, concepts, theoretical positions 
and research questions to be addressed in the study. On-going data analysis and processing is 
also in line with the qualitative studies reliance on inductive grounded theory from data. That 
is “theory that was derived from data is systematically gathered and analysed through the 
research process” (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p12). Thus, the approach is “iterative or 
recursive…in that data collection and analysis proceed in tandem repeatedly referring back to 
each other” (Bryman 2001, p.390). 
 
The goal of the interpretation and analysis of data is for a detailed and thick description of the 
findings. As Tesch (1990, p.97) notes “while much work in the analysis process consists of 
‘taking apart’ (for instance, into smaller pieces), the final goal is the emergence of a larger 
consolidated picture”. The qualitative research paradigm is an interpretive approach as such its 
results have often been in the form of ‘thick’ descriptive narratives rather than quantified 
scientific reports common in quantitative studies (Cresswell 1994, Cohen and Manion 1994, 
Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). It describes the data holistically, considering the 
complexity of the social systems rather than concentrating on discrete variables as in 
quantitative research. In the process of data analysis, and presentation the researcher should 
strive to balance subjective and objective interpretations, engagement and disengagement for 
credible and objective research findings. That is, the researcher has to be conscious of the 
Page 86 of 220 
 
effects of his/her beliefs, feelings and world view on the research process, data interpretation 
and presentation (Rossman and Rallis 1998, Babbie and Mouton 2006).  
  
The researcher made concerted efforts to code, categorise, interpret and analyse the research 
data based on identified and emerging themes from the findings.  Some relevant features fitting 
within the context of the study were adopted and adapted while some features which were 
deemed unfitting were left out. In analysing data, the researcher coded the core themes such as 
the nature and extent of the problem of petroleum products pipelines vandalism, the strategies 
and tactics been employed to address the problem, the strengths of these measures, weaknesses 
of the measures adopted, ways of improvement and the main barriers militating against the 
achievement of the desired goals.  To enhance the authenticity and credibility of the research 
findings, the researcher quoted the participants interviews verbatim. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical measures are very important in ensuring that the researcher complies with the ethical 
standards, codes and procedures for conducting credible research and obtaining accurate, 
objective, trustworthy, valid and reliable research findings. It was therefore imperative for me 
to set out ethical considerations, not just for the start of the thesis but also those “that would 
continue through the entire research” (Kvale 1996. p. 110). It was the desire of the researcher 
to obtain the best possible data on the reality of truth from the participants, but correspondingly 
wanted to ensure that his actions would not harm or disadvantage anyone involved in the 
research. 
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The norms for conducting research include adhering to the principles of voluntary participation 
and informed consent by the respondents, protection of the privacy, rights and safety of the 
research subjects, guaranteeing anonymity and confidentiality on respondents and the 
information they provide, accountability and professionalism in the presentation of the findings 
(Cresswell 1994, Bryman 2001, Babbie and Mouton 2006). 
 
In undertaking the research, I was careful to employ the ethical approach. The criticality of 
research ethics is brought to the fore by Benatar (2002, p.1134) when he argues that while 
conducting research involving humans, “the scientific merit of a project must be matched by 
the ethical merit of the work”. According to him, ethical merit encompasses respect for the 
dignity of the research subjects which includes their integrity, privacy, safety and human rights.  
Macfarlane (2009) traces research ethics and ethical code development to the Nuremberg code 
and the trial of Nazi war criminals but further notes that subsequently devised code of research 
ethic focuses on the fundamental principle of respect for participants. 
 
Haggarty (2004, p.393) notes that from a historical perspective, the ethical status of research 
was governed through a combination of “discipline-specific codes of conduct and the 
professional standing of research scientists”. He notes that at present, the system has been 
supplanted and replaced by a “formal process of bureaucratic oversight”. Many scholars and 
ethical codes place a strong emphasis on the principle of informed consent (British Society of 
Criminology 2006; Davies 2011; Davies & Francis, 2011), which ensures that participants are 
aware of the nature of the study and any implications so as to enable them to take informed 
decisions about their participation. This consent “must be voluntary, and participants must be 
aware that they are free to withdraw from the research at any time without facing any 
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repercussions” (Haggarty, 2004, p.404), and the participants should normally not be deceived 
according to Descombe (2010). Benatar (2002, p.1135) maintains that “informed consent has 
become established as of the cornerstone of research ethics”. 
 
To provide a framework for assessing potential ethical issues, I have completed application for 
ethics (Ethics Review - Staff and Postgraduate Students), and have been given favourable 
ethical opinion.  The letter from the chair of the Ethics Committee agreeing this research is 
attached.  Since the method involves direct contact with participants, measures have been taken 
to protect them. Such measures involve making the interviews entirely anonymous and 
providing the participants with a Research Information Sheet. Sufficient information about the 
research was given to participants to allow them to give informed consent. 
 
Research experience 
The process of inquiry began with a problematic or indeterminate situation. In the initial 
stages, understanding of the problem may have been little more than an intuitive sense 
or gut feeling that something was wrong or could be better. Through these integrally 
linked processes of observation and analysis, we come to see clearly the discrepancies, 
incongruities, and failure to reach intentions (Osterman and Kotlkamp, 1993, p.6). 
The process of this investigation began with my perception of indeterminate situation 
surrounding the problem of petroleum products pipelines vandalism in Nigeria. Prior to this 
study, I was wondering why the strategies and tactics employed by the Nigerian government 
to combat oil pipelines vandalism were unable to check the menace. I questioned the rationale 
behind massive deployment of security forces to the oil producing areas of Nigeria, when 
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studies indicate that there were indeed no commensurate positive effects on the activities of oil 
vandals. I admit that what motivated me to initiate this research in the first place, was my belief 
that the Nigerian government has not ‘got it right’ in the strategies and tactics deployed to 
curtail oil pipelines vandalism. At this stage, my understanding of the problem was limited; a 
little more than ‘an intuitive sense’ or a ‘gut feeling’ that something was wrong or could be 
better. Through the process of literature exploration and interview analysis, I came to see 
clearly the discrepancies and incongruities. My main motivation was finding what went wrong 
and there was indeed a genuine need for new information, and as a practitioner, I assumed the 
role of a researcher and began to gather information. In this research, I considered myself an 
‘external researcher’ examining the measures adopted by the Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps and other relevant stakeholders to protect petroleum products pipelines in 
Nigeria, consequently the risk of the researcher’s bias and pre-conceived ideas was greatly 
minimized. On the other hand, the fact that the researcher had no prior dealings with the 
potential participants became an impediment to the research since the researcher was not 
familiar with the internal workings of these organisations.  
 
All the interviews were conducted in English, which is the official language of Nigeria. I 
however experienced some challenges while conducting interview with the selected leaders of 
the oil producing communities, who were not fluent in English language. The interviewees in 
this category were encouraged to use pidgin/broken English which is a diluted form of English 
widely spoken in the Niger Delta due to multiplicity of languages in that region of Nigeria. 
 
In the process of carrying out this study, the researcher experienced both up and down 
moments, as well as positive and negative sides. The negatives that occurred resulted in some 
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frustrations that were however overcome by utilizing new and developed abilities as a result of 
the study. One of the major frustrations that the researcher faced was how to gain access to the 
respondents. My ‘gate keeper’ in the case study organisation, the NSCDC, is the Commandant 
General (CG) of the Corps. As the number one man of the Corps, it was not easy to track him 
down for an appointment. His apparent very busy schedule was not unconnected with the 
precarious security situation in Nigeria. When we eventually met, there were distractions from 
numerous visitors who were cleared to see him by his security details. I was forced to caution 
one of his details to allow me to conclude my discussion with the CG. My successful meeting 
with the CG and subsequent approval granted me to use his organisation as case study for my 
research eventually paved way for me to reach my study population.  
 
The second major challenge was how to solicit the attention of the interviewees considering 
the sensitive nature of the research problem. Most respondents were hesitant to express their 
perspectives. This challenge was eventually resolved through the intervention of my 
“gatekeeper” the Commandant General (CG) of NSCDC who had earlier given me his consent 
and unrestricted access to conduct the research in his organisation. 
 
Another major hurdle was lack of internet facilities in the rural oil producing communities, 
which hindered the use of Skype for the interview. This hurdle was overcome by the researcher 
travelling to two oil producing communities (Egbema in River State and Ibeno in Akwa Ibom 
State), where interviews were conducted with the communities’ leaders.  
The researcher also experienced challenges in the area of funding. The study was funded 
exclusively by the researcher from his monthly salary, because the research was not employer-
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supported. This challenge was overcome through the prudent management of the available 
financial resources. The researcher had to suspend frequent trips to the University Campus in 
UK, resorting to graduate school online training. Another drawback suffered during this 
research was tuition fee withdrawal of services followed by subsequent exclusion suffered by 
the researcher as a result of failure to meet the tuition fees obligations as scheduled. As a result 
of this, the researcher could neither access the school library nor relevant individuals for 
assistance. This setback was resolved when the tuition fee was paid in full. In order to make up 
for the lost time, and to complete this study as quickly as practicable, the researcher applied 
and obtained one-year study leave from his employers which took effect from 1st November, 
2017 ending on the 31st October 2018. During the study leave period, the researcher devoted 
full time to the research activities resulting in completing this study earlier than envisaged. 
 
There were no negative ethical issues. Ethical documentation was sent to all participants in 
advance of the study, their consents were received and consent forms returned prior to the 
interview. The research participants were fully aware of what their involvement meant and how 
they could withdraw if they decided to do so. They were also given the option of being 
anonymous. 
 
Conclusion 
The qualitative research design adopted for this study worked adequately for the research 
project. It allowed direct data to be obtained from the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (NSCDC) and other critical stakeholders with regards to the management of petroleum 
products pipelines security in Nigeria. The qualitative questions generated were meant to 
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discover what the interviewees are experiencing and how they interpreted their experience with 
regards to their roles in containing the menace of the petroleum products pipelines vandalism.  
 
The main goal was to obtain data which was interpreted and understood within the world and 
perspectives of the insiders. Although there were challenges with completing the semi-
structured interview programme, these were successfully overcome. For instance, the 
interviews were hand recorded, making it difficult to effectively capture all the views of   
participants who were fast in their responses. This challenge was overcome through appealing 
to such interviewees to slow down in their responses. Another challenge was non-availability 
of internet facilities in some oil producing local communities. To overcome this challenge, the 
researcher had to travel to two oil producing communities to conduct the interviews 
 
The case study method allowed a detailed, in-depth and intensive exploration and analysis of 
the NSCDC in its natural setting to obtain the perspectives of the participants on the fight 
against oil pipelines vandals in Nigeria. The two primary research mechanisms met the 
objectives set for them. The conduct of the semi-structured interview was simple as the 
interview was administered through Skype using internet. Where the respondents had no access 
to the internet facilities, arrangements were made for the interviewees to move to the nearby 
location with internet facilities. This allowed for 100% response rate which provides 
reasonable approximation of current strategies and tactics adopted to protect oil pipelines in 
Nigeria and the major challenges facing NSCDC and other critical stakeholders in the 
discharge of their responsibilities with regards to petroleum products pipelines security 
management in Nigeria. 
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The purposive non-probability sampling adopted for the study allowed the researcher to obtain 
expert answers with regards to the problem of petroleum products pipelines vandalism in 
Nigeria and the strategies and tactics put in place to check the menace. Serious care was taken 
during the interview process to avoid interviewer bias and allow the participants freedom to 
express their views in full. 
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Chapter four: 
 Participant perspectives on the nature and extent of the problem of 
vandalism of petroleum products pipelines. 
 
Introduction  
This chapter presents the first of the three stages of the empirical research to assess the 
effectiveness of government security agencies in petroleum products pipeline security 
management in Nigeria. It draws on empirical research data to examine the nature and extent 
of the problem of vandalism of petroleum products pipelines. The chapter begins with the 
examination of how the interviewees perceive oil pipeline vandalism in terms of the nature of 
the phenomenon and its impacts on the socio-economic lives of Nigerians.  
 
Subsequently, the chapter examines the perception of the interviewees on the skills possessed 
by the vandals in carrying out vandalism of oil pipelines. This chapter also presents the views 
of the respondents on the impact of the operational terrain on the activities of the oil pipelines 
vandals and the security forces. Finally, the chapter presents the respondents’ views on the 
involvement of foreign nationals in oil pipelines vandalism in Nigeria and concludes with a 
discussion of the themes.  
 
The nature of vandalism  
This section of the report examines the perceptions of the research participants with regards to 
the definition and key features of oil pipeline vandalism. While three-quarters of the 
interviewees believed that there is no difference between pipelines vandalism, bunkering and 
oil theft, the remaining participants perceived vandalism of pipelines differently.  The 
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perception of those who believed that vandalism, bunkering and oil theft are the same are 
illustrated in the following comments; 
 
Pipeline vandalism means the same thing as oil bunkering because both of them result 
in oil theft. Vandals destroy the oil pipelines to siphon petroleum products illegally 
while the illegal bunkers load the stolen crude to the barges or ship and sell same 
illegally. NGO manager (17) 
 
As far as I am concerned, oil pipelines vandalism is a deliberate act of destroying oil 
pipelines with the aim of stealing the crude oil, while oil bunkering means filling a 
barge or ship with the stolen crude from vandalised pipelines and selling the crude oil 
either within Nigeria or outside the country. To me it is one and the same thing. MOC 
manager (13) 
 
In the Niger Delta region, we know that oil pipelines are vandlised to enable the vandals 
steal crude oil from the pipes and illegal bunkering is the act of stealing the crude oil 
from the pipes to the barge. So what is the difference? That is why Niger Delta people 
use the terms to mean the same thing. Community leader (15) 
 
It is a question of semantics. As far as we are concerned here, oil pipeline vandalism is 
the same thing as oil bunkering. Both refer to [the act of] illegally puncturing of oil 
pipelines to siphon the products for personal use or sales. NSCDC Commander (5) 
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The Niger Delta militants vandalise oil pipelines to sabotage the federal government. 
They are freedom fighters who want to draw the attention of the government to the 
plight of the oil producing communities. (Community leader 15) 
 
 Some participants held the views that oil pipeline vandalism is carried out to sabotage the 
government. Their views are presented below; 
 
These agitators willfully and meticulously damage oil pipelines in order to disrupt oil 
supply. They carry out this activity to sabotage federal government which depends on 
oil petroleum products for government revenue. They believe that since the government 
cannot develop the oil producing communities with the revenue from the crude oil 
drilled from their communities, then the oil exploration and exploitation must be 
disrupted. (Community leader 14) 
 
I can assure you that some of these vandals are neither oil thieves nor oil bunkers. They 
are angry with these oil companies that drill crude oil from their communities and refuse 
to develop these communities. They vandalise the pipelines that convey the crude from 
their communities to sabotage the oil companies. They believe that since the oil 
companies have refused to bring social infrastructures to the communities, their 
activities must be disrupted. (NGO Manager 18) 
 
These militants continue to vent their anger by blowing up oil facilities.    They use 
explosive devices to destroy the pipelines for vendetta purposes, to sabotage the 
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government and at the same time to steal the crude and raise money to sustain their 
agitation. NSCDC Commander (8) 
 
A few participants however perceived vandalism of oil pipelines as an act of terrorism. These 
perceptions are illustrated through the following comments: 
 
These vandals are terrorists. Their operations are meant to intimidate the government 
and create fear in the oil producing communities. They have continuously made the 
people of the Niger Delta region to live in perpetual fear. They attack oil pipelines, 
attack the security forces with sophisticated weapons. To this extent they are terrorists 
and should be classified as such by the government. JTF Commander (11) 
 
To me, vandalism is an act terrorism. The militants operate like any other terrorists; 
intimidating innocent citizens, kidnaping oil workers and creating fear during their 
operations, the same vandals who blow up pipelines facilities also engage in the 
kidnapping of oil companies’ expatriates to collect huge ransoms from them.  The Niger 
Delta militants are not different significantly from Boko Haram terrorists of the North 
Eastern part of Nigeria who also involve in kidnapping of women and children to extort 
ransom from their families or the Nigerian government. NSCDC Commander (12) 
 
The majority of the participants viewed the three activities: - petroleum products pipeline 
vandalism, oil bunkering, and oil theft – as illegal activities perpetrated by the criminal 
elements in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria. Their views suggest three stages within the 
Page 98 of 220 
 
trafficking process. They believed that the three terms are used interchangeably despite there 
being differences between them. 
 
The remaining interviewees however perceived the problem differently. Some participants 
within this group perceived that vandalism of oil pipelines is carried out to sabotage the 
government while others view oil pipeline vandalism as terrorism. Those who held the view 
that pipeline vandalism is an act of sabotage believed that it is perpetrated to sabotage the 
government so as to draw the attention to the plights of the oil producing communities that 
have been neglected by successive governments in Nigeria, despite the fact that oil and gas that 
sustains the Nigerian economy are derived from the communities.  Those that viewed 
vandalism of oil pipelines as terrorism, argued that the militants’ operation is not different from 
that of terrorists’ modus operandi.  They believed that the way militants instill fear on their 
targets, kidnap and extort money from their victims are typically terrorists’ tactics and 
strategies.  
 
With regards to the perception of the participants on the impacts of vandalism of oil pipelines 
on the socio-economic lives of Nigerians, all the interviewees emphasised the profound 
negative effects of vandalism of oil pipelines on the socio-economic lives of Nigerians. The 
participants believed that vandalism of oil pipelines leads to reduction in government revenue 
which impact heavily on government financial planning and revenue. About two-thirds of the 
participants emphasised on the economic effects while the remaining participants emphasised 
the negative effects of oil pipelines vandalism on human security, national security and the 
environment. Their perceptions are illustrated by the following comments: 
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Over the years, the Nigerian government constantly fails to fully implement annual 
budgets due to dwindling government revenue as a result of vandalism  of oil pipelines 
and oil theft. It is a very unfortunate development. NGO Manager (18) 
 
Most uncompleted projects that litter all nooks and crannies of this country are due to 
lack of funds to complete them. They [projects] were budgeted   for in the annual 
Federal government budgets, but because of short fall in the revenue side of the budget, 
they were abandoned. These projects include roads, dilapidated school classrooms and 
hospitals projects. Community leader (16) 
 
Vandalism tampers with infrastructure elements along the chain of natural gas   
production. The inability to evacuate liquids affects associated gas and non-  
associated supplies. MOC Staff (14) 
 
A senior manager with an NGO in Akure Ondo state, believed that oil pipelines vandalism has 
resulted in the dead of many Nigerians who died through fire explosions during vandilisation 
of oil pipelines and scooping of the petroleum products from vanadlised pipelines. His 
perception is illustrated thus: 
 
Many Nigerians have lost their lives in the process of scooping fuel from vandalised 
pipelines. Recently and to be specific, on October 13, 2018, about 50 Nigerians lost 
their   lives in pipeline explosion that occurred in Aba, Abia state. They were 
scooping premium motor spirit (PMS) from a vandalized pipeline conveying petrol 
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form Port Harcourt to Aba. These vandals punctured the pipeline to intercept the flow 
of petrol and in the course of scooping the spilled product, there was an explosion and 
they [vandals] were burnt by the fire that engulfed the place. NGO manager (18) 
 
According to the perspective of an NGO manager from Bayelsa state: 
 
In all facets of the socio-economic lives of Nigerians, oil pipelines vandalism has 
impacted negatively. These include the loss of crude oil and revenue, loss of gas and 
the associated revenue and it impacts on the electricity tariff. The multiple costs of 
infrastructure repairs impacts negatively on the economy and above all, land and water 
pollution affect farming activities of the area negatively. NGO Manager (17) 
 
A physical security consultant from Port Harcourt believed that vandalism of pipelines and oil 
bunkering has a serious negative impact on Nigerian national security. His perception is 
illustrated through this comment: 
 
The oil pipelines vandals constitute a serious threat to the Nigerian national security. 
These vandals sell the stolen crude and use the proceeds to purchase illegal weapons. 
The weapons are brought into this country and are circulated illegally within the 
network of criminal elements leading to proliferation of illegal arms and ammunition. 
These arms are used to attack government security forces.  Physical security expert 
(22) 
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Operational terrain  
This part of the primary research programme examined the perception of the interviewees on 
the impact of the Niger Delta terrain on the activities of oil pipeline vandals in the region. The 
Niger Delta region covers about 70,000km and makes up of 7.5% of Nigeria land mass.  
The interviewees were asked to give their perceptions on the impacts of the Niger Delta terrain 
in enhancing or inhibiting the success of the efforts to eliminate oil pipeline vandalism in the 
region. All the interviewees from the security forces asserted that the terrain of the Niger Delta 
region inhibits the efforts of the security forces to reduce or eliminate the activities of oil 
pipeline vandals. They believed that the large rivers, swamps, estuaries and the coaster areas 
generally restrict their tactical operations, while enhancing easy escape of the vandals after 
vandalisation of oil pipelines.  
A commander of the anti-vandalism unit in Ondo state believed that most of the vandals are 
locals from the oil producing communities who are familiar with the local terrain and illustrated 
his view thus:   
Most of those involved in vandalisation of the pipelines in the creeks of the Niger Delta 
are the locals of the place, who were born and bred in the region, and are familiar with 
all the river channels, estuaries and distributaries. NSCDC Commander (7) 
 
The physical attributes of the region actually constitute a serious limitation in our 
efforts to checkmate these vandals. This region is dissected by a dense network of rivers 
and creeks creating a condition of delta-wide hydrological continuity. The river 
network conveys water through some estuaries into the Atlantic Ocean. This region is 
unique in Nigeria with over 180km of coast lines and continental shelf region and the 
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vandals are familiar with the terrain while we only struggle to adapt to the environment. 
NSCDC Commander (12)  
 
An interviewee from NSCDC headquarters perceived that the terrain of the region is 
particularly very difficult for the people who are not from the southern part of the country. He 
gave as an example the security operatives from the northern part of Nigeria who were born 
and bred in the environment of Sahel Savannah with desert vegetation arguing that the riverine 
environment is an unfamiliar terrain.  
 
The Niger Delta has a difficult and complicated terrain for people like us who are not 
from here. For instance, I am from the Northern Part of Nigeria deployed here to serve 
in the Join Task Force (JTF), to fight pipelines vandals. Most settlements here [the 
Niger Delta region] are located at the head of the navigable limits of the coastal rivers 
or estuaries. The inhabitants are very familiar with the terrain. The vandals who are 
mostly from here can always escape through the network of these rivers and creeks 
when confronted by members of the Joint Task Force. NSCDC Commander (7) 
 
The Niger Delta is made up of 9 political states of Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Imo, Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Ondo, Edo, and Cross River and are characterised by multiplicity of 
ethnicity.  The inhabitants [of the region] include the ijaws, ogonis, ikweres, etches, 
ekpeyes, ogbas, obolos, isoko, nembes, okrikans, kalabaris, urhobos, itsekiris, ndomis, 
oron, bono etc. The unique characteristic of these ethnic groups is their ability to use 
water transportation system. Most of them live in small hamlets mostly in riverine areas 
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while only a minority lives in main towns such as Porthacourt, Warri, Asaba, Benin, 
Akure, Calabar, Uyo, Umuahia, Aba, Owerri and Yenagoa. Community leader (16) 
An interviewee from an NGO opined that the concentration of oil and gas facilities, including 
oil and gas pipelines within the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta is one of the 
major factors that facilitate the illicit business of  vandalism of pipelines and oil theft, because 
members of the communities have easy access to the facilities and continuously engage in the 
oil facilities vandalisation.  
 The vandals have easy access to the pipelines and other oil facilities because these 
facilities are located within their communities. The vandals simply blow them up, 
siphon the crude and escape through the network of rivers, creeks and estuaries to the 
Atlantic Ocean where the products are discharged into waiting tankers and ship which 
sail off Nigerian territorial waters. NGO Manager (9) 
An interviewee, a member of Security Joint Task Force opined that oil pipelines vandalism in 
the Niger Delta region may persist as long as most security personnel deployed to check the 
activities of the vandals are not drawn from Niger Delta region.  
It is practically difficult to eliminate this illicit business [oil pipelines vandalism], when 
most of us deployed to fight the militants engaged in this vandalism are not from here 
or familiar with the operational terrain. The vandals know all the rivers, creeks and 
estuaries and are very good in speed boats and swimming. They can navigate themselves 
to safety after their evil acts. Those of us who are not familiar with the terrain are very 
careful because they [the pipeline vandals] can always ambush us and overpower us. 
NSCDC Commander (9) 
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Some interviewees identified the settlement pattern in the Niger Delta region especially in the 
riverine areas as a critical factor that aid and abet the perpetuation of pipelines vandalism in 
the oil producing communities.  
An interviewee from an NGO noted:  
The vast majority of settlement is largely rural communities and dispersed villages. 
These communities habitually shield the vandals in their villages. Some community 
leaders protect them by hiding them and resisting their arrests claiming that their 
youths are not thieves but freedom fighters who are agitating for resource control. 
NGO Manager (17) 
Another interviewee from an NGO believed that the community leaders have not given the 
security forces the needed cooperation in their fight against vandalism of  oil pipelines.   
As long as members of the local communities and particularly the community 
leaders do not cooperate and assist the security forces to flush out the vandals in their 
communities, oil pipelines vandalism may continue to persist. NGO Manager (18) 
 
Skills/types of vandals 
This section of the report examines the perception of the interviewees on the types and 
operational modality of the oil pipelines vandals. All the respondents believed that vandalism 
of oil pipelines is carried out at various levels by different categories of vandals. A participant 
who is a senior manager with an NGO from Akure in Ondo state of Nigeria believed that each 
type of vandals possesses unique skills and equipment that facilitate oil pipelines vandalism. 
He gives his perspective thus: 
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Each level of oil pipelines vandalism applies specific skills and tools in carrying out 
the illicit business. At the lowest level of pipeline vandalism in Nigeria, the vandals are 
mainly the unemployed youths from the local communities where the pipelines 
traverse. At this level of operation, the basic skill required is the ability to puncture the 
pipeline with local instruments such as chisels or hand drilling machines to access the 
petroleum products which spill to the ground from where it is scooped into drums, 
plastic containers and cans. The products are then sold in the black market to the ready 
buyers. NGO Manager (17) 
Another participant, an NGO senior manager from Bayelsa state gave his perspective on the 
skills of the vandals as follows:  
The unemployed youths and the poor locals in the communities traversed by oil 
pipelines have always been involved in pipelines vandalism and many have been 
victims of oil pipeline explosion. At this level, they don’t require special skills to 
puncture the pipelines that pass through their communities. Let me give you a brief 
statistic between 2009 and 2013. Between December 2009 and January 2013, there 
have been at least six pipeline explosions caused by the activities of the unemployed 
youths and the poor within the communities. In December 2009, a pipeline explosion 
occurred in Arepo, Ogun state, in May 2010 a pipeline explosion also occurred in 
Amukpe, Delta State. This was followed by Idu pipeline explosion, Lagos state in 
December 2010. In May 2011, another explosion occurred in Amukpe, Delta state and 
this was followed by another explosion in Nembe, Bayelsa State. In October 1, 2012 
an explosion occurred in Abia state and in 2013, Arepo in Ogun State witnessed another 
pipeline explosion. In all these the victims drill a hole on the pipelines and scoop the 
Page 106 of 220 
 
products that spill from the vandalised pipes and these victims are the vandals involved 
at the lowest level of Oil pipelines vandalism. NGO manager (18) 
The next category of oil pipeline vandals involves the educated youths sponsored by influential 
Nigerians. 
Some of these vandals are sponsored by very influential people in our society. Their 
sponsors include top military officers, senior police officers and top    
politicians who provide cover for them to engage in the illegal act. These vandals    are 
skillful in breaking into oil industry equipment and steal petroleum products in large 
quantities and load them into tankers and barges for exports. MOC Staff (14) 
A JTF commander from Ogun state operations believed that the second category of vandals 
employ more advanced skills, as detailed in the following quote:  
The second category of oil pipelines vandals are more sophisticated than the local 
vandals. They require special skills of tapping the crude oil from the well head or 
vandalised pipelines from which the crude oil is transferred into barges or tankers for 
sale. JTF Commander (12) 
Their higher sophistication extended to the use of firearms and explosives, as noted by a JTF 
commander from Akwa Ibom State: 
Other skills required by the vandals in this category, are weapon handling skills. They 
are armed with weapons and explosives, and require the skills of weapon handling and 
the use of these explosive devices. JTF commander (2) 
A community leader from Rivers state believed that a major critical attribute required of the 
vandals sponsored by top security officers and political leaders is loyalty. This perception is 
expressed thus: 
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The main attribute required of this category of vandals is absolute loyalty to their 
sponsors. They must be loyal to their sponsors and their godfathers. The vandals go 
extra miles to take dangerous oaths to conceal the identities of the sponsors when the 
foot soldiers are apprehended. These oath-taking rituals are conducted to ensure loyalty 
and confidentiality. Community leader (15) 
The third category of the vandals is the Niger Delta militants whose primary aim was to 
sabotage the Federal Government of Nigeria and force them to negotiate for the purpose of 
developing the Niger Delta region.  
A community leader from Rivers state believed that this category of vandals is the most 
dangerous and has dwarfed other categories in terms of frequency of their operations and the 
negative impacts they have created over the years. He gave his perspectives thus: 
Within this category are over 20 militant youth organisations some of which are the 
Ijaw youth council, Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Meinbutu Group, 
Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Front for Izon Survival and 
Hope, Niger Delta Vigilante, Martyr Brigade, Iduwini Volunteer Forces, and the Niger 
Delta peoples Salvation Front. This category of vandals possesses high level of 
technical skills in blowing up oil pipelines and siphoning the products. They are 
sophisticatedly armed and skillful in blowing up oil pipelines and terminals of oil 
producing companies. Their activities are concentrated within the creeks, swamps, 
waterways and high seas and their initial aim was primarily to press for socio-
economic development, gainful employment, and improvement in social 
infrastructure, resources control and management in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. 
Community leader (15) 
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A participant from an NGO in Bayelsa state perceived that: 
The militants’ political struggle later changed to big time and unprecedented oil 
pipeline vandalism for the purpose of stealing the Nigerian crude oil. They blow the 
pipes using various devices and siphon the oil into barges and tankers ready   
for export through the high seas. NGO manager (17) 
A commander of the anti-vandalism unit at the headquarters of NSCDC perceived that the 
vandals in this category demonstrate special and technical skills during their operations. He 
illustrated his perception thus: 
This class of vandals is very skillful in welding taps to pipelines for easy access to crude 
and condensates. They are also experts in connecting detonation devices and cables to 
riser platform for the purpose of blowing up the risers to enable them siphon crude oil 
in their barges and tankers. NSCDC Commander (9) 
The views of the interviewees on the types of vandals suggest that there are three categories of 
oil pipeline vandals, each employing unique expertise in carrying out their illegal activities. 
The first category, according to the participants include the unemployed youths of the local 
communities where the pipelines traverse. The second category of the vandals are described as 
those sponsored for a fee by top military and police officers, including top political leaders, 
while the third category involves the Niger Delta militants who are the most sophisticated and 
presently have overshadowed other categories of the vandals.  
Foreign nationals’ involvement 
This theme in this chapter is concerned with examining the interviewees’ perception on foreign 
nationals’ involvement in sustaining oil pipelines vandalism in Nigeria participants were asked 
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to give their perspectives on the role of foreigners and international community in aiding and 
abetting petroleum products pipeline vandalism in Nigeria. All the interviewees held the view 
that foreigners of different nationalities were actively involved in illegal bunkering and theft 
of Nigeria crude in active collaboration with local actors in oil pipeline vandalism. 
The following comments illustrate the perceptions of the participants:  
Let me say that in Nigeria as at today, there are no private refineries in operation. The 
four refineries owned by Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in Port 
Harcourt, Kaduna and Warri cannot engage in illegal refining of stolen crude and few 
illegal local refineries found in the creeks of oil producing communities have no 
capacity to refine more than 10% of the stolen crude. It means foreigners collaborate 
with criminal elements in Nigeria to refine the stolen crude outside the country. 
Community leader (16) 
It is a known fact for us in the Niger Delta, that foreigners from many countries are involved 
in buying the stolen crude oil. Even some of our neighbouring countries are buying [crude 
oil] from the vandals. We know that buyers come from Ivory Coast and Benin. Even 
countries like Switzerland and United States have criminal cartels that buy stolen crude from 
Nigeria. NGO manager (17) 
Aparticipant from the oil producing communities reported that some foreigners have been 
arrested and some are already convicted in Nigerian courts in connection with pipelines 
vandalism and oil theft.  
On April 25, 2017, the Nigerian Navy Ship (NNS) DELTA arrested 10 suspected oil 
thieves on board MT TECNE Vessel in Delta State. One of those arrested was a 
Nigerian while 9 were foreigners made up of one Indonesian, three Ghanians, one 
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Beninese and two Ukrainians. They were arrested while siphoning crude oil into vessels 
from a platform, a loading jacket belonging to Shell Petroleum and Development 
Company (SPDC), in Forcados Rivers State. Community leader (16) 
Another community leader reported that some foreigners have been arraigned in Nigerian 
courts and some have been convicted in connection with pipelines vandalism and oil theft.  
In July 2017, the court of Appeal sitting in Lagos [Nigeria] affirmed the judgment of 
Federal High Court in Lagos which sentenced nine foreigners to five years 
imprisonment each for stealing Nigerian crude oil. Among them were five Filipinos 
and four Bangladeshi. These people were earlier convicted on December 15, 2015 for 
stealing 3,423.097 metric tons of crude oil.  Community leader (15) 
An NGO interviewee from Bayelsa state reported that on December 19, 2017, fourteen (14) 
foreigners lost an appeal in Nigerian Court of Appeal, Lagos Division. These suspects were 
arrested by officers of the Nigerian Navy on March 27, 2015 along with their vessel MT Anuket 
Emeral loaded with stolen crude oil estimated at 1,738.087 metric tons. The convicts who are 
citizens of Russia, Ukraine, the Philippines and Japan were convicted by a Federal High Court 
sitting in Lagos after their arrest, investigation and trials.  
Narrating further, he noted that 16 Ukrainians are currently undergoing investigation by the 
Nigerian Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) for theft of Nigeria crude oil. 
Ukrainians were arrested on January 23, 2018 by the Nigerian Navy Ship NN6 
SAGBAMA’s Patrol team deployed for anti-crude oil theft and illegal bunkering 
operations around Odudu terminal, Port Harcourt. Both the foreigners and the vessels 
are investigated for their involvement in the illegal act. NGO manager (17) 
Page 111 of 220 
 
A commander of the anti-vandalism squad of NSCDC from Rivers state reported that some 
arrested foreigners and their vessels have been released illegally after successful arrests, 
without being charged to the court or presented to the public.  
Let me inform you that those charged to the court are far less than those released 
illegally NSCDC Commander (8) 
Another interviewee believed that the arrested foreign nationalities charged to the court are 
those who cannot pay the demanded bribe or who do not have the right connection in the 
military or with powerful politicians.  
Most of the foreigners charged to court are those who cannot “play ball” [give bribe] 
or those who are not connected in the military or protected by the corrupt politicians. 
NGO Manager (18) 
Discussion 
This theme commenced with the research findings on how the participants understood 
vandalism of pipelines. The findings demonstrated that all the participants knew what 
vandalism of oil pipeline meant especially among the Nigerians living in the Niger Delta 
region. The term petroleum vandalism of products pipelines is generally understood as illegal 
or unauthorized activities that involve the destruction of oil pipelines in order to siphon crude 
oil or its refined products for personal use or sales whether locally or intentionally. This 
understanding corroborates the views of Okafor & Okaniyan (2017); Onuoha, (2007); Adishi 
and Hunda, (2015-2016).  
From the perspectives of the interviewees, vandalism of oil pipelines is also known as oil 
bunkering in the Niger Delta region and both terms relate to oil theft. This perception agrees 
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with the views of Okoli & Oringa (2013) who describe vandalism of oil pipelines as bunkering 
involving drilling into the pipeline to steal the products.  
The findings also brought to the fore the negative impacts of vandalism of oil pipelines in 
different areas of socio-economic lives of Nigerians. Vandalism of oil pipelines has led to 
economic losses, leading to shortfall on revenue side of Nigerian annual budgets. The deficit 
in the expected revenue to the government result in the government’s inability to fully 
implement her annual budgets leading to many uncompleted projects littered all over Nigeria. 
Other Negative effects of oil pipeline vandalism include, environmental degradation, pipelines 
explosions that has caused the dead of thousands of Nigerians who scramble to scoop spilled 
petroleum products from the vandalised pipelines.  
Other socio-economic effects of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria highlighted by this 
research include proliferation of illegal weapons resulting in increased criminality, confirming 
what is found in the extant academic literature; (Okoli & Sunday 2013; Amah & Edeke 2016; 
Boris 2015). Recently a report by Brookings Institutions, a nonprofit public policy organization 
in the USA has ranked Nigeria as a country with highest number of extremely poor people in 
the world in 2018, and similarly an economist from John Hopkins University in Baltimore, 
USA has also ranked Nigeria as the most miserable country of the world in march 2019. These 
rankings may not be fully attributable to oil pipelines vandalism; however, the negative effects 
of vandalism oil pipelines have contributed to the increased poverty level since the government 
has not been able to fully implement the annual budgets which are typically meant to tackle 
poverty and under-development in the country.  
Oil pipelines vandalism has also been identified as threat to Nigerian National security through 
the proliferation of illegal arms and ammunitions which are usually received in exchange for 
stolen crude oil and smuggled into the country. This empirical finding corroborates the findings 
Page 113 of 220 
 
in literature.  Abolurin (2010) for instance argued that the proceeds from vandalism of oil 
pipelines and crude oil theft are used for purchase of illegal weapons which are deployed for 
more bunkering, theft and other crimes including armed robbery, kidnapping and murder.  
The empirical findings highlight the difficult and complicated terrain in the Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria. The terrain of the region is made up of large rivers, swamps, estuaries and coastal 
areas. The region has 9 political states of Rivers, Bayelsa, Imo, Abia, Akwa Ibom, Ondo, Edo 
and Cross River states and is characterized by multiplicity of ethnicity. The empirical research 
confirmed the findings in the body of literature, that within the region are 800 oil producing 
communities, with over 90 oil wells and several oil and gas facilities. Within the region also 
are 600 oil fields of which 240 are off-shore and 360 are on-shore. This region also hosts about 
6000 kilometers of pipelines which link some 275 flow stations and 13 oil export terminals. 
The Niger Delta region specifically covers an area of about 70,000 square kilometers and it is 
an ecological zone of large rivers, coastal areas, mangroves and fresh and swamp forest (Adishi 
& Hunga, 2017; Chukwujekwu, Chibuzor & Ekene 2014; Wilson 2014; Odalonu; 2016; 
Katsouris & Sayne, 2013).  
The implication of this finding suggest that the Niger Delta regions a very difficult and 
complicated terrain which can only be easily understood by the locals and those brought up in 
the environment .It means the region has the terrain that is bound to inhibit the operations of 
the security forces who are not from the Niger Delta region and at the same time enhances the 
activities of the vandals who are mostly the locals or those brought up in  the Niger Delta 
region. 
At the early stage, vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria were mainly carried out by the 
unemployed youths operating mainly from the remote areas where the pipelines traverse 
(Alawode & Ogunleye, 2011), but overtime, illicit business transformed from the amateur stage 
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to a highly sophisticated venture which deploys advanced technology and equipment to blow 
up the pipelines and siphon the crude oil into ships and large oil tankers which ferry the 
products outside the country (Ikelegbe, 2005; Onuoha, 2008; Boris 2015). The findings of the 
research brought to the fore the three categories of actors responsible for vandalism of oil 
pipelines in Nigeria currently. 
 The first category includes the jobless youths and community leaders who try to earn a living 
through the illegal business, while the second category are the vandals sponsored by influential 
Nigerians such as top military officers, some corrupt senior police officers and highly placed 
politicians. The third category of vandals includes the dreaded Niger Delta militants who 
siphon the crude oil by blowing up the pipes using various explosive devices or instruments. 
The militants are also involved in kidnap-for-ransom crimes, and acts of sabotage. The 
militants are highly skilled in guerilla warfare and the use of state-of-the-art weapons.  
Initially, the militants claimed that they were agitators whose primary goal was to struggle for 
resource control and the development of the Niger Delta. Overtime, the goals of the militants 
shifted from political agitation to pursuing economic benefits emanating from oil crimes, 
(Ikelegbe 2005; Onuoha 2008; Boris 2015; Okolo, 2010; Asumi, 2009; Okoli and Sunday 
2013; Odalomu, 2016; Akpan 2016; Lopz-Lucia, 2015). The implication of the findings, and 
the categorisation of the major actors in vandalism of  oil pipelines in Nigeria suggest that a 
single mitigation strategy may not be adequate in addressing the motivations, the threats and 
the operations of all the actors in the three identified stratifications. 
It has also been revealed that the problem of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria is 
compounded by the involvement of some foreign nationals in the illicit business. It was found 
out that while the Niger Delta youths are involved in local tapping and loading of stolen crude 
oil, foreigners from Eastern Europe, Russia, Australia, Lebanon, the Netherlands and France 
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play vital roles of financing, transporting and laundering stolen crude oil from Nigeria. The 
study also revealed that only 10 percent of the stolen products are locally refined in Nigeria 
illegally, suggesting that 90 percent of the stolen crude go to the criminal network outside the 
country, this is also confirmed in the body of literature; (Asuni, 2009; Sawyerr, 2013, Katsouris 
& Sayne 2013). 
The empirical research also confirmed the findings in the body of literature that some foreign 
nationals were arrested and convicted in the Nigerian courts for their involvement in vandalism 
of oil pipelines and crude oil theft in Nigeria. These foreign nationals included; Russians, 
Philippines, Ghanaians, Georgians, Greeks, Ukrainians and Cameroonians. Their involvement 
according to the findings include shipping the crude oil to other countries, organizing 
documentations and payment and banking the oil money (Katsouris & Sayne 2013). The 
implication of these findings suggests that the government of Nigeria needs to urgently 
collaborate with foreign governments especially those countries whose citizens have been 
implicated in this illicit business, to effectively tackle this organised crime. 
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Chapter Five:  
Participant perspectives on the strategies and tactics being employed to 
address the problem 
 
Introduction  
This Chapter outlines the findings from stage two of the empirical research; the strategies and 
tactics employed to address the problem of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria. The chapter 
begins by examining the perception of the interviewees on deployment of security forces as a 
measure to combat vandalism of oil pipelines. Next, the deployment of physical protection 
measures is investigated. This is followed by examining the role of PSCs in the fight against 
vandalism of oil pipelines. The chapter also appraises the involvement of other stake holders 
in the anti-oil pipelines vandalism drive and concludes with a discussion of the findings.  
 
Security Forces deployment  
The perception of the participants on the impacts of deployment of security forces to contain 
the pipeline vandals provided a suitable starting point towards achieving the second objective 
of the study; the strategies and tactics employed to combat vandalism of oil pipelines in 
Nigeria.  
All the interviewees reported that the massive security forces comprising the army, the navy, 
the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) 
have been deployed to fight oil pipelines vandals in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. They 
believed that this strategy has significantly reduced the activities of the vandals.  
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The Federal Government has flooded the Niger Delta region with security forces to 
counter the activities of oil pipeline vandals. We support the government’s action. If 
not for the presence of the military in our communities, the pipelines and other oil 
facilities would have been completely destroyed. Community Leader (15) 
 
A community leader perceived that the presence of the Joint Task Force operations in the Niger 
Delta region helps immensely, not only in protecting the oil facilities but also in protecting the 
residents of the oil producing communities from the ravages of the pipeline vandals. 
 
You can notice the presence of the security forces [Joint Task Force] in all oil producing 
communities. The Army, Air force, Navy, Civil Defence (NSCDC) and the police are 
working together to resist the militants [vandals] who are well armed. The vandals’ 
primary targets are the pipelines, but also they do not spare any member of the 
community who dare to challenge them. Indeed members of the Joint Task Force 
always come to our rescue whenever there is a distress call. Community Leader (16) 
 
All respondents noted that the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region rely heavily 
on the military to carry out their protection activities. A multinational oil company senior 
manager in ExxonMobil in Akwa Ibom state believed that the oil companies could not have 
operated successfully without the presence of the military in the region. His perception is 
illustrated through this comment: 
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The military not only protect the oil facilities, but also provide security for the staff and 
contractors especially the expatriates who are targets of the militants for kidnap and 
ransom purposes. MOC senior manager (14) 
 
Another multinational oil company senior manager from Shell Petroleum Port Harcourt opined 
that it would be practically impossible for any oil company to operate in Nigeria without the 
military and the police as his view illustrates: 
The oil companies cannot operate without the security forces [protection]. Our offices 
are protected by the police. All our onshore facilities are secured by the military. The 
Joint task force provides escorts for the movement of the staff and logistics for onshore 
and offshore operations. There is no vehicle carrying our staff without military escorts 
attached. MOC Staff (13) 
 
An NGO interviewee however described the “Militarization” of the Niger delta region as both 
a blessing and a curse. 
 
The heavy presence of the security forces indeed deter the pipeline vandals and offer 
protection for the oil pipelines and other oil and gas facilities, however, they constitute 
nuisance, create fear and anxiety in the oil producing communities. Women and 
children living in the local communities are constantly harassed and sometimes abused 
by the operatives of the Joint Task Force who mostly are from other parts of the country. 
NGO Manage (17) 
 
Page 119 of 220 
 
A participant from an oil producing community reported that the security forces in the Niger 
Delta region help to protect the oil pipelines, but also destroy the local community cultural 
affinities.  
In the Niger Delta region, the military are deployed everywhere especially within the 
oil producing communities. Indeed they help in checkmating the oil pipelines vandals. 
The other side of the coin is that our women and children are witnessing invasion of 
people with different culture who are members of Joint Task Force. Our children are 
copying their lifestyles and their religion. This is not good for us. Community Leader 
(16) 
An interviewee from a multinational oil company reported that there are two categories of 
security personnel involved in the protection of shell Nigeria facilities. The First category 
comprises of officers of the Nigeria Police Force who are specially trained to guard shell 
Nigeria assets, facilities and staff. The other category is the Joint Task Force comprising the 
Army, Navy and Police who are deployed by the government to provide security in the Niger 
Delta and the Waterways.  
 
The Police that protects our facilities and staff do not carry arms, because they are 
specifically trained using Shell Nigeria’s security management system and guidelines 
on the use of external security forces, developed in line with the United Nations (UN) 
norms and codes as well as the UN’s Code of Conduct for law enforcement officials. 
However, the men of the Joint Task Force are armed because they are under the 
command and control of the Nigerian government. MOC Staff (14) 
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Reporting further on the Army deployment in the Niger Delta, a commander of the Joint Task 
Force in Ogun state has this to say: 
 
I can confirm to you that the Army authorities have deployed at least 3,000 soldiers so 
far to the Niger Delta region. This number excludes the massive deployment by the 
Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air force, the Nigeria Police Force and even our personnel; 
the Nigerian security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). NSCDC (12) 
 
Physical Security 
This section of the primary research program examines the perception of the interviewees on 
the physical protection measures adopted in the management of petroleum product pipelines 
security in the Niger Delta. Although the literature has clearly indicated that most oil and gas 
producing countries around the world combine security forces and physical security measures 
in integrated form to protect oil and gas pipelines from terrorists and vandals, most 
interviewees express ignorance of presence of physical security measures that is currently 
deployed in the security management of vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria.  
 
What do you mean by physical security measures? Here in the Niger Delta, the 
government and oil companies utilise security forces and private security companies to 
protect pipelines and other oil and gas facilities. I am not aware of any technology 
deployment to protect oil facilities. NSCDC (8) 
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An interviewee, who is a physical security consultant expressed disappointment over what he 
called “lack of integration of elements of physical security with the security forces” by relevant 
authorities.  
 
There are many modern technologies available in the market to monitor and protect oil 
pipelines. These monitoring and surveillance solutions are simply ignored by our policy 
makers in the oil and gas sector. SCADA and Seismic sensor monitoring methods are 
utilised globally for detection of pipelines third party interference. There is nowhere in 
the Niger Delta or any other part of Nigeria where these technologies are utilised. 
Physical Security Consultant (21) 
 
Another interviewee pointed out that the use of drones (UAV) to monitor oil and gas facilities 
in Nigeria has been in the pipeline over the years. According to him, the oil companies and the 
Nigerian Air Force have been planning to deploy drones to secure oil and gas installations. Till 
date such plans have not been implemented.  
 
There has been so much noise in the press by the Nigerian Air Force to deploy drones 
to monitor oil pipelines and provide surveillance along oil pipelines right-of-way. The 
same apply to some oil companies, especially Shell Nigeria. As I am talking to you, 
these plans are still in the pipelines, they are not yet implemented. Physical Security 
Consultant (22) 
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An interviewee from NGO observed that Nigerian has not attained the technical capability to 
deploy physical security elements to protect oil pipelines. He noted that to deploy drones for 
example, to monitor oil installations in Nigeria, it requires involvement of Nigeria Air Force, 
other partners outside the country and the office of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). 
 
Presently, drones cannot be deployed to monitor oil installations in Nigeria. This is 
because of the technicalities involved. Nigeria Air Force must be involved, some other 
partners outside Nigeria have to be involved, clearance must be obtained from office of 
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and it is indeed, high security issues. NGO Manager 
(18) 
 
A staff of a multinational oil company hinted that even when some oil companies express 
willingness to bring in some technologies such as drones and other surveillance equipment, the 
federal government security agencies continue to frustrate their efforts, citing security 
concerns. 
 
When Shell Petroleum Development Company attempted to introduce oil pipelines 
surveillance technology to secure their pipelines, the security agencies frustrated them, 
arguing that such deployment could compromise National Security.  MNOC staff (13) 
 
A physical security expert from Lagos however opined that the inability of relevant authorities 
in Nigeria to use physical security elements such as drones to monitor oil installations including 
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oil pipelines in Nigeria is due to disagreement between the multi-national oil companies and 
the security agencies.  
 
Simply put, the multinational oil companies (MNCs) indeed favour the use of drones 
and other high technology devices to monitor oil and gas facilities in Nigeria, but 
security agencies such as the military and Department of State Security Service (DSS) 
are opposed to such measures citing national security concerns. Physical Security 
Consultant (21) 
 
A physical security expert from Port Harcourt believed that both the Nigerian government and 
the multinational oil companies lack political wills to deploy technologies to protect oil 
pipelines. He believed that, there are many physical security service providers in oil and gas 
industry globally who could be invited to deploy technologies to complement security forces 
in the protection of oil and gas facilities. Neither the NNPC nor its subsidiaries and the 
multinational oil companies are willing to introduce modern technologies in oil pipeline 
security management. 
 
The oil and gas pipelines surveillance technologies are available everywhere globally. 
The vendors and service providers are there in the market, but both the NNPC and oil 
companies are not ready and willing to engage them. They seem to be satisfied with 
security forces deployment to protect oil and gas facilities including the oil pipelines. 
That is why we cannot win this war against the pipelines vandals. Physical security 
consultant (22) 
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 Private security companies 
This part of the primary research programme examines the role PSCs in mitigating oil pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria.  The participants were asked to give their views on the roles of PSCs in 
preventing vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria. Most interviewees reported that both the 
Federal government owned NNPC and the Multinational oil companies contract PSCs 
belonging to ex-militant commanders to protect their facilities including oil pipelines. Most of 
these security companies were formed by ex-militant leaders in the Niger Delta region and 
some states from the South-West after they have accepted the Federal government amnesty 
programme and denounced militancy. Some of the private security firms owned by the ex-
militant leaders were identified as; New Age Nigeria Ltd belonging to factional leader of 
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) (Fasehun). Another factional leader of OPC Gani Adams 
owns Donyx Global concept, ATEF Nigeria Limited belongs to Asari dokubo, a former Niger 
Delta warlord. Others include gallery security services Ltd owned by Bibo Ajube, Bajeros 
Nigeria Limited, Close Body Protection Limited and Izon ibe security Limited, all belonging 
to the former militant leaders of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  
These private security companies [PSCs] actually belong to the former militant 
commanders and leaders who were actively involved in oil pipelines vandalism. When 
they embraced the amnesty programme of the federal government, they incorporate and 
operated these companies to enable them provide surveillance for the oil and gas 
facilities which are within their domain. NGO Manager (17) 
A participant from oil producing community noted that the strategy of engaging former ex-
militant leaders as private security providers and consultants in the Niger Delta is a positive 
step in the right direction. He pointed out that since the ex-militant leaders were the same 
people that coordinated attacks on oil pipelines and stole the crude oil, they are in a better 
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position to coordinate the protection of the facilities from those still engaging in oil pipelines 
vandalism. 
The idea of contracting former militant leaders and commanders as private security 
providers is a welcome development. Most of the vandals were operating under the 
command of the former militant leaders and commanders. The foot soldiers of the 
former warlords still engage in oil pipelines vandalism. Even the local oil pipelines 
vandals who are indigenes [locals] of oil producing communities are well known to the 
ex-warlords. It is therefore reasonable that the ex-militant leaders were brought in to 
check the illicit activities.  Community leader (16) 
About two-thirds of the interviewees however reported that the involvement of the PSCs 
belonging to the Niger Delta former warlords has not achieved the desired result. They argued 
that it is a question of “appeasing evil and evil men”.  These views are illustrated by these 
comments: 
What is the morality in awarding multi-billion dollars security contracts to the likes of 
Dokubo-Asari, leader of the Niger Delta people’s volunteer Force with a contract sum 
of $9million annually? The same applies to Tompolo, a former warlord who earns $22.9 
million annually from NNPC oil pipelines surveillance contract. Other ex-militant 
leaders; Boyloaf and Ateke-Tom were also awarded pipeline security contracts worth 
$3.8 million annually by Nigerian government through the NNPC. I believe that it is 
morally wrong to award these contracts with such huge amount of money to the 
repented criminals who were destroying our national assets and engage in bunkering.   
Physical security consultant (22) 
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These security contracts were awarded to the ex-militants leaders with the intention that 
the warlords would engage the militant youths in their communities to protect oil 
pipelines within their domains. This unfortunately was not the case because the ex-
militant leaders failed to engage the militant youths in the pipeline security projects, 
thereby triggering further pipelines vandalism by the youth who felt cheated and 
exploited. Community leader (15) 
An NGO manager from Akure believed that the security contracts awarded to the ex-militant 
leaders were meant to enhance community participation and human capacity development for 
the oil producing communities. 
The original intention of the government was to engage the youths of the local 
communities where the pipelines are situated with the jobs of securing the pipelines, 
thereby reducing unemployment and at the same time proving security for the oil 
pipelines. The intention of the government has not been achieved. NGO manager (18) 
A participant from Bayelsa believed that the poor implementation of this programme could be 
the reason for escalation in oil pipelines vandalism in the Niger Delta region. He pointed out 
that apart from the exploitation of the youths of the communities by the ex-warlords; the 
contracts are highly politicised leading to corruption and inefficiency which militate against 
the positive result expected. He pointed out as an example, the surveillance of the 87-kilometer 
Trans-Forcados pipelines (TFP) which was awarded to Ocean Marine Solution Limited. 
The surveillance contract was initially awarded to certain operators; Heritage Energy 
Operational Services Ltd and Shore Line natural Resources. These companies adjudged 
to be performing satisfactorily surveillance for the 87-Kilometer Trans-Forcados 
pipelines. Through political interference, the contract was revoked and re-awarded to 
another company, Ocean Marine solution limited, at the sum of $18.8 million, about 5 
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times higher than the initial contract, contrary to extant rules. This action had triggered 
series of protests by thousands of youths and ex-militants from the host communities 
to Oil Mining License (OML) assets.The question being asked is “why award an 
already running contract to another company and the contract now inflated to about five 
times?” NGO Manager (17) 
A physical security expert identified the lack of legal framework for proper integration of the 
operations of the PSCs with those of the government security forces as a factor which slows 
down the achievement expected of this strategy. 
Let me inform you that the main problem in the whole arrangement is that the private 
security companies are not formally integrated with the government security forces. 
They operate independently without any form of cooperation. The ex-militants still 
consider members of the Nigerian Armed Forces and other government security agents 
as enemies and hence there is no intelligence sharing between them. Physical security 
consultant (22) 
A community leader illustrated the rivalry between the government security agencies and PSCs 
in the management of oil pipelines security in Nigerian using a case of the Topline security. 
There is no cooperation between the government security agencies and the private 
security companies in this task of protecting oil and gas facilities in Nigeria. For 
instance, when Topline security was suspended from providing surveillance for Atlas 
Cove pipelines, the NNPC directed the Nigerian Navy as well as the personnel of the 
Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) to take over the patrol of the 
pipeline. This action further deepened the suspicion between the government security 
forces and the private security companies. Community leader (15)  
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A Supervisor with PSC claimed that companies belonging to the former militant leaders could 
be a good source of intelligence to the security Joint Task Force if there is cooperation among 
them because the ex-militants working in the private companies have access to information in 
the local communities.  
We can provide reliable intelligence to members of JTF. We are from the local 
communities; we hear their language and we can effectively interact with the indigenes 
[locals] of the local communities. Before the militants carry out attacks on oil pipelines, 
we usually have information and we can pass same to the military commanders. The 
problem here is that we don’t have a good working relationship with the government 
security forces because of mutual distrust among ourselves. PSC Supervisor (19) 
Another interviewee explained that apart from the government security forces and PSCs, local 
vigilantes are recruited by some community leaders from the oil producing communities to 
complement the Joint Task Force and the PSCs. He stressed that members of the vigilantes are 
also ex-militants who accepted amnesty programme of the Federal Government. 
Apart from the members of the Joint Task Force and the private surveillance companies 
belonging to the ex-militants, members of the vigilantes are very critical in the fight 
against the vandals. Don’t forget that these vigilantes were also involved in militancy 
and oil pipelines vandalism before they accepted the amnesty programme of the 
government. They are drawn from the oil producing communities. They are familiar 
with the terrain and even know those involved in oil pipelines vandalism. NSCDC (11) 
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A participant from an oil producing community noted that some oil-producing communities 
effectively assist in the fight against vandalism of oil pipelines by recruiting and engaging 
vigilantes from their local communities. 
Some communities recruit vigilantes who provide surveillance over the oil facilities in 
their neighbourhood. The vigilantes provide timely information to the Security Joint 
Task Force regarding the activities of the vandals. These communities in my opinion 
are very useful in this campaign, they should be encouraged by the government. 
Community Leader (16) 
Other stakeholders’ involvement 
This theme in this chapter is concerned with the extent to which other stakeholders in oil and 
gas sector in Nigeria are involved in petroleum products pipelines security management. 
Most participants identify these stakeholders as; the Niger Delta states’ governors, Nigeria 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and its subsidiaries which include Department of 
Petroleum Resources (DPR), Petroleum Products Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA), 
Petroleum Products Marketing Company (PPMC), Petroleum Equalization Fund (PEF) and 
Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Ltd (NLNG); the major oil companies include Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (SPDC), AGIP oil Co, Texas Overseas Petroleum Company Nigeria 
ltd, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhilips,  TransAtlantic, Esso & Nexen Inc. The oil producing host 
communities are also identified as major stakeholders in this anti-vandalism fight. However, 
about two-thirds of the interviewees reported that most stakeholders in the oil and gas sector 
have not shown sufficient commitment towards the protection of oil and gas facilities.  The 
view of a senior manager with an NGO in Bayelsa state illustrates this perception: 
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Presently the main player in this fight [anti-Vandalism drive] is the Federal government 
of Nigeria who deploys security forces to the Niger Delta region to curtail the oil 
pipelines vandalism. Other stakeholders are paying lip services. NGO Manager (17) 
A physical security expert from Lagos expressed disappointment over what he perceived as 
apparent lack of seriousness by the Multinational Oil Companies in Nigeria to actively get 
involved in oil pipelines security management. 
I am really disappointed by the Multinational oil companies. Even though most of them 
have the capacities to bring in technologies to protect oil pipelines, they bluntly refused 
to do so. Most of them depend on the government security forces to protect the 
pipelines, their facilities and even their staff. Few of them engage services of ex-
militants to protect their facilities. Security consultant (21) 
 
A leader from an oil producing community perceived that the state governors from the oil 
producing states who are strategic stakeholders in the fight against oil pipelines vandalism 
cannot do much to protect oil facilities in their domains because they do not have control over 
military and other government security forces who are under the direct command and control 
of the federal government.  
I cannot blame the state governors of the 9 oil producing states. These governors do not 
control the security forces. Even those who establish local vigilantes cannot provide 
arms for them because they are not permitted by the law.  Community leader (15)  
 
 A participant from an NGO in Akure Ondo state, however gave a contrary view. He opined 
that oil producing states in Nigeria usually receive extra 13% revenue as derivation fund from 
Page 131 of 220 
 
the Federation account. This extra revenue or part of it could be utilised to provide logistics 
and welfare for the security forces deployed to their states, thereby boosting their moral in the 
anti-vandalism war. Only very few of these states assist in this direction. In his view: 
 
The state governors of the oil producing states have the capacity to contribute 
effectively towards eliminating oil pipelines vandalism in their respective states. These 
governors receive huge sums of moneys as 13% derivation funds from the Federation 
accounts every month. They appropriate huge sums of money annually as security 
votes. They could deploy part of this fund to equip members of joint task forces 
deployed to their respective states to boost the anti-vandalism war. As I speak to you, I 
am not aware of any substantial contributions made by most of these governors. NGO 
Manager (18) 
 
A community leader from Akwa Ibom state perceived that apart from a few multinational oil 
companies such as Shell Petroleum Development Company and ExonnMobil which have 
shown some levels of commitments in protecting oil and gas pipelines, through their 
investments in oil and gas pipelines security, most multinational oil companies have not made 
sufficient efforts to protect oil and gas facilities.  
 
Let me inform you that apart from Shell [SPDC] and Mobil [ExonnMobil], I am not 
aware of any other multinational oil companies that have shown adequate interest in 
introducing any measures to protect oil pipelines. Most of these oil companies depend 
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heavily on the government security forces to protect their oil facilities and staff. 
Community leader (16) 
 
About one-third of the interviewees commended some oil-producing communities in their 
contributions towards combating vandalism oil pipeline. These participants believed that a few 
oil-producing communities are cooperating with security agencies to flush out pipeline vandals 
from their communities. The comments below illustrate these views 
 
Some community leaders are cooperating with the government to eliminate oil pipeline 
vandalism. They help in sensitising their youths on the need to stop vandalising oil and 
gas facilities in their communities. NGO Manager (18) 
 
In recent times some chiefs in oil producing communities are exposing the oil pipeline 
vandals who are hiding in their communities. This action is aimed at deterring others 
engaged in the illicit acts. NGO Manager (18) 
 
A participant from an NGO however reported that some communities in the riverine areas of 
the Niger Delta are actually shielding their youths who engage in pipelines vandalism from 
arrest. Some of these youths are even encouraged to set up illegal refineries to refine the stolen 
crude oil. 
 
Some communities in the riverine areas are shielding the pipeline vandals from arrest 
by the security forces. They even encourage their militant youths to set up illegal 
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refineries to refine the stolen crude, claiming that the oil [crude oil deposit] is their God-
given natural resources.   NGO Manager (18) 
 
This comment seems to suggest that some oil producing communities actually aid and abet the 
illegal activities of vandalism of oil pipelines, by protecting oil pipelines vandals from arrests 
and encouraging their youths to set up illegal refineries for the purpose of refining stolen crude 
oil in their communities. 
 
Discussion  
The theme examined in this section demonstrates the perception among the participants about 
the strategies and tactics that have been employed to address the problem of vandalism of oil 
pipelines in Nigeria, the phenomenon that is consistent with the findings in the wider body of 
literature.  
The empirical research findings suggest that there is a massive security security forces 
deployment in the Niger Delta region. These findings corroborate the findings in the extant 
academic and grey literature that successive Nigerian governments have increased security 
forces deployment to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria over the years to contain vandalism of 
petroleum products pipelines. Such deployments include the military which culminated in the 
deployment of a JTF in 2008 comprising the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, Nigeria Air 
Force the Nigeria police force, and paramilitary agencies (Adishi & Hunga, 2017; Chatham 
House, 2013; Lupoez-Lucia, 2015) 
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The massive deployment of security forces to the Niger Delta region of Nigeria was generally 
perceived by the participants as a positive strategy that could checkmate the phenomenon of 
vandalism of petroleum products pipeline in Nigeria. This is because members of the armed 
forces of Nigeria are well equipped to confront the militants who are sophisticatedly armed.  
 
These deployments are codenamed differently such as Operation Delta Safe, Operation 
Crocodile Smile 1, 11, &111; and Operation Tsare Teku, each operating in deferent axis of the 
Niger Delta region. For instance, Operation Crocodile Smille 11 was carried out by troops of 
the 6th Division, Nigeria Army, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, and the operation covered the four 
states of Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers.  Operation Awase was also launched in the 
South-West region of Ogun-Lagos axis, particularly Arepo where illegal oil bunkering and 
pipeline vandalism are regular occurrences. Most of these operations typically operate as Joint 
Task Forces comprising the Army, the Navy, the Air Force the Nigerian Police, the Nigeria 
Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) and other paramilitary agencies. 
 
  Physical security deployment as a strategy for combating vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria 
seems to be absent in the overall strategy adopted to counter the illicit business in Nigeria. 
Although the wider body of literature has identified technologies such as acoustic impact 
detection system, optic fibre system, unmanned aerial vehicle (drones), SCADA, and seismic 
sensor monitoring devices as some of the technologies deployed for protection of oil and gas 
pipelines globally, (US General Accounting Office 1991, Agbakwuru 2011; Udofia & Joel 
2012, Keri 2015; Cooper 2006;Eze, Nwagboso, Newman & Georgakin 2015),  the Nigerian 
government and the multinational oil companies (MNOC) seem not to have considered these 
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technologies as viable option in the oil pipeline security architecture in Nigeria citing National 
security concerns as the reason.  
 
The research findings brought to the fore the critical roles of PSCs commonly referred to as 
“oil pipelines surveillance companies”, owned and operated by the former militant leaders in 
the Niger Delta region. These findings corroborate the findings in the literature. According to 
Afred and Adeshi (2014, p.52); 
The violence in the Niger Delta has generated to a level that former war Lords and 
militants are now discretely and officially given crude oil facilities and sometimes 
personnel to protect. The Federal Government of Nigeria, the major multinational oil 
firms and even the local industry players like the servicing companies are neck-deep in 
the business of ensuring that they are protected by warlords and former combatants. 
The $383 million security fund and the $200 million community development 
expenditure that SPDC is spending per annum are actually protection and security fees 
 
The participants viewed the engagement of PSCs in the oil pipelines security management 
programme as an effective strategy in mitigating petroleum products pipeline vandalism, 
because the service providers (contractors) who are typically the ex-militants leaders and 
former warlords, have the capacity to confront their former colleagues who are still engaging 
in the illegal activities. The participants however believed that the politicisation of the security 
contract and the exploitative tendencies of the ex-warlords render the strategy ineffective.  
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The research participants generally identified many potential stakeholders that should be 
involved in the fight against vandalism of oil pipelines in Nigeria. The Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the governors of oil producing states of the Niger Delta 
region, the multinational oil companies and the oil producing communities are all major 
stakeholders that should come together in a coordinated manner to confront the evil of 
vandalism oil pipelines.  Presently these institutions have not demonstrated sufficient interest 
in contributing towards eradication of vandalism of oil pipelines.  
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Chapter six: Participant perspectives on the strengths, weaknesses and ways 
of improvement of the current measures 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the research identified some measures deployed to contain the problem 
of vandalism of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria. This chapter examines the 
perspectives of the participants with regards to the strengths, weaknesses and ways of 
improvement of these measures with particular emphasis on security forces deployment and 
PSCs.   
 
Strengths of the current measures deployed in oil and gas pipelines security 
management 
 
About 40 percent of the interviewees believed that the security forces deployment to the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria to curb vandalism oil pipelines are effective in protecting oil and gas 
facilities. 
 
The deployment of security forces in the Niger Delta region has deterring effects on the 
oil pipeline vandals, especially those involved at the local level. I mean the youths and 
the women from the communities where the oil pipelines pass through. A mere sight of 
the security forces deters them from carrying out the illegal activities. Community 
Leader (16) 
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Pipeline vandalism carried out at the local level by the women and youths cannot 
operate where we are. They dare not come out for fear of arrest and prosecution. 
NSCDC Commander (8) 
 
In terms of combat capabilities, two joint task force commanders from Lagos and Akwa Ibom 
states respectively believed that members of the security forces are far more superior to the 
militants whenever there are confrontations. 
 
Whenever there are direct confrontations between the vandals and the JTF personnel, 
the vandals are usually overpowered with high casualties on their side, forcing them to 
escape through the river channels in the creeks. JTF Commander (11) 
 
Nigeria has highly trained armed forces personnel comprising the Nigerian Army, 
Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force. Members of the Joint Task Force are drawn 
from these personnel including Nigeria Police, NSCDC and the DSS. These personnel 
receive periodic trainings that give them advantage over the militants. That puts the JTF 
members in advantaged position whenever there is direct confrontation. JTF 
Commander (2) 
 
A commander with NSCDC anti-vandalism squad in Delta state believed that JTF comprising 
the Nigeria Army, Nigerian Navy and the Nigerian Air Force possess superior arms and 
ammunition in sufficient number that can successfully neutralise the oil pipeline vandals at any 
point in time. 
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 The Nigeria armed forces are well equipped with modern arms and ammunition. We 
also have adequate number to repel the militants. Here lies our strength as a response 
force against these criminal elements called militants who vandalise and steal Nigeria 
crude oil. NSCDC Commander (5) 
 
A joint task force commander from Akwa Ibom State believed that the militants can easily be 
defeated by the Nigerian armed forces because they (the militants) do not possess adequate 
arms and ammunitions to match those of the joint task force. 
 
The militants can easily be defeated by our military force. Although the vandals 
typically brandish sophisticated weapons for media publicity, they do not possess these 
weapons in sufficient quantity to match the Nigeria military. Besides, the militants lack 
adequate military training and discipline. JTF commander (2) 
 
Another interviewee from an NGO believed that the personnel of NSCDC whose main 
responsibility is to protect Nigeria critical National infrastructure are deployed everywhere that 
oil and gas pipelines pass through in the country. 
 
The presence of NSCDC personnel everywhere is a positive development. Men and 
officers of the corps are deployed in large numbers to communities through which 
pipelines traverse and this number puts the vandals in these communities in serious 
check. With this arrangement, the response time is always short anytime there are 
security incidents involving vandalism oil pipelines. NGO Manager (17) 
Page 140 of 220 
 
A multinational oil company senior manager believed that the greatest strength of the JTF lies 
in their usual quick response to kidnapped victims of the militants as the following comment 
illustrates: 
 
As far as I am concerned, the security forces response to kidnap for ransom victims 
remains the greatest strength of the government response force. Whenever any of our 
expatriates or any of our staff for that matter is kidnapped by the militants, the response 
of the JTF is always swift and result oriented. If not for the JTF, I doubt if we would 
still have expatriates with us. MOC Manager (14) 
 
Another senior manager with a multinational oil company in Akwa Ibom State perceived that 
military escorts are indispensable in the movement of oil companies’ staff and logistics in the 
Niger Delta. 
 
Let me inform you that without the military escort, oil companies would close their 
operation in the Niger Delta. All our expatriates are escorted by heavily armed members 
of the joint task force. Even the logistics for both on-shore and off-shore operations are 
escorted by heavily armed men of the Nigeria armed forces.  MOC Manager (14) 
 
A community leader believed that the response force of the government has been able to get 
rid of some illegal refineries in the creeks of the Niger Delta. 
 
Page 141 of 220 
 
Without doubt, the JTF [security force] has succeeded in destroying many illegal 
refineries built by the vandals to refine stolen crude in the creeks and the riverine areas. 
The JTF has succeeded in taking the war to the hide out of the vandals. Community 
leader (15) 
 
A commandant of the anti-vandalism squad at the headquarters of NSCDC believed that the 
NSCDC has fulfilled its mandates of protecting critical national infrastructures especially oil 
pipelines in Nigeria. 
 
Without doubts, I can tell you that the NSCDC has created positive impacts in the 
current war against oil pipeline vandals. Many arrests are made on a daily basis; many 
vandals including foreign nationals and their vessels have been impounded and 
prosecuted. Drums of stolen PMS from the vandalized pipelines have been seized and 
destroyed. NSCDC Commander (10) 
 
All the participants believed that technologies and equipment have many advantages over 
human security, especially in areas of detection and delay of the intruders. They however 
believed that the government of Nigeria has not fully utilised these technologies in the security 
management of petroleum products pipelines. The comments below illustrate this view: 
 
Some detection technologies commonly deployed globally to provide surveillance on 
oil and gas facilities are very effective. An example is the deployment of unattended 
ground sensors which provide covert, reliable way to detect unusual movement along 
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pipelines. This technology has not been deployed in this country. Physical security 
consultant (21) 
 
The commonest surveillance technology in use is Unmanned Aerial Vehicle usually 
referred to as drones. The strength of this technology in monitoring pipelines right-of-
way is generally acknowledged globally to be very effective. Physical security 
consultant (22) 
 
The respondents believed that detection capabilities of security measures are usually achieved 
better through technology than security forces. The comments below illustrate this perception: 
 
Security forces patrol along the right-of-way of the oil pipelines has its limitations when 
it comes to the issue of detection. It means they have to keep vigil around the clock on 
the entire lengths of the pipelines. This is practically difficult to achieve through human 
elements hence, the critical need for technology and equipment. MOC manager (13)  
Electronic Surveillance is more effective than ground patrol when it comes to detection 
of pipeline vandals. NSCDC commander (8) 
 
Early detection of intruders such as these vandals can only be achieved effectively 
through electronic surveillance and intrusion detection system. There are many 
effective detection technologies which include sabotage warning and detection of 
pipeline illegal hot tapping; Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and wireless sensors network 
are generally deployed for early detection of intruders along the pipelines right of way. 
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As I speak to you, these technologies are not considered in our pipelines protection 
strategy. Physical Security Consultant (22) 
 
Globally oil and gas pipelines are being monitored and secured with the RadioBarrier 
System. RadioBarrier can be used as a standalone or self-contain solution for large 
perimeters’ protection as well as integrated with part of multi-layered systems. The 
deployment of this system as an early warning detection provides security with time 
needed for safety reaction to potential threats. Physical Security Consultants (22) 
 
Interviewees were asked to give their perceptions on what they considered as strengths of PSCs 
contracted to provide surveillance for oil pipelines. Their views are presented below:  
 
The major strength of the pipelines surveillance companies is that their owners and 
operators who are ex-militants leaders have good local knowledge of the riverine areas 
and water channels. With this knowledge, they can better secure pipelines, repel pirates 
and apprehend oil thieves than government security force. They also create jobs for 
thousands of youth not covered by the amnesty programme of the government. 
Community leader (15) 
 
A commander of NSCDC at the headquarters believed that pipelines surveillance contracts 
awarded the ex-war lords in the Niger Delta is a strategy meant to appease them. The statement 
below illustrates his view: 
The idea of awarding oil pipelines surveillance contracts to ex-militant leaders is 
basically giving spoilers what they want so that peace can reign. NSCDC Commander 
(8) 
The view of an NGO manager seems to suggest that the programme has positive effects on 
socialization of the ex-militants. 
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To me, it is a socialization programme which is directed at socializing the ex-militants 
to adhere to established norms. NGO Manager (18) 
 
A community leader believed that the programme is effective in engaging idle youths who 
were involved in pipelines vandalism 
 
The oil surveillance contracts have positive effects on the restiveness of the Niger Delta 
region. The idle youths who were formally recruited as militants to vandalise oil 
pipelines are now recruited to productively protect the pipelines with monthly salary. 
Community leader (15) 
 
Some contract agreements make provisions for the contractors to protect the pipelines 
and bear the cost of repairs if and when there is any breach to the pipeline. A typical 
example is the NNPC contract with Ocean Marine Limited (OMS) which compels the 
contractor to bear the cost of repairs if and when there is any breach to the pipeline. 
PSC supervisor (20) 
 
My perception on the issue of contracting former warlords and oil pipeline vandals to 
protect the same facilities they were targeting is that the ex-militants have the ability to 
persuade the vandals from tampering with the pipelines under their coverage. Physical 
security consultant (21) 
 
A community leader believed that the PSCs contracted to provide surveillance on oil pipelines 
enjoy more cooperation of the local communities than the government security forces usually 
regarded as strangers by the oil producing communities. His comment demonstrates this view: 
The surveillance companies are owned and operated by our sons. They enjoy local 
cooperation and legitimacy. They obtain intelligence from the local community about 
the movement of the vandals. That is why the vandals hardly tamper with pipelines 
under their protection. Community leader (16) 
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Weaknesses of the current measures deployed in oil pipelines security management 
About 60 percent of the interviewees believed that the massive deployment of the security 
forces in the Niger Delta region to combat oil pipelines vandals has not achieved the desired 
result in the region. This perception is illustrated by the following view. 
 
The response capability of the JTF is ineffective because timely response requires better 
detection and delay of the adversary. The entire response operations of the security 
forces are typically reactive and therefore most times the security force personnel arrive 
after the crime has been committed. Physical security consultant (12) 
 
A community leader believed that the operational terrain of the Niger Delta constitutes a 
limiting factor to the effectiveness of the security force operations. 
Members of JTF are drawn from different parts of the country. They are not familiar 
with the Niger Delta terrain. They are strangers in the oil producing communities. They 
are not familiar with the estuaries and the river channels that the militants use in 
accessing oil and gas facilities and escaping after their operation. Their response 
capability is therefore limited. Community leader (16) 
An interviewee from an NGO perceived that constant bombing of the oil pipeline vandals in 
civilian areas result in civilian casualties and human right abuse. His perception is illustrated 
by the following comments;  
 
Whatever successes the military seems to have achieved are eroded by human rights 
abuses. The military constantly bomb the vandals in civilian areas thereby causing 
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civilian casualties and also engage in human rights abuses. This is another weakness of 
the Federal government response force. NGO Manager (17) 
Note that the excessive force used by the Nigeria Military in fighting the pipeline 
vandals increases the level of violence by triggering attacks and counter attacks 
resulting in human rights casualties. Community leader (15) 
The more the military attacks the more effective, aggressive and resilient the militants 
become. The militants believe that the oil is drilled from their own soil and therefore 
they must resist the “oppressors” with everything within them. NGO Manager (18) 
A community leader believed that the military force has not established local legitimacy with 
the oil producing communities. His perception is illustrated by this view: 
The JTF members are total strangers from other regions of Nigeria.  Members of the 
oil producing communities do not trust them. The JTF members do not enjoy any form 
of co-operation because they have not established local legitimacy. This slows down 
their success in the war against the vandals. Community leader (15) 
An NGO manager opined that part of the problem in the current military campaign against oil 
pipeline vandalism is the inability of the military to respect the rule of engagement. 
The Military does not comply with the rules of engagement in their operations against 
pipeline vandals. They apply maximum force even in the communities dominated by 
armless civilians resulting in civilian casualties and human rights abuse. NGO 
Manager (18) 
A JTF commander from Akwa Ibom state perceived that a major weakness of government 
security agencies in the war against vandalism of oil pipelines is that the operations typically 
are not intelligence driven. 
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 Intelligence is very critical in detection capability of any security operation. When you 
don’t have actionable intelligence, you will not know where the next target is and 
therefore effective response is hindered. Intelligence is not considered a priority in this 
operation. JTF Commander (2) 
An NGO manager believed that corruption is another major weakness of the government 
security forces in the Niger Delta. This view is demonstrated by the following comment: 
Many officers and men of the security forces are corrupt. Some of them are informants 
to the militant leaders. They turn their attention to the right when the vandals are 
operating on the left. At the end of the day, the corrupt officers and men receive their 
share of the proceeds of the crime. NGO Manager (18) 
A commandant of NSCDC believed that the involvement of some top military officers and 
political leaders in vandalism of oil pipelines and oil theft weakens the operations of the 
security forces because the same political leaders and top military officers would always direct 
their subordinates on actions to take. This view is demonstrated by this statement: 
 
The major hindrance to the success of military operations against oil pipeline vandalism 
is the involvement of top military hierarchy and political leaders in the illicit business. 
They sponsor some of the vandals who enjoy their protection and cover during the 
illegal operations. NSCDC Commander (5) 
A JTF commander operating from Ogun state perceived that distrust among men and officers 
of the JTF is another weakness of the security forces deployed to curb vandalism of oil 
pipelines. 
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As Members of the JTF we do not even trust ourselves. Everyone is a suspect. Members 
do not share intelligence for fear of leakage to the vandals. How do you expect such 
operations to achieve desired success?  JTF Commander (12) 
With regards to the PSCs’ weaknesses, about one third of the participants believed that oil 
pipelines surveillance contract companies have some inherent weaknesses that slow down the 
anti-vandalism war. Their views are expressed through the following comments: 
A major weakness of private security companies is that they are not armed. The law 
does not permit them to carry arms. How do you expect unarmed security officers to 
confront dangerously armed vandals? NSCDC commander (5) 
 
Some private security company’s operatives are involved in vandalism of oil pipelines and oil 
theft. This is a perception of a manager with multinational oil company as illustrated by this 
comment: 
I can confirm to you without any fear of contradiction, that some employees of oil 
pipelines surveillance companies are involved in pipeline vandalism and oil theft. The 
contract awarded to Topline security is a good example. The NNPC accused the 
surveillance company of vandalizing the pipelines they were meant to protect. The 
contract was subsequently suspended. MOC Manager (13) 
 
An NGO manager perceived that private surveillance companies’ involvement in oil pipelines 
security amounts to appeasing evil men. 
The whole arrangement is meant to appease evil men. No matter how much you try to 
appease them, this cannot change their criminal disposition. They will definitely strike 
at the least opportunity. NGO Manager (17) 
 
A perception expressed by  about two third of the participants is that the selection process of 
surveillance companies for contract awards is marred  by corruption and political 
considerations and not guided by efficiency and professionalism consideration. This perception 
was illustrated by a comment from a physical security consultant based in Port Harcourt:  
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The process of selecting these PSCs is highly politicized and corrupt. Most times, it 
does not follow due process. Take for instance the Trans Forcados pipelines 
surveillance contract awarded to Ocean Marine Solutions (OMS). This company 
belongs to a Nigerian businessman who is a friend to the National Chairman of All 
Progressive Congress, the governing Political Party in Nigeria. This contract award has 
already attracted several criticisms from members of the public especially the youths 
from the local community. Physical Security Consultant (21) 
 
A Joint Task Force commander believed that a major weakness of PSCs in oil pipelines security 
in Nigeria is their refusal to share intelligence with the government security forces. The view 
below illustrates this perception: 
 
The private security companies’ operatives protecting oil pipelines facilities in Nigeria 
are not willing to share intelligence with the government security forces. These 
operatives are recruited from the local communities; they are in possession of 
actionable intelligence that could help in this war against pipelines vandals. It is very 
regrettable that they do not normally pass such intelligence to the JTF. JTF 
Commander (12) 
 
A supervisor with a PSC perceived that a major weakness of their organization is the 
concentration of surveillance activities along the pipelines under the contract awarded to them 
and nothing else. 
 
Our area of concentration is restricted to the pipelines covered by the contract award. 
We are not concerned about what happens outside our area of concentration. PSC 
Supervisor (20) 
 
A physical security consultant from Lagos believed that oil pipelines surveillance companies 
do not have trained professionals within their employment and do not also deploy technologies 
in their operations.  
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Most pipeline surveillance companies recruit their staff from the oil producing 
communities where they operate. These youths are not trained. Moreover the 
companies do not deploy technologies in their surveillance operations. Physical 
Security Consultant (21) 
 
Ways of improvement 
After discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the current anti-vandalism measures familiar 
with the participants, the research sought to obtain their perspective in areas of improvement 
needed. The responses were varied but mostly reflected what were believed to be the 
weaknesses of the current measures.  
A physical security consultant from Lagos believed that a major area needed for improvement 
is to detect and possibly delay the oil pipelines vandals before they carry out the illegal 
activities.  
To improve on the current measures aimed at curbing oil pipeline vandalism, 
strategies must be developed to detect and delay the vandals until the security 
forces arrive and disrupt their operations. I believe this can be achieved either 
though the deployment of physical security elements or robust and actionable 
intelligence. Physical Security Consultant (21) 
It is therefore imperative that a legal framework that would facilitate the deployment of 
technology such as drones for monitoring the pipelines right-of-way in Nigeria be put in place. 
Moreover, the intelligence agency of the government of Nigeria should be deployed to the 
Niger Delta region to boost the JTF with actionable intelligence.  
A community leader from Rivers State believed that another way of improvement necessary to 
enhance effective operations of the anti-vandalism measures is to deploy locals from oil 
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producing communities, who are familiar with the riverine terrain as members of JTF. His 
comment illustrates this view: 
Most members of JTF posted to the Niger Delta currently do not understand the 
terrain of the riverine areas. They cannot achieve much when they don’t know 
the river channels used by the vandals to access the oil facilities, and escape 
through after vandalism. The complicated terrain is well known to those brought 
up in the area. To improve on the current measures therefore, I suggest that most 
members of JTF deployed to the Niger Delta should come from the area 
especially the riverine areas. Community Leaders (15)  
An NGO manager from Bayelsa State believed that the current measures can be improved if 
the military in the Niger Delta stops human rights abuses on the Niger Delta people. The 
participant illustrates his view thus:  
Let me inform you that if the members of JTF in the Niger Delta operate within 
the rules of engagement in the conduct of their operations in the Niger Delta, 
there will be peace. Presently, the use of excessive force and human right abuses 
trigger move violence and vandalism. Measures must be put in place to check 
the excesses of the security forces in the Niger Delta region. NGO Manager 
(17) 
The Federal government of Nigeria seems to emphasise on security forces as a sole- response 
to oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria. This is a perception by a physical security consultant from 
Rivers State. To improve on the current strategy, the participant believed that:  
There must be combination of methods and methodology. It is practically 
difficult to police for instance 500 kilometers of pipelines using security forces. 
Page 152 of 220 
 
Physical security elements have to be integrated with the human security. For 
example, if drones or other intrusion detection systems detect vandalized 
pipelines, response force must intervene immediately to repel the vandals. 
Physical Security Consultant (22) 
There must be massive deployment of technology if we must contain this illicit 
business of oil pipelines vandalism. Physical Security Consultant (22) 
A participant who is an NGO manager from Ondo state of Nigeria believed that corruption has 
always been a major factor hindering effective growth of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria. 
He perceived that inorder to improve on the current strategies and tactics, corruption must be 
reduced to the lowest minimum if not completely eliminated. His perception is illustrated thus: 
 
 We must find ways of dealing with corrupt military officers and politicians who are 
sponsoring oil pipelines vandals to sabotage the Nigerian people. A strong institutional 
framework must be put in place to deal with corrupt military officers or government 
officials who sponsor oil pipeline vandals. NGO Manager (18) 
 
A private security company supervisor who is a participant from Delta State believed that 
another way of improvement on the current measures is for the Nigerian government to permit 
PSCs involved in pipelines protection to carry fire arms and ammunition. He believed that: 
 
The private security companies contracted to provide surveillance for oil 
pipelines have the capacity to contain pipelines vandalism if they are permitted 
to carry arms. Some of us were vandals before we decided to embrace amnesty 
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programme of the government. If the Nigerian constitution is amended to permit 
those of us engaged to protect oil and gas facilities to carry arms, I can assure 
you that pipelines vandalism will end. This is because we know the terrain and 
the strategies of the vandals and we know how to trail them if the escape. PSC 
Supervisor (19) 
A Joint Task Force commander from Ogun State perceived that the bad elements within the 
JTF that aid and abet the vandals must be identified and dismissed to pave way for improved 
performance of the JTF.  
One of the ways of improving the performance of JTF is by removing the bad eggs 
among us. This can be achieved through thorough screening of officers and men 
deployed to serve in the JTF. JTF Commander (12)  
A participant from Lagos believed that proper training and orientation of the youths from the 
local communities on how to protect the oil pipelines can improve their performance.  
All the youths from the local communities engaged by the surveillance companies 
should be properly trained on basic security operations.  NSCDC Commander (10) 
An NGO manager from Bayelsa State believed that co-operation between PSCs and members 
of JTF could improve the current performance of the JTF in the fight against vandalism of oil 
pipelines.  
If there is cooperation between PSCs and JTF, the performance of the security forces 
will improve greatly. PSCs have good actionable intelligence on the vandals, because 
both the vandals and the communities’ youths are members of the same communities. 
If there is cooperation between the security forces and operatives of the PSCs, their 
joint efforts would put an end to the activities of the vandals in the oil producing 
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communities especially the riverine areas where most of the oil and gas facilities are 
sited. NGO Manager (17) 
 A physical security consultant from Lagos believed deployment of technology and equipment 
by the PSCs could enhance their performance greatly.  
PSCs should deploy technologies and equipment to monitor and protect the pipelines 
assigned to them. Surveillance, detection and delay equipment and technologies will 
greatly improve their performance in the current fight against pipeline vandalism. 
Physical security consultant (21). 
Discussion  
The theme examined in this section brought to the fore what are considered to be areas of 
strengths and weaknesses of the current measures deployed to curb the menace of vandalism 
of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria. The empirical research results are found to be in 
consistent with the findings in the wider body of literature.  Foremost in the current measures 
considered to have contributed positively towards eradication of vandalism of petroleum 
products pipelines in Nigeria is the deployment of security forces in the Niger Delta region. 
Although the actual number of the security personnel deployed to the Niger Delta region is not 
available in public domain for strategic reasons, there is however, noticeable presence of the 
security forces in every oil producing community in the Niger Delta, giving rise to what is 
commonly referred to “the militarisation of the Niger Delta region”. The deployment which 
commenced in the early 2004 resulted in the presence of members of armed forces of Nigeria 
and other security personnel in all the oil producing communities of the Niger Delta region. 
This deployment was triggered by the increasing threats of militants’ attacks on the oil 
pipelines in the region. The presence of the JTF provides deterrence against oil pipeline vandals 
as many vandals at the local communities’ level could not operate freely for fear of attacks and 
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arrests by the members of the security forces. As cited in the literature, one of the measures put 
in place by the Federal Government of  Nigeria to curb the menace of vandalism of oil pipeline 
is the increased military presence in the Niger Delta, which culminated in the deployment of 
the JTF in 2004 (Adishi & Hunga, 2017; Chatham House, 2013; Lopez – Lucia, 2015). The 
participants emphasized that the presence of JTF deter the oil pipeline vandals especially the 
women and youths who are involved in oil pipeline vandalism at the local level.  
 
Another positive effect of the JTF is that they are well trained and are provided with sufficient 
arms and ammunitions compared with the militant vandals who also possess sophisticated 
weapons but in limited quantity. With the personnel of JTF been well trained and been fully 
equipped with sufficient arms and ammunition, the security outfit has the capacity to defeat the 
militant in open confrontation.  
 
The deployment of NSCDC personnel in 2007 to all areas covered by 5001kilometres of oil 
pipelines also strengthens the anti-vandalism war in Nigeria. Although the exact number of the 
personnel deployed is not made available by the authorities concerned, it is common to find 
personnel in most area covered by oil pipelines in Nigeria. As cited in the literature, one of the 
ways NSCDC responds to vandalism of oil pipelines is “preventive diplomacy”, which entails 
the deployment of men and officers of the Corps to the Communities through which pipelines 
traverse and also patrolling the pipelines on daily basis (Abolurin, 2010, p.52) 
 
Another important area of strength of the government security forces in the Niger Delta region 
is their involvement in the rescue of kidnapped oil workers and expatriates usually abducted 
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and held for ransom by the militants in the region. The military is also involved in the escort 
of most staff and logistics of the multinational oil companies, thereby creating conducive 
environment for the oil companies to operate in the Niger Delta. Boris (2016 pp.004-008) and 
Mboho & Udousoro (2014) have enumerated in the body literature the achievements of the JTF 
in the current anti-vandalism drive. 
 
The research participants also identified the contributions of PSCs towards curbing vandalism 
of oil pipelines in the Niger Delta. Most of the owners and operators of the PSCs are former 
warlords in the Niger Delta. These ex-militants have a good knowledge of the creeks of the 
Niger Delta where most oil and gas facilities are sited; hence they have the capacity to resist 
the pipeline vandals who operate within the creeks.  
 
Moreover, the engagement of the ex-militants as private security providers creates employment 
opportunities for thousands of Niger Delta youths who were hitherto engaged in oil pipelines 
vandalism and oil theft. The participants were quick to note that the private surveillance 
companies owned and operated by the ex-militants enjoy co-operation from the oil producing 
communities since they are typically engaged from the respective communities.  
 
Militarisation of the Niger Delta region has its weaknesses. One of the weaknesses is that the 
presence of military personnel in large numbers in the Niger Delta increases tension among the 
locals from the oil producing communities for fear of confrontation between the militants and 
the security forces which usually trigger further violence which could result in further 
vandalisation of oil pipelines. The situation is worsened because most of the operatives of JTF 
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are drawn from other parts of the country. The oil producing communities consider this 
deployment as an attempt by the Federal Government to oppress them and continue to deprive 
them of their God-given natural resources.   
Another area of weakness in the current measures is that the JTF personnel who are mostly 
from other parts of Nigeria do not have good knowledge of the terrain of the local oil producing 
communities, especially the creeks where most oil facilities are sited. The vandals on the other 
hand operate from the creeks and are familiar with all the river channels which they use as 
escape routes after successful operations.  
 
The empirical research also brought to the fore a major weakness of the current measure, which 
reveals that the JTF operations are not driven by actionable intelligence. The absence of 
credible intelligence makes it difficult for the military operations to be proactive. This results 
in reactive security operations resulting mostly in recovery of stolen crude instead of 
prevention of attacks on the pipelines and other oil and gas facilities. 
 
Another weakness of the current measures indicates that the JTF personnel are usually accused 
of human right abuses such as intimidation of the locals, extortions and indiscriminate arrests 
and illegal detention of youths of the region who criticise their illegal activities (refer to table 
2.6 which presents the recorded human right abuses between 1990 and 2006).  This stems from 
the fact that the military does not seem to comply with the rules of engagement. Moreover, it 
is widely believed that some corrupt military officers are involved in sponsoring some of the 
oil pipelines vandals. This corroborates the views of Odalomu (2016) and Lopez – Lucia 
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(2015). The same corrupt top military officers provide cover for the vandals who escape with 
the stolen crude oil to the high seas where the products are exported to international market.  
 
Another theme that featured in the empirical research is the role of PSCs in oil pipeline security 
management in Nigeria. A fundamental weakness of this measure is that the security guards 
deployed to provide surveillance on oil pipelines are not usually armed. This renders their 
protection of the oil pipelines not effective, because they cannot confront the heavily armed 
militants. This situation is worsened by the political considerations which often determine 
those to be awarded the security contracts at the expense of professionalism and competence.  
 
Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the current measures from the participants 
perspectives, the research also brought to the fore ways of improvement of these measures.  
The foremost identified way to improve on the current measures based on the participants 
perceptions is an urgent need to deploy technologies and equipment alongside the security 
forces in an integrate manner. There is also a need to identify the locals of Niger Delta region 
of Nigeria within the Nigerian Armed Forces and deploy them to serve in the JTF in the region.  
 
In order to stop human rights abuses by the military personnel in the Niger Delta, the oversight 
authorities which include the military high command in Nigeria, the army committees in the 
Nigerian Senate and the House of Representatives, should ensure that the military operations 
are guided strictly by rules of engagement and that the military must be directed to conduct 
their operations within the specified rules.  
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There should be a legal framework that authorises the private security guards contracted to 
protect oil pipelines to carry arms, given the sensitive nature of their assignment. The major 
private security providers contracted to provide surveillance on the oil pipelines should be 
required to deploy detection and surveillance technologies and equipment along the pipelines 
right-of-way. These measures would assist in detecting intrusions along the right-of-way and 
swift intervention accordingly. In practical terms, Wireless Sensors Network (WSN) is a 
technology that could report third party intervention in real time. Moreover, specially trained 
armed guards patrolling the pipelines right-of-way could also assist in detecting such 
intrusions. 
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Chapter seven: Conclusion 
Summary of findings  
Petroleum resources are the primary source of revenue and particularly foreign exchange 
earnings in Nigeria, also the petroleum products majorly come from the Niger-Delta region 
of Nigeria where all the oil explorations and exploitations currently take place, hence most 
oil and gas facilities are located within the region. Oil pipelines are the safest and most cost-
effective means of transportation of petroleum products and hence they are deployed 
globally to move oil and gas products both within the countries and across the national 
borders. As a major oil producing country in the world, Nigeria also make use of oil 
pipelines to transport her petroleum products to refineries within the country and to all the 
off-shore terminals (Alawode & Ogunleye, 2011; Adejor, 2014; Onuoha, 2008; Okoli & 
Orinya 2013). 
 
This research project sought to assess the effectiveness of government security forces 
involved in the petroleum products pipeline security in Nigeria. The project is a case study 
research focusing primarily on the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), a 
paramilitary agency of the federal government of Nigeria established specifically to protect 
Nigeria critical national infrastructure, including petroleum products pipeline. In order to 
contain the rising incidence of oil pipelines vandalism in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, 
the federal government further deployed members of the armed forces of Nigeria, 
comprising the Nigerian army, the Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air force to the region which 
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commenced in 2004. Also deployed are personnel of the Nigeria Police Force and also 
contracted PSCs also referred to as oil pipelines surveillance companies.  
 
This research extended its scope beyond the NSCDC in order to obtain more comprehensive 
perspectives. The study embarked on extensive review of extant academic and grey 
literature, spanning over four years period. The literature explored three major themes 
including the nature and extent of vandalism of oil pipelines the strategies employed to 
address the problem, the weaknesses and strengths of the measures, including ways of 
improving the current measures.  
 
Recocognising that vandalism of oil pipelines remains a major threat to petroleum products 
pipelines in Nigeria, the research identified three categories of actors responsible for 
vandalism oil pipelines in Nigeria. The first category involves the local actors from the oil 
producing communities who are mainly jobless youths, who try to earn a living through the 
illegal business. The second category encompasses those vandals sponsored by top military 
officers, senior police officers and highly placed politicians for a fee, while the third 
category are the Niger Delta Militants who siphon the crude oil by blowing the pipes using 
various devices. 
 
The interviews indicated that some foreign nationals from Eastern Europe, Russia, 
Australia, Lebanon, the Netherlands and France are involved in vandalism of oil pipelines 
and oil theft in collaboration with the local vandals. The foreign nationals help in facilitation 
of exportation of the stolen crude oil off the Nigerian territorial waters and also sourcing 
Page 162 of 220 
 
illegal buyers outside Nigeria. The research confirmed that vandalism of oil pipelines has 
serious negative consequences on various sectors in Nigeria. These negative effects include 
massive economic losses, environmental degradation and a threat to national security. The 
research findings suggest that despite some positive impacts made by the security forces in 
reducing the scourge of vandalism of oil pipelines, the illicit business is still flourishing and 
is on the rise. It found that vandalism of oil pipelines is a multifaceted phenomenon 
requiring a holistic approach rather than the current tactics and strategy which emphasies 
solely on security response.  
 
The participants’ accounts recognised that the massive deployment of security forces to the 
Niger-Delta creates tension amongst the people of the region which leads to further 
escalation of violence in the region, culminating in more attacks on oil and gas facilities. 
The response of the military to the escalated violence often results in more attacks on the 
militants who typically operate from civilian-dominated areas thus resulting sometimes in 
civilian casualties and human rights abuses. The interviews indicated that the deployment 
of technology and equipment such as intrusion detection system, surveillance technologies 
such as unmanned aerial vehicle (drones) has not been given serious consideration in the 
current strategy adopted by the Federal government to combat the pipelines vandals.  It has 
been found in body of literature, that most oil and gas producing countries globally deploy 
equipment and technologies in conjunction with security forces to protect oil and gas 
facilities. Such technologies and equipment include access control technologies, intrusion 
detection system, aerial and ground surveillance of oil pipelines corridor (US General 
Accounting Office, 1991; Partomak, 2004; Ngbokwuru 2011; Zabyelina & Kustoria, 2015). 
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Having recognised that there exists a wide gap between the Niger Delta oil producing 
communities and the security forces deployed to the communities, the interviews indicated 
that this gap exists because of suspicion and lack of trust between the Niger Delta region 
and the federal government of Nigeria that deploys these security forces. The oil producing 
communities still view the members of the joint task forces (JTF) as agents of the federal 
government sent to their region to continue to suppress them and deny them of their God-
given natural resources. 
 
The participants’ accounts brought to the fore the role of PSCs in the oil pipelines security 
management. The interviews indicated that these PSCs which are owned and operated by 
the Niger-Delta ex-militant leaders and commanders have the potentials of significantly 
reducing the threats of pipeline vandals, but are weakened by corruption and deliberate 
compromise by the owners and operators of the companies. According to the research 
participants, the operations of the security forces in the Niger Delta region against pipelines 
vandals are not intelligence driven because the government’s main intelligence agency, the 
Directorate of State Services (DSS), has not been formally deployed along with other 
security agencies for the purposes of combating vandalism of oil pipelines. Besides, the 
apparent lack of cooperation between the security forces and the oil producing communities 
significantly deprives the security personnel access to local information on the vandals who 
live and operate from the oil producing communities. 
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Implications of the findings 
There is no doubt that the Nigerian government is determined to reduce drastically, if not 
totally eliminate vandalism of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria. This determination 
is expressed through several measures embarked upon by the government, including the 
massive deployment of government security forces to the Niger Delta region, where oil 
pipelines vandalism is prevalence and seems to have attained endemic dimension. The 
efforts of the security forces have resulted in several arrests of the vandals, the oil vessels 
that carry the stolen crude, and destruction of several illegal refineries in the creeks of the 
Niger Delta.  
 
However, this research has cast doubt about the capability of the government to substantially 
curb vandalism of oil pipelines through the measures currently adopted to tackle the menace. 
Although it is not possible to generalise the findings of this research beyond the context of 
the experience of the participants within the case study organization and other research 
participants, which indeed is an acknowledged limitation of a qualitative research, there are 
however many points under discussion that have reflected the findings in the body of extant 
academic and grey literature. Used together therefore, the findings may be viewed using 
“moderatum generalization” (Bryman, 2013, p.406), in that they be seen as instances of a 
broader set of recognizable features that are transferable to other contexts if not directly 
generalisable.  
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As earlier noted, the findings of this research suggest that vandalism of oil pipelines in 
Nigeria is a multifaceted and multidimensional phenomenon which requires a holistic 
approach. The research identified three categories of actors responsible for oil pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria. To effectively combat holistically the three categories of oil pipelines 
vandals, there must be a combination of methods and methodologies and critical appraisal 
of the motivations of each category so as to apply specific solution to each of the adversaries.   
 
The first category has been identified as jobless youths who vandalise the pipelines that pass 
through their communities, by puncturing the pipes and siphoning the contents into drums, 
jerry-cans and other containers which is sold in the local black market to earn a living. The 
second category is made-up of the vandals sponsored by top members of the Nigerian armed 
forces, the upper echelons of the Nigeria Police Force and senior members of the political 
class. This category enjoys full cover of the government security forces when carrying out 
the illicit activities. The third class comprise of several Niger Delta militant groups who 
vandalise oil pipelines to sabotage the Nigerian government primarily and also engage in 
crude oil theft which they sell to international buyers illegally, and sometimes exchange the 
crude for sophisticated weapons. The militants describe themselves as freedom fighters 
demanding for resource control and regional autonomy.   
 
The implications of these findings suggest that an approach which depends solely on 
security response strategy may not be able to address holistically the motivations of these 
categories of actors involved in vandalism of petroleum products pipelines. Each of these 
adversaries requires unique strategy to deal with the threats. While it is possible to engage 
the jobless youths through job creation and provision of social amenities such as schools 
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and hospitals, such solution may not be applicable to the sponsored vandals or the agitators. 
Arising from this argument, the security response may successfully check the militants but 
may not be effective in tackling the vandals who are sponsored by some senior military and 
police officers including some top political leaders.  
 
It is worthy to note that the feeling of anger and demand for attention motivates the militants 
to interrupt oil pipelines. Militarization of Niger Delta region therefore creates more tension 
and increases the feeling of anger by the militants. The response of the militants to military 
invasion trigger further attacks on oil and gas facilities compelling the security forces to 
apply excessive forces resulting in human rights abuses and civilian casualties. The dead of 
civilians in the course of military operations further trigger more attacks on oil and gas 
facilities and the cycle continues.  
 
The involvement of foreign nationals in vandalism of oil pipelines and oil theft suggests that 
the Nigeria government may not unilaterally succeed in the efforts to eradicate or reduce 
pipeline vandalism to the bare-minimum without active collaboration with foreign 
governments, to help determine who the buyers of Nigerian crude oil are, and through what 
fiscal institutions the proceeds of the sales of the stolen crude are being laundered. One of 
the findings of the research suggests that the “war” against pipelines vandals in the Niger 
Delta may not be intelligence driven due to non-deployment of relevant intelligence 
agencies to compliment the military and other security forces. Moreover, there is lack of 
cooperation between the security forces and the oil producing communities. It means 
therefore that the security forces may not be able to synergize with the local communities 
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for intelligence sharing that could help in detection and possible prevention of vandalism of 
oil pipelines  
 
The research findings also suggest that the deployment of physical security elements such 
as technology and equipment has not been given serious consideration in the current anti-
vandalism strategy. This implies that the critical roles of physical security in the protection 
of assets, which include deterrence, detection and delay of adversaries are not factored into 
the petroleum products pipelines security management strategy. It is worthy to note that 
these technologies and equipment are combined with security forces in integrated form to 
protect oil and gas pipelines in most oil and gas producing countries globally.  
 
The research also identified PSCs as major players in the protection of oil pipelines in 
Nigeria. The private security providers are mostly ex-militant leaders and warlords in the 
Niger-Delta region who have embraced the amnesty programme of the Federal Government.  
The strategy of awarding the pipeline security contracts to the ex-militants who are also 
locals of the oil producing areas of the Niger Delta is intended to appease the ex- warlords 
who still muster great influence over those currently engaged in the illicit activities; and 
also provide jobs to the youths of the oil producing communities. The strategy failed to 
achieve the desired purpose due to corrupt practices prevalence in the contract award 
processes and lack of sincerity on the part of the ex-militants, who turnaround to get 
involved in vandalizing and stealing crude oil from the same pipelines they were meant to 
protect. 
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Key recommendations  
There is a substantial programme of work needed to achieve complete eradication of vandalism 
of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria. This research recommends 11 key actions that the 
federal government of Nigeria could implement to eradicate the illicit business or at least 
reduce it to the bare minimum. These recommendations are categorised into short- and long- 
term recommendations: 
 
Short-term recommendations 
1.  Personnel in the Nigerian Armed Forces who are from the oil producing communities of 
the Niger Delta in Nigeria should be identified and deployed as members of JTF to the 
region, especially the creeks and the riverine areas. This measure should aim at populating 
the JTF with security operatives who are familiar with the local terrain of the riverine areas 
where oil and gas facilities are sited predominantly, and are frequently vandalised.  
 
2. The participant’s accounts and the findings in the literature indicated that vandalism of oil 
pipelines and concomitant oil thefts are believed to be sponsored by very powerful and well-
connected cabals including some senior military personnel, senior echelons of the Nigeria 
Police Force, and some top political leaders. It is recommended that thorough investigations 
should be carried out into the allegations. If confirmed, the perpetrators should be identified 
and apprehended by the government, charged to court and ensure speedy trials and possible 
convictions.  
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3. It is also proposed that the intelligence agents of the Nigerian Government be deployed to 
the Niger Delta region to provide adequate intelligence to the JTF operatives for proactive 
security operations. The official intelligence agency in charge of internal security in Nigeria 
is the Department of State Services (DSS). The personnel of this agency are specifically 
trained to provide intelligence through the office of the National Security Adviser, to tackle 
all internal security issues that affect the Nigerian state. The agency operatives are skilled 
in all forms of intelligence gathering and production. It is therefore the recommendation of 
the research that personnel from this agency be deployed to serve as members of JTF for 
the purpose of providing intelligence for the operations against vandalism of oil pipelines 
in Nigeria.  
 
4. The Military officers deployed to the Niger Delta region should comply with the rules of 
engagement, and any military officers involved in human rights abuses should be sanctioned 
to serve as deterrence to others. Section 217(2) (c) of the 1999 constitution of Nigeria and 
Section (8) (1) and (3) of the Armed Forces Acts, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (LFN) 
2004, provide code on conduct and rules of engagement for the armed forces in internal 
security. Among the provisions of the rule of engagement is the principle of minimum force 
and proportionality which must be applied at all times; whenever operational situation 
permits; every reasonable effort shall be made to control the situation through measures 
short of using force. 
 
5. It is recommended that the major players in oil and gas sector in Nigeria should learn best 
practices from other oil and gas producing countries. The best practices within the context 
of this recommendation connote the pipelines protection solutions deployed by developed 
oil producing countries.  Such countries include the United States of America (USA), where 
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pipelines operators in conjunction with oil and gas companies established Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) where Intelligence is generated to help secure oil and 
gas facilities against terrorism. Also, in Russia, in addition to the specialized paramilitary 
units tasked to protect oil and gas pipelines, security experts at Skichel Corporation; a 
Russian security company, developed several solutions for pipelines security using security 
detectors manufactured by the corporation. The detectors are deployed in conjunction with 
the specialized paramilitary forces to provide security for Russian oil and gas pipelines. The 
Kenya pipelines companies deploy private security firms which work closely with the 
nation’s intelligence professionals to identify and defeat threats before approaching oil 
pipelines perimeters (Parfomak, 2004; Vatansever, 2017; Odhiambo, Maito & Onkware 
2014). Other countries include the UK and Turkey. Major players in the Nigerian oil sector 
should sponsor their employees and consultants to such countries for training on how best 
to protect oil pipelines in Nigeria. 
 
6. For proper oversight of PSCs, the regulatory agencies must have the capability to monitor 
constantly the activities of the private surveillance companies operated by the former 
militant leaders. The Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) who awarded the 
security contracts to the ex-militant’s leaders on behalf of the Nigerian government, should 
set up a committee to oversee the day-to-day operations of the security companies to ensure 
that they comply with the terms of the contract. 
 
Long-term recommendations 
7. It is proposed that an integrated solution be adopted in the security management of 
petroleum products pipelines. Consequently, in addition to the massive deployment of 
Page 171 of 220 
 
security forces, the federal government in collaboration with the multinational oil 
companies should invest massively in technology, for surveillance of oil facilities, including 
unmanned aerial vehicle (drones) surveillance equipment, which have the capacity to detect 
and report third party tampering with the pipelines for quick response.  This solution 
requires long term planning and putting some measures in place.  These measures include 
an alternative power supply with the capacity to provide constant power for the operations 
of the equipment and technologies. Efforts must be made to identify the technologies that 
can easily be deployed and the experts that would be involved in installations and 
operations. Such experts could be sourced from either foreign security service providers  or 
locally.   
 
8. It has been established that military operations can neither eradicate vandalism of oil 
pipelines nor win peace and security in the Niger Delta without establishing local legitimacy 
through hearts and minds campaigns that address the core issues at the heart of the Niger 
Delta crisis. These core issues include: - youth unemployment in the region, environmental 
degradation due to oil exploration activities, lack of social amenities and poverty. It is 
proposed that the government of Nigeria should evolve alternatives away from a sole-
security response to vandalism of oil pipelines. The government should actively be involved 
in developing local institutions and economies such as provision of social amenities, 
increase employment of the youths from the oil producing communities and pursue other 
programmes aimed at empowering the youths and taking them away from criminal 
activities.  
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9. It is recommended that the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 
collaboration with the oil companies should recruit and train youths around the oil pipelines 
areas and deploy them as first and primary line of defence to protect the pipelines since it is 
difficult to police a long-distance pipeline using security forces. Research should be 
conducted to determine the training needs of the youths and the modality of recruitment of 
the youths.  
 
10. Stolen crude oil from vandalised pipelines passes through the creeks of the Niger Delta 
usually at night with the aid of small vessels that transfer the crude into cargo ships anchored 
at international waters. This research recommends international collaborative efforts that 
may involve the use of helicopters and gun boats on international waters. In addition, foreign 
governments should assist in determining the buyers of the Nigerian stolen crude oil and 
through what fiscal institutions the proceeds are being laundered. This recommendation 
requires long term planning and consultation with relevant foreign governments for 
effective implementation 
 
11. Finally, it is recommended that the Federal Government should issue licences to the 
indigenous companies from oil producing communities to establish modular refineries in 
the creeks of the Niger Delta. A modular refinery is a prefabricated processing plant that 
has been constructed on skid-mounted surface, with each structure containing a portion of 
the entire refining process plant connected together by interstitial piping to form an easily 
manageable process. It is relatively easier to fabricate and erect. This measure should aim 
at refining crude oil legally by the oil producing communities and discouraging the vandals 
from building illegal refineries which is the current practice in the creeks of the Niger Delta 
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region. This recommendation requires enabling legislation from the Nigerian Parliament for 
legal backing and also modality on establishment and ownership structure. 
 
 
Options for further research 
The research outcome showed that pipelines are vandalized at the local level by the youths 
and the unemployed living within the communities where the pipelines traversed. Further 
research could investigate the modalities of recruiting and training the youths of these 
communities to form the first line of defence against vandalism of oil pipelines. 
 
According to the research participants, illegal refineries are built in the Niger Delta creeks 
by the vandals who refined stolen crude oil illegally, and sold the refined products to local 
consumers. This study recommends that further studies be conducted on how to ‘legalise’ 
the illegal refineries by establishing modular refineries in the oil producing communities 
and giving the ownership structure to the communities to discourage oil pipeline vandalism. 
 
The role of physical security has been brought to the fore by this study. The interviews 
indicated that the Nigerian authorities have not considered physical security deployment as 
an acceptable strategy for oil pipeline security management, despite its usefulness in some 
oil and gas producing countries. Further research should be carried out on the role of 
equipment and technology in the oil and gas pipelines security management using the United 
States as a case study; and recommending the findings for application in Nigeria. 
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Appendix 1 - Semi structured interview 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Research Topic: 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of government security agencies in Petroleum                            
Products Pipelines Security Management in Nigeria: A case study of Nigeria 
Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) 
 
 
Background 
1. Can you tell me a bit about your current role and your Professional background? 
 Current department 
 Level of management 
 Roles in the host community 
 Previous roles 
Nature and extent of the problem of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria 
2. What do you see as being the distinctive features of petroleum product pipelines vandalism 
in Nigeria? 
 Nature of vandalism 
 Sophistication of the vandals 
 Motivation of vandals 
 Equipment deployed by vandals 
 Network of vandals 
 Skills of vandals 
 Operational terrain  
 Foreign government dimension 
Strategies and tactics being employed to address the problem 
3. What are the main measures adopted by your organisation to combat pipeline vandals? 
 Surveillance of the petroleum products pipelines 
 Patrol of the pipelines routes 
 Welfare of security personnel 
 Deployment of high-tech equipment   
 Access control 
 Host communities sensitisation 
 Engagement of private security companies (PSC) 
 Engagement of vigilantes 
Strengths and weaknesses of the measures 
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4. What do you see as being the main strengths of these measures in combating the vandals? 
 Detering  vandals 
 Detecting vandals 
 Delay  vandalism 
 Respond to the vandals 
 Neutralise their attacks 
 Intelligence sharing 
 Interagency cooperationm 
 Community involvement 
 Ease of use 
 
 
5. What do you see as being the main ways which these measures could be improved? 
 Coverage 
 Robustness 
 Resilience to evolving offender techniques 
 Intelligence sharing capabilities of security agencies 
 Skills of security agents 
 External factors being addressed 
 Involvement of foreign government 
 Involvement of international security institutions 
 Host communities engagement 
 
6. How effective do you believe your organization/community to be in oil pipelines security 
management in Nigeria? 
 Lessons that can be learned from elsewhere? 
 
7. What do you see as being the main barriers to be overcome to enable improvements to be 
made in the effective protection of petroleum products pipelines? 
 
Additional comments 
8. Is there anything you would like to add that we haven’t already covered? 
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Appendix 4: Participant Invitation Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
      Institute of Criminal Justice studies           
                                                St George’s Building 
                                                        141 High Street  
                                                               Portsmouth 
PO1  2HY 
                                                  Tel: 023 9284 50689 
                                                                                                        Researcher: Christopher Udoaka 
UP792029@myport.ac.uk 
                                                                                                          Supervisor: Dr Alison Wakefield                                                                              
Alison.Wakefield@port.ac.uk 
                                                                                               Head of Department: Dr Paul Norman 
        Paul.norman@port.ac.uk 
         
 15th April 2018                                                     
 
Invitation Letter 
Dear Potential Participant 
RE: Assessing the effectiveness of government security agencies in petroleum products 
pipelines security management in Nigeria: A case study of Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps (NSCDC) 
 
I am writing to invite you to participate in a research study on the above topic, which I am 
undertaking as part of my Professional Doctorate in Security Risk Management (DSyRM) at 
the University of Portsmouth, UK. 
This research will examine by means of case study the problem of petroleum products pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria and consider the reasons why this illicit business continues to thrive 
despite government efforts to combat it. It will identify the measures being employed by 
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NSCDC and assess their perspectives on it effectiveness with a view to making best practice 
recommendations in oil pipeline security management. 
I have been granted permission for this case study research to be undertaken in your 
organisation. Specifically, the research will be based on the following three objectives: 
 The first is to examine the nature and extent of the problem of petroleum products pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria.  
The second is to identify the strategies and tactics being employed to address the problem. This 
will include examination of best practices adopted by other countries faced by similar problem.  
The third is to examine the strengths and limitations of the current measures with a view to 
making recommendations for their improvement. 
The research is intended to gather the perspectives of a number of interviewees and then present 
a description of these issues through their eyes: there are therefore no “right” or “wrong” 
answers. 
I am seeking 10 interviewees who would be willing to participate in a telephone or Skype 
interview of no more than 20 to 30 minutes from NSCDC. I am also seeking 12 interviewees 
ifrom other critical stakeholders including members of the military joint task force (JTF), 
multinational oil companies (MOC) in Nigeria, leaders of  oil producing communities of the 
Niger-Delta Region, non-governmental organisations (NGO), private security companies and 
physical security consultants. I will bear all the calling costs of the interview.  Interviews will 
be completely anonymous and confidential. The notes from the interview will be hand recorded 
and no audio recording will be used. Participants will be permitted to withdraw from the 
research at any time prior to the analysis of the data. Included with this letter is an information 
sheet that explains more about the research and the processes employed, and a consent form 
which you will be asked to return if you are willing to take part. 
It is my hope that you will be interested in taking part in this research. By way of appreciation, 
I would be pleased to share a copy of the final research report with you. If you have any specific 
queries or concerns please feel free to get back to me or my research supervisor, Dr Alison 
Wakefield (alison.wakefield@port.ac.uk).  I would highly appreciate if you could confirm with 
me via my email address above if you are willing to take part in the research. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
Christopher Udoaka 
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Appendix 5: Participant consent form 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal Justice studies         
                                                St George’s Building 
                                                        141 High Street  
                                                               Portsmouth 
PO1  2HY 
                                                  Tel: 023 9284 50689 
                                                                                                        Researcher: Christopher Udoaka 
UP792029@myport.ac.uk 
                                                                                                          Supervisor: Dr Alison Wakefield                                                                              
Alison.Wakefield@port.ac.uk 
                                                                                               Head of Department: Dr Paul Norman 
        Paul.norman@port.ac.uk 
         
 15th April 2018                                                 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Assessing the effectiveness of government security agencies in petroleum 
products pipelines security management in Nigeria: A case study of Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps (NSCDC) 
Name and Contact Details of Researcher: Christopher Udoaka, Email:  UP792029@myport.ac.uk 
Name and Contact Details of Supervisor: Dr Alison Wakefield, Email: Alison.Wakefield@port.ac.uk 
University Data Protection Officer: Samantha Hill, 023 9284 3642 or data-protection@port.ac.uk 
Ethics Committee Reference Number: 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated April 2018 
Please 
initial 
box 
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 (version 2.3) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any timebefore 
August 15th 2018, without giving a reason. 
 
3. I understand that data collected during this study will be retained in accordance with the 
University’s data retention policy and could also be requested by UK regulatory authorities. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
5.  I agree to the data I contribute being retained for any future research that has been given a 
favourable opinion by a Research Ethics Committee. 
6. I understand that the results of this study may be published and / or presented at meetings 
or academic conferences, and may be provided to research commissioners. I give my 
permission for my anonymous data, which does not identify me, to be disseminated in this 
way. 
 
7. I would like to receive further information about the results of the study    
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant:     Date:  Signature: 
 
Name of Person taking Consent:    Date:  Signature: 
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Appendix 6: Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
                          Institute of Criminal Justice Studies                    
                                       St George’s Building 
                                                   141 High Street  
                                                     Portsmouth 
PO1  2HY 
                                                   Tel: 023 9284 50689 
                                                                                                         Researcher: Christopher Udoaka 
 UP792029@myport.ac.uk 
                                                                                                          Supervisor: Dr Alison Wakefield                                                                                
Alison.Wakefield@port.ac.uk 
                                                                                              Head of Department: Dr Paul Norman 
        Paul.norman@port.ac.uk 
 
                      15th April 2018                                                        
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Study Title:    Assessing the effectiveness of government security agencies in petroleum  
Products pipelines security management in Nigeria: A case study of Nigeria  
                        Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)  
 
Researcher:    Christopher Udoaka, Email:  UP792029@myport.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Dr Alison Wakefield, Email: Alison.Wakefield@port.ac.uk 
 
1. Invitation    
 
I would like to invite you to take part in my research study. Joining the study is entirely up to you, 
before you decide I would like you to understand why the research is being done and what it would 
involve for you. I will go through this information sheet with you, to help you decide whether or 
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not you would like to take part and answer any questions you may have. I would suggest this 
should take about 20 minutes. Please feel free to talk to others about the study if you wish.Do ask 
if anything is unclear. 
I am a doctoral student of Security Risk Management, Institute of Criminology and Security 
Studies of the University of Portsmouth, UK. 
2.  Study Summary 
This research will examine by means of case study the problem of petroleum products pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria and consider the reasons why this illicit business continues to thrive despite 
government efforts to combat it. It will identify the measures being employed by NSCDC and 
assess their perspectives on it effectiveness with a view to making best practice recommendations 
in oil pipeline security management. 
 
3.  What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This research will assess stakeholder perceptions of the effectiveness of government security 
agencies in managing the security risk of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria with a particular 
focus on the Nigeria Security & Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). I am carrying out this research as 
part of the requirements for obtaining the Doctor of Security Risk Management (DSyRM) of the 
University of Portsmouth. 
4.  Why have I been invited? 
The research is based on semi-structured interviews with 10 NSCDC officers from the rank of 
deputy commandants spread over the oil producing states in Nigeria and the headquarters in 
Abuja, 5 staff of major oil companies operating in Nigeria including the Nigeria National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and 5 community leaders from the oil producing communities of 
the Niger-Delta. The recruitment of the participants from the NSDCD is managed by the 
Commander of the anti-vandalism unit of the organization, who is my personal contact while the 
recruitment of participants from the major oil companies is based on availability and willingness 
of the participants to be interviewed. You are invited because of your direct involvement/interest 
in the protection of petroleum products pipelines in Nigeria. 
 
5.  Do I have to take part?  
No, taking part in this research is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide if you want to 
volunteer for the study. We will describe the study in this information sheet. If you agree to take 
part, we will then ask you to sign the attached consent form, dated April 2018 version number, 
2.4 
6.  What will happen to me if I take part? 
The interview will be conducted using skype and are expected to be approximately 20 to 30 
minutes in duration. It will be conducted at your preferred time. Notes will be taken by hand by 
the researcher. The format is intended to be a relaxed discussion to gather your perception on 
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the effectiveness of government security agencies in petroleum Products pipelines security 
management in Nigeria. 
7.  Expenses and payments  
There will be no cash payment for participants. However where a participant incurs an expense 
during interview either through phone calls or transportation, such an expense will be defrayed 
by the researcher. 
8.  Anything else I will have to do? 
You are expected to put off your cell phones to avoid distraction.   
 
9.  What data will be collected and / or measurements taken?  
Research questions are descriptive, qualitative and flexible in nature and seek to solicit for 
information that is contextual to solving the research problem.  Approximately 20 interviews will 
be conducted and qualitative data generated from the interviews. Four stages of thematic coding 
analysis such as data familiarisation, coding, identifying themes and constructing thematic 
networks will be adopted for the data analysis.  The coded data will be segregated into broad 
themes and analysed accordingly in relation to each research questions. 
10. What are the possible disadvantages, burdens and risks of taking part?  
The only risk inherent in your taking part in this research is the inconveniences of your time during 
the interview. 
11. What are the possible advantages or benefits of taking part? 
There is no direct benefit for you in taking part in this research. However, the outcome of the 
research project is expected to add to the body of knowledge regarding petroleum products 
pipelines security management in Nigeria 
 
12. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
If you join the study, it is possible that some of the data collected will be looked at by authorised 
persons from the University of Portsmouth. Data may also be looked at by authorised people to 
check that the study is being carried out correctly. All will have a duty of confidentiality to you as 
a research participant and will do their best to meet this duty. 
While the project is on-going I will need to store my data securely and protect them from loss, 
unlawful or unethical access. To achieve this, encrypted laptop, memory stick, portable hard drive 
and DVD will be used in storing data. All paper records which contain personal data will be stored 
in lockable filing cabinet. The raw data will be retained for a minimum of 10 years. When it is no 
longer required, the data will be disposed of securely and paper destroyed. 
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13. What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
Prior to the analysis or publishing of the collected data, you have the right to withdraw the 
permission at any time before August 15th 2018, without giving a reason if you do not wish to. 
This can be done by contacting me through my email address up792029@myport.ac.uk.  If you 
do withdraw from the study after some data have been collected you will be asked if you are 
content for the data collected thus far to be retained and included in the study. If you prefer, the 
data collected can be destroyed and not included in the study. Once the research has been 
completed, and the data analysed, it will not be possible for you to withdraw your data from the 
study. 
14. What if there is a problem? 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the researcher 
Mr Christopher Udoaka (Tel: +234(0) 8036554533, Email UP792029@myport.ac.uk) or the 
supervisor, Dr Alison Wakefield (Tel: +44(0)2392843942, Email Alison.wakefield@port.ac.uk) 
who will do their best to answer your questions.  If you remain unhappy and wish to complain 
formally, you can do this to Dr Phil Clements, Head of Department, Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies (Tel:+44(0)2392845069, Email: phil.clements@port.ac.uk). If the complaint remains 
unresolved, please contact: The University Complaints Officer +442392843642, 
Email:complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk. 
 
15. Who is funding the research?  
This research is sponsored by the University of Portsmouth and is part of requirements for the 
award of Professional Doctorate in Security Risk Management (DSyRM) of the University. The 
researcher or the sponsors are not likely to benefit from any significant financial gains. 
16. Who has reviewed the study? 
Research involving human participants is reviewed by an ethics committee to ensure that the 
dignity and well-being of participants is respected.  This study has been reviewed by the Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies (ICJS) Research Ethics Committeeand been given favourable ethical 
opinion.  
Thank you 
 Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet and for considering volunteering for this 
research. If you do agree to participate your consent will be sought; please see the accompanying 
consent form.  You will then be given a copy of this information sheet and your signed consent 
form, to keep. 
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Appendix 7:  Draft letter to host organization 
 
 
 
 
    Institute of Criminal Justice Studies                    
                                   St George’s Building 
                                     41 High Street  
                                              Portsmouth PO1  2HY 
                                                Tel: 023 9284 50689 
                                                                                                            Researcher: Christopher Udoaka 
        UP792029@myport.ac.uk 
                                                                                                             Supervisor: Dr Alison Wakefield                                                                                
Alison.Wakefield@port.ac.uk 
                                                                                                 Head of Department: Dr Paul Norman 
        Paul.norman@port.ac.uk 
     
        15th April 2018  
 
 
The Commandant General (CG), 
Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) 
Wuse Zone 5, 
Abuja 
Dear Sir, 
 
RE: Assessing the effectiveness of government security agencies in petroleum products 
pipelines security management in Nigeria: A case study of Nigeria Security and Civil Defence 
Corps (NSCDC) 
I am writing to seek your assistance as the Commandant General of Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defence Corps (NSCDC) with a research study as titled above. 
This research will examine by means of case study the problem of petroleum products pipelines 
vandalism in Nigeria and consider the reasons why this illicit business continues to thrive despite 
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government efforts. It will identify the measures being employed by NSCDC and assess their 
perspectives on it effectiveness with a view to making best practice recommendations in oil 
pipeline security management. 
I am writing specifically to request permission for this research to be undertaken in your 
organisation. The research will be based on the following three objectives: 
 To examine the nature and extent of the problem of petroleum pipeline vandalism in Nigeria; 
 To identify the strategies and tactics being employed to address the problem; and 
 To assess the strengths and limitations of these measures from the perspectives of the 
participants and make recommendations. 
I am seeking 10 interviewees who would be willing to participate in a telephone or skype 
interview of no more than 20 to 30 minutes. I will bear all the calling costs of the interview. I 
would be grateful if you could circulate copies of the participant invitation letter to individuals 
who would be eligible for the study. Interviews will be completely anonymous and 
confidential. The notes from the interview will be hand recorded and no audio recording will 
be used. Participants will be permitted to withdraw from the research at any time prior to 
the analysis of the data. Included with this letter are the participant invitation letter, an 
information sheet that explains more about the research and the processes employed, and a 
consent form that each research participant will be asked to return. 
While thanking you for your support during the pilot study, it is my hope that you will be 
interested again in supporting this major research. By way of appreciation, I would be pleased 
to share a copy of the final research report with you. If you have any specific queries or 
concerns please feel free to get back to me or my research supervisor, Dr Alison Wakefield 
(alison.wakefield@port.ac.uk).  I would highly appreciate if you could confirm with me via my 
email address above if you are able formally to give permission for the research. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Christopher Udoaka 
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Appendix 8 : Evidence from external organisation showing support  
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Appendix A1: Some incidences of oil theft arrests in Nigeria 2009-2014 
 
Dated of 
Arrest 
Vessel People 
Involved 
Place of Arrest Reason for arrest Arrested by & 
Action taken 
August 25, 
2014 
MV Mercy Seven Crew 
Members 
The Furopa 
Waterways in 
Southern Ijaw 
Local Government 
Area of Bayelsa 
Vessel loaded with 
180,000 litres of 
illegally refined 
Automated Gas oil 
(diesel) worth 
N28.8 million 
The suspects and 
vessel and were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to the Nigerian 
Security and Civil 
Defence Corps for 
further investigation 
and prosecution 
August 7, 
2014 
MV Elmina 18 Nigerians, 
one 
Camerounion 
and one 
Ghanian 
Sangana River in 
Brass Local 
Government of 
Bayelsa State 
Allegedly stealing 
500,000 litres of 
crude oil 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to EFCC 
April 19, 
2014 
MT Rheinfeld 
En 
One crew 
Member 
Akassa Community 
in Brass L.G.A of 
Bayelsa State 
The vessels was 
laden with 849,612 
tonnes of illegally 
refined automotive 
gas oil 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to Effcc 
April 18, 
2014 
MV FLORA Eight Crew 
Member 
Lagosgbene Obi 
Creek in Southern 
Ijaw Local 
Government Area 
of Bayelsa State 
Vessels laden with 
1,000 litres of 
suspected stolen 
crude oil 
The crew members 
were arrested Joint 
Task Force (JTF) 
March 28, 
2014 
MT CRETE Two Britons 
and 12 
Nigerian 
technician 
Chanomi Creek 
near warri in Delta 
State 
Involvement in 
illegal bunkering 
and offering of 
$66,500 bribe to the 
JTF to facilitate oil 
theft 
The suspects were 
arrested by Joint 
Task Force (JTF) 
and handed over to 
the Department of 
State Security (DSS) 
for prosecution 
March 26, 
2016 
MV GARE Three crew 
members 
The coast of 
Angola 
Vessel arrested for 
hijacking and 
stealing petroleum 
products from a 
bigger vessel-MV 
Karela 
Crew and vessel 
were arrested by 
Nigerian Navy and 
handed over to the 
Interpol for further 
investigation 
March 20, 
2014 
MT Cergen 
(whose 
original name 
Six Nigerian 
crew members 
Around Fish town 
river in Southern 
Ijaw Local 
The vessel was 
loaded with 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy 
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was 
MARISA) 
Government Area 
of Bayelsa State 
2,332,000 litres of 
stolen crude oil 
February 18, 
2014 
Locally made 
tug Boat 
Six Crew 
member and 
two others 
 The boat was 
loaded and 
conveying 30 
drums of stolen 
petroleum 
The six suspects 
were arrested by 
Joint Task Force 
(JTF) and moved to 
the Tactical 
Headquarters of the 
Battalions for 
preliminary 
investigation 
February 10, 
2014 
MT DIVINE 
FAVOUR 
11 Crew 
Members 
Fairway Buoy, 
Bonny Island, 
Rivers State 
The vessel had no 
valid documents to 
operate on Nigerian 
water and was 
carrying about 500 
metric tonnes of 
products suspected 
to be automated 
Gasoline Oil 
(AGO) 
The suspects and the 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
operatives of the 
Economic and 
Financial Crimes 
Commission 
(EFCC) 
January 14, 
2014 
MT ELI 
TANK 
21 Nigerian 
crew members 
Along the 
waterways of 
Agbami Oilfield in 
Southern Ijaw 
Local Government 
Area od Bayelsa 
State 
Vessel allegedly 
loaded with 2.111 
million litres of 
stolen crude oil 
valued at N2.4bn 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy 
December 
31, 2013 
A Boat Four 
Cameroonians 
and three 
Nigerian  
The suspects were 
arrested at the 
Agbani Area, near 
Bakassi Local 
Government Area, 
the board between 
Nigeria and 
Cameroon 
The suspects were 
caught with 134 
drums containing 
250 litres of petrol 
each, and concealed 
under consumer 
goods 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy handed over 
the seven suspects to 
the Akwa Ibom 
Commandant of the 
Nigeria Security and 
Civil Defence 
Corps, for proper 
investigation and 
prosecution 
December 
26, 2013 
MV ECLIPS Nine Nigerian 
Crew 
Members 
Obi Creek, Bayelsa 
State 
The vessel was 
laden with about 
870,000 litres of 
suspected stolen 
crude oil 
The suspect were 
arrested Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to the Nigerian 
Security and Civil 
Defence Corps, 
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Bayelsa State 
command for 
prosecution 
October 23, 
2013 
MT 
FRANKESEN 
Three 
Ghanians and 
nine Nigerians 
Akassa Community 
in Brass L.G.A of 
Bayelsa State 
Vessel was loaded 
with over 1,092, 
000 litres of crude 
oil suspected to be 
stolen 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to the Police 
Command in 
Bayelsa 
October 07, 
2013 
Two Vessels: 
MILANDROS 
and EBBA, 
Belonging to 
PWS 
Integrated 
Services 
Limited 
A Ghanaian 
and 25 
Nigerians 
Bonny Anchorage 
in Rivers State 
The vessel, 
MILANDROS, was 
intercepted where a 
six-inch diameter 
hose over a distance 
of 1,000 metres 
from the vessel had 
been connected to 
pipeline, while 
EBBA was laden 
with 282 tons of 
suspected illegally 
distilled diesel 
Crew members and 
vessels were arrested 
the Joint Task Foce 
(JTF) 
September 
25, 2013 
MV 
JEHOVAH 
MIRACLE 3” 
and a wooden 
boat 
15 Nigerians 
on saperate 
raids 
Brass River in 
Bayelsa State 
The small tug boat 
and wooden boat 
with 15 Nigerians 
were arrested due to 
the lack of proper 
permit 
The suspects were 
arrested Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to the police. 
September 
16, 2013 
MB LILLY Eight crew 
members 
Akassa creek in 
Bayelsa State 
Allegedly indulging 
in illegal oil 
bunkering 
The crew members 
were arrested by 
Joint Task Force 
(JTF). The barge 
was towed to Brass 
anchorage for safe 
custody 
September 6, 
2013 
MT 
PAULINE 
A 
Cameroonian 
and nine 
Nigerians 
Atlantic fringe of 
Brass in Brass 
L.G.A of Bayelsa 
State 
Vessel loaded with 
360,000 litres of 
illegally refined 
diesel suspected to 
have been stolen 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
EFCC 
September 3, 
2013 
Two barges 
christened 
CWTC16 and 
TIKORO2 
11 crew 
members 
Kasabobo Creek, 
Southern Ijaw LGA 
Bayelsa State 
Loaded with 
illegally sourced 
crude oil 
Crew members and 
barges were arrested 
by Joint Task Force 
(JTF) 
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August 26, 
2013 
MV SEA 
GIANT 
A Cameronian 
and 11 
Nigerian crew 
members 
Waterway of the 
Egweama 
Community in 
Brass LGA of 
Bayelsa State 
Theft of 10,000 
litres of locally 
refined diesel 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
EFCC 
August 24, 
2013 
MV 
TOBILOBA 
Seven 
Nigerian crew 
members 
Akassa Creek in 
Bayelsa State 
Vessel laden with 
100,000 litres of 
illegally refined 
AGO 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
EFCC 
August 15, 
2013 
MV LILA and 
tugboat 
christened, 
MV St. 
VICTORIA 
Six suspects 
were arrested 
on the togboat 
Odioma waterways, 
Brass Local 
Governmetn Area, 
Bayelsa State 
The barge was 
carrying an 
unknown quantity 
of products 
suspected to be 
stolen crude oil 
Crew members and 
vessels were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
EFCC 
August 11, 
2012 
TUGS & T 
VICTORIA 
Six crew 
members 
Akassa creek in 
Bayelsa State 
Salvage operation 
of MT LINA 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
EFCC 
July 25, 2013 MV Henty A Ghanaian 
and five 
Nigerians 
Egweama, Brass in 
Bayelsa State 
Illegal conversion 
from fishing trawler 
to a bunkering 
vessel with 132,000 
litres of illegally 
refined AGO 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
EFCC 
July 23,2013 MT RICA and 
MT FAVOUR 
1 
14 suspects 
were arrested 
from MT 
RICA; nine 
were nabbed 
on MT 
FAVOUR 1 
MT RICA was 
apprehended along 
the Nun Rive while 
MT FAVOUR 1 
was arrested off 
akassa Riverm 
Bayelsa State 
The two vessels, 
MT RICA and MT 
FAVOUR 1 were 
loaded with 
150,000 and 
100,000 litres 
respectively of 
illegally refined 
AGO 
The suspects were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to the police in 
Yenagoa for further 
investigation and 
prosecution 
July 14, 2013 CAPE HOPE 14 crew 
members 
Benneth Island in 
Warri South Local 
Government Area 
of Delta State 
Allegedly illegal 
bunkering and 
offering JTF 
commander bribe or 
N14 million to 
facilitate the illegal 
deal 
The crew members 
and vessel were 
arrested by Joint 
Task Foce (JTF) 
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July 9, 2013 Unregistered 
vessel 
A traditional 
ruler and three 
other persons 
Along the 
waterways of 
Akassa in Brass 
Local Government 
Area of Bayelsa 
State 
Stealing 2,000 
metric tonnes of 
crude oil 
The suspects were 
arrested by the Joint 
Task Force (JTF) 
July 6, 2013 MT WHARF 
DALE 
Six Nigerian 
crew members 
Egweama, Brass in 
Bayelsa State 
Dubious intent to 
load stolen crude 
and engaged in oil 
transport without 
flag, registration, 
call-sign and 
international 
maritime 
organisation (IMO) 
number 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
police 
June 3, 2013 MV DALAL 10 crew 
members 
Akassa creeks of 
Southern Ijaw  
Local Government 
Area of Bayelsa 
State 
The vessel was 
loaded with 
120,000 litres of 
illegally refined 
AGO (Automated 
Gas Oil) 
Crew members and 
vessel were arrested 
by Nigerian Navy 
and handed over to 
the EFCC 
May 27, 
2013 
ERISHNA 
DOLPHIN 
and two barges 
11 crew 
members 
Obi Creek in 
Southern Ijaw 
Local Government 
Area of Bayelsa 
State, Bakana creek 
and Abonema 
waterfront in Rivers 
State 
The two barges 
were laden with 
7,500 and 500,000 
litres of adulterated 
Automated Gas Oil 
illegally distilled 
from stolen crude 
oil 
The suspects and 
barges were arrested 
by the Joint Task 
force (JTF) 
May 22, 
2013 
MT 
SWORDFISH 
Three crew 
members, two 
staff of the 
Liberty Jetty 
and 20 other 
suspects in 
connection 
with the oil 
theft 
Liberty Jetty 
Elegbata, Marina, 
Lagos 
The vessel was used 
for theft. The vessel 
was loaded with 
unspecified amount 
of crude oil 
suspected to have 
been stolen 
Suspects and vessel 
were arrested by the 
Nigerian Army and 
handed over to the 
Economic and 
Financial Crimes 
Commission, EFFC, 
for prosecution 
May 3, 2013 EMPTY V-
LAND 
10 crew 
members 
The high sea of 
Bonny in Rivers 
State 
The vessel was 
carrying stolen 
crude oil of about 
1,300 metric tones 
Vessels and crew 
members were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy handed over to 
FOB Bonny 
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January 26, 
2013 
MT ASHKAY 10 indians and 
two 
Ghanaians 
Sangana River, 
near Port Harcouty 
in Rivers State 
The vessels was 
laden with 157,822 
litres of stolen 
crude 
The suspected were 
arrested by Nigerian 
Navy and handed 
over to EFCCD for 
investigation and 
prosecution 
December 
29, 2012 
MT 
ATLANTIC 
STAR 
Nine crew 
members 
The coast of Bonny 
Island in Rivers 
State 
The vessel loaded 
with 1,000 tonnes 
of stolen crude oil 
was arrested while 
illegally siphoninh 
crude oil from a 
pipeline 
The suspects were 
arrested by (JTF) 
and handed over to 
Nigerian Security 
and Civil Defence 
Corps for 
prosecution 
October 17 & 
18, 2012 
MT LADY 
THERESA 
AND PECOS 
PETERS 
10 Nigerian 
crew members 
LightHouse, Bonny 
River, Bonny Local 
Government Area 
of Rivers State 
The two illegal 
bunkering vessels 
containing 300,000 
litres of diesel were 
caught siphoning 
illegally-refined 
petroleum product 
from a barge 
The crew members 
were arrested by 
Joint Task Force 
(JTF) and handed 
over to the police 
October 5, 
2012 
Seven Barges 20 Ghanaians 
and six 
Nigerians 
Barges were 
impounded in 
Abonnema, Akuku-
Toru Local 
Government Area 
of Rivers State 
Alleged illegal 
bunkering. The 
seven barges were 
loaded with crude 
oil 
The seven barges 
were destroyed 
while the suspects 
were arrested by 
Joint Task Force 
(JTF) and handed 
over to the Nigerian 
Security and Civil 
Defence Corps 
(NSCDC( for 
prosecution 
June 19, 
2012 
MT ST 
VANESSA 
Nine Filipinos 
and Six 
Romanians 
45 nautical miles 
off akassa in 
Bayelsa State 
Suspicious 
activities and 
loitering around 
Akassa-Brass for 
about two weeks, 
without clear and 
specific mission 
The 15 expatriates 
and the vessel were 
arrested by the 
Nigerian Navy and 
handed over to the 
police in Port 
Harcourt and Bonny 
Island 
May 09, 
2012 
MT ANI and 
MT OSO 
21 Ghanaians 
and five 
Nigerians 
Sombeiro River in 
the South-Eastern 
part of Degema 
Local Government 
The vessels were 
arrested with 
650,000 metric 
tonnes of stolen 
crude oil 
The vessels were 
destroyed by the 
security outfit, Joint 
Task Force (JTF) 
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Area of Rivers 
State 
November 
01, 2011 
MV 
OMIESAM 
and Several 
Cotonu boats 
Vessels has a 
crew of eight 
and the other 
38 suspects 
were found 
with 13 
Cotonou boats 
that had 
assembled 
beside the 
vessel 
Akassa enclave on 
the Atlantic fringe 
of Brass, Bayelsa 
State 
The vessel was 
arrested while 
receiving illegally 
refined petroleum 
products from the 
Cotonu boats 
The vessel MV 
Omiesam and its 
eight man crew were 
arrested and escorted 
to Government Jetty 
Yenagoa by Joint 
Task Force (JTF)  
January 6, 
2009 
SANDRA 
VALLETA 
LAGOS 
Six Ghanaians 
and a Nigerian 
Chanomi Creeks of 
Warri South West 
Local Government 
Area of Delta State 
The vessel was 
loaded with 4,000 
metric tonnes of 
illegally bunkered 
crude oil worth 
about $1.17 million 
The suspected were 
paraded by the Joint 
Task Force (JTF) in 
Warri Delta State 
Source: Boris (2016, pp.004-008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
